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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Thesis
This thesis aims to defend deflationary heuristics against hyperintensional ma-
noeuvres.
A deflationary heuristic is a method for determining whether a given dispute
is deflatable. There is a contemporary interest in these deflationary methodolo-
gies. For example, Hirsch (2009, 2016) sets out conditions for when a dispute is
merely verbal. The thought is that some persisting, metaphysical disputes can
be given deflationary treatment, thus ending otherwise intractable disputes.
By way of example, we might believe that a metaphysical dispute over whether
tables exist is merely verbal. A commonsense mereologist will affirm that tables
exist. Meanwhile, a mereological nihilist might argue that tables don’t exist,
but concede that there do exist atoms arranged tablewise. We might think
that this dispute is merely verbal, because the two disputants mean something
different by ‘table’. The commonsense mereologist takes ‘there exist tables’ to
be synonymous with ‘there exist atoms arranged tablewise’, whilst the mereo-
logical nihilist does not take the two phrases to be synonymous.
Hyperintensional manoeuvres are utilised by the substantivist to avoid a
dispute otherwise being found to be deflatable. The basic thought is that de-
flationary heuristics often work by finding complete agreement between the dis-
putants on any relevant, extensional or intensional fact. Hyperintensional ma-
noeuvres appeal to relevant, hyperintensional facts over which the disputants
disagree. Having reformulated the dispute over these hyperintensional facts,
13
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the substantivity of the dispute is preserved. We can demonstrate this with
the example of the dispute over whether tables exist. The substantivist makes
a hyperintensional manoeuvre and insists that the disputants disagree over
whether the fact that there exist tables is metaphysically dependent on the fact
that there exist atoms arranged tablewise. They disagree over whether the fact
that there are atoms arranged tablewise is more fundamental than the fact that
there exist tables.
I seek to provide a response for deflationists against hyperintensional ma-
noeuvres. My strategy is as follows. I consider variants of hyperintensional
manoeuvre, characterised by how fundamentality is analysed. For example, we
might think that a property is more fundamental than another iff it is more
natural. Applying this notion of fundamentality in a hyperintensional manoeu-
vre is then a naturalness-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre. Meanwhile,
we might think that a fact is more fundamental than another iff the former
grounds the latter, or the former is ungrounded, and the latter is not. Apply-
ing this notion of fundamentality in a hyperintensional manoeuvre is then a
grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
From there, I focus on those hyperintensional concepts that underpin these
variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre. In this thesis, I focus on naturalness
and grounding. I seek to argue that the correct interpretations of natural-
ness and grounding are deflationary-friendly. The thought is that the correct
interpretation of naturalness is such that it is subjective and interest-relative
whether a property is perfectly natural. Analogously, the idea is that the cor-
rect interpretation of grounding is such that it is subjective and interest-relative
whether a fact grounds another.
Suppose that I offer the correct interpretations of these notions. The
deflationary-friendliness of these notions should ‘push through’ to fundamen-
tality through these various analyses of fundamentality. Hence, it becomes a
subjective and interest-relative matter whether one property or fact is more
fundamental than another. The thought is that there is nothing more to such
debates other than the interests of the disputants, confusions about meanings
of words, and other similar issues.1
1I resist the thought that we should offer precise definitions of ‘subjective’, ‘pragmatic’
and ‘interest-relative’ in this thesis. This is because precise definitions will probably con-
tain controversial implications about which disputes are subjective, pragmatic and interest-
relative. Rather than this settling the issue, substantivists will challenge the definitions,
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This defangs hyperintensional manoeuvres. If it is subjective and interest-
relative whether one property or fact is more fundamental than another, then
it is only of pragmatic significance whether one side in the dispute uses more
fundamental concepts. Nothing objective rests on settling who is thinking in
fundamental terms. Hyperintensional manoeuvres therefore reformulate meta-
physical disputes into pragmatic disputes. Intuitively, this does not preserve the
substantivity of the original dispute, and hyperintensional manoeuvres there-
fore serve to deflate the disputes further.
I defend deflationary heuristics, then, if I can show that the correct interpre-
tations of naturalness and grounding are deflationary-friendly. My argument
is as follows. Deflationary-unfriendly interpretations of naturalness commit
naturalness theorists to substantive, metaphysical theories about the structure
of objective reality. The thought is that this incurs some kind of cost for the
naturalness-theorist. This cost might be justified by the benefits that positing
naturalness can deliver. Naturalness has a wide variety of useful, theoretical
applications. On the other hand, if these theoretical applications are available
more cheaply under deflationary-friendly interpretations, then a plausible cost-
benefit analysis favours deflationary-friendly interpretations of naturalness.
My deflationary-friendly interpretation of naturalness does not commit nat-
uralness theorists to claims about the structure of objective reality. It therefore
avoids the associated costs. Consequently, if it allows naturalness to play the
same theoretical roles, then it enjoys the same benefits as alternative interpre-
tations, but more cheaply. I argue that my deflationary-friendly naturalness
can play all of the same theoretical roles that were otherwise successful. My
deflationary-friendly naturalness is incompatible with certain theoretical ap-
plications of naturalness, but I argue that these applications are unsuccessful
for any interpretation of naturalness. Given that these applications are unsuc-
cessful under any interpretation of naturalness, rivals to deflationary-friendly
interpretations do not enjoy any benefits over the deflationary-friendly inter-
and we will end up more confused than when we started. To take a toy example, suppose
that we defined an ‘interest-relative dispute’ as one that some disputants find interesting.
This would imply that disputes over the existence of free will are interest-relative. However,
the substantivist should not accept this conclusion, but instead challenge the definition of
‘interest-relative dispute’ that led to this conclusion.
I contend that it is better to keep these terms as neutral as possible, at the risk of some
vagueness. The hope is that this allows a common framework for talking about whether
disputes are substantive or deflatable.
See §2.2 for a related discussion about definitions of ‘deflatable’.
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pretation. I then appeal to my cost-benefit analysis, which plausibly favours
my deflationary-friendly interpretation.
To argue that the correct interpretation of grounding is deflationary-friendly,
I find conceptual links between grounding and naturalness. The thought is
that a given grounding claim is true iff certain claims involving naturalness
are true. By this conceptual link, the deflationary-friendliness of naturalness
pushes through to grounding, such that grounding is shown to be deflationary-
friendly.
I therefore argue that the correct interpretations of naturalness and ground-
ing are deflationary-friendly. This pushes through to their analyses of funda-
mentality. This defangs naturalness-variants and grounding-variants of hyper-
intensional manoeuvre. I thus defend deflationary heuristics from hyperinten-
sional manoeuvres.
1.2 The Structure of the Thesis
In §1.1, I presented the argument of the thesis. This section presents the
structure that the argument takes.
The thesis is divided into three Parts. Part 1 introduces the deflationary
heuristics I want to defend, and the hyperintensional manoeuvres that threaten
them. It therefore sets up the motivation for the thesis. Part 2 considers natu-
ralness, and seeks to demonstrate that the correct interpretation of naturalness
is deflationary-friendly. Part 3 turns to grounding, and seeks to demonstrate
a conceptual link between grounding and naturalness: by which grounding is
shown to be deflationary-friendly.
Part 1
Part 1 consists of ch.1-ch.5. Ch.1 is this chapter. It presents the main argument
of the thesis, and describes the structure of the chapters.
Meanwhile, ch.2 presents the deflationary ideas underpinning the deflation-
ary heuristics I want to defend. It also presents the general form of hyperin-
tensional manoeuvres that threaten them: that hyperintensional manoeuvres
find disagreement over relevant, hyperintensional facts in a dispute.
I defend the idea that we are looking for heuristics, rather than analyses
of unsubstantivity. I believe that deep analyses of unsubstantivity have two
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main flaws. Firstly, they give a global analysis of what is a relevant fact in a
dispute. This is problematic, as whether a fact is relevant is intuitively local
to the dispute in question. Secondly, deep analyses of unsubstantivity seek
to make controversial judgements on which disputes are deflatable. This is
problematic, as it builds controversy into the analysis itself. Instead, I propose
that we are better off with shallow analyses of unsubstantivity. These render it
intuitive what an deflatable dispute is. From there, we can present deflationary
heuristics for arguing that a dispute is merely verbal. These heuristics are
designed to persuade someone neutral to the issue, but can admit of exceptions.
I detail three deflationary heuristics, across ch.3-ch.5. In ch.3, I consider
Hirsch’s (2016) Equivalence Condition heuristic. This sets out conditions un-
der which two disputants might recognise the other to be speaking the truth
in their respective languages. I distance the Equivalence Condition heuristic
from the thesis of quantifier variance, as commitment to one does not force
commitment to the other. The second heuristic is Chalmers’s (2009, 2011)
method of elimination, which is the subject of ch.4. This bans a key term from
the dispute, to see if the dispute can be preserved without it. If it cannot, then
the thought is that there is something wrong with the term that is banned
– for example, the disputants may be using it differently and speaking past
one another. I find conflict between the method of elimination and Chalmers’s
notion of a bedrock dispute, and argue that we should reject the latter. The
third and final heuristic is given by Thomasson’s (2009, 2016) easy approach
to ontology, considered in ch.5. This associates noun-phrases with application
conditions, that can be straightforwardly tested to see if they obtain. This can
render ontological questions trivial – when asking whether X exists, we find
the application conditions for ‘X ’ and then see if those conditions obtain.
In each of these chapters, I show how these deflationary heuristics are
threatened by hyperintensional manoeuvres. These are typically naturalness-
variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre. However, I make the case that grounding-
variants represent just as much a threat to these deflationary heuristics.
Having explicated the deflationary heuristics and the hyperintensional ma-
noeuvres that threaten them, I establish what is at stake. The rest of the thesis
turns to defending those deflationary heuristics from this threat.
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Part 2
Part 2 consists of ch.6-ch.11. It considers naturalness, and argues that the
correct interpretation of naturalness is deflationary-friendly.
In ch.6, I introduce the basic idea of Lewis’s (1983) naturalness. I provide
some basic examples of naturalness and provide some grammatical details.
Furthermore, I present my deflationary-friendly interpretation of naturalness,
which is as follows:
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness: Property α is perfectly natural iff α
is a property referred to by a primitive predicate in the language of ideal
science.
The rest of the chapter explains what is meant by ‘ideal science’. The basic
thought is that ideal science is a complete science adopted by scientists, in the
closest world (subject to some restrictions on the accessibility relation) to our
own where a complete science is discovered. It is ideal in the sense that it is
complete and may not be discovered in the actual world, rather than in the
sense that it involves ideal, epistemic agents. As such, the languages of ideal
science may be subject to interest-relative and accidental factors. I defend the
idea that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness avoids the costs associated with
deflationary-unfriendly interpretations: which commit the naturalness-theorist
to claims about the structure of objective reality. This sets up Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness as ‘cheaper’ than its rivals.
In ch.7, I turn to the task of demonstrating that Deflationary-Friendly Nat-
uralness enjoys the same benefits as its rivals. Naturalness plays a variety of
theoretical roles. For example, it is used to analyse duplication, which in turn is
used to analyse a variety of important, philosophical concepts. I present these
applications and argue that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is compatible
with these theoretical roles. This makes plausible a cost-benefit analysis that
favours Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, because it shows that the interpre-
tation enjoys many of the same benefits as its rivals, but without the costs
associated with those rivals.
Throughout ch.6 and ch.7, I make the assumption that there is a unique,
ideal science. Ch.8 considers this assumption in more detail. I argue that
there may not be a unique, ideal science, depending on which worlds are
closest to our own. This complicates the cost-benefit analysis that favours
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Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. However, I argue that Lewis’s deflationary-
unfriendly interpretation is also compromised by analogous assumptions about
which worlds are closest to our own. I demonstrate that my Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness does as well as Lewis’s deflationary-unfriendly interpre-
tation across different scenarios regarding which worlds are closest. This means
that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness continues to enjoy the same benefits as
its rivals, protecting my cost-benefit analysis in its favour.
Next, I consider the remaining theoretical roles for naturalness. These prove
more challenging than those discussed in ch.7. In ch.9, I consider naturalness’s
role of restricting mental content. Lewis (1983) applies naturalness to meeting
Putnam’s (1981) permutation arguments and Kripke’s (1982) rule-following
paradox. Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is incompatible with these appli-
cations. In brief, this is because it renders naturalness relative to the theories
of ideal science. However, I argue that any interpretation of naturalness fails in
this theoretical application. I defend both Putnam’s permutation arguments,
and Kripke’s rule-following paradox, from appeals to naturalness. The thought
is that Lewis misapprehends the scope or context of these arguments, and that
the appeal to naturalness is either inappropriate to these contexts, unexplana-
tory, or redundant. I draw heavily from the arguments of Button (2013) and
Merino-Rajme (2015).
In ch.10, I turn to naturalness’s theoretical role in analysing what it is to
be a law of nature. Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is incompatible with this
role, again because it renders naturalness theory-relative. Once more, I argue
that any interpretation of naturalness fails to analyse lawhood successfully. I
outline Lewis’s Best Systems Analysis (BSA). I expand on Woodward’s (2014)
arguments against the scientific credentials of the BSA. The basic idea is that
the notions appealed to by Lewis – simplicity and theoretical strength – admit
of scientific justifications in the context of scientific, theory choice. However,
these justifications are inapplicable in the context of best theory choice. Hence,
Lewis’s use of them is unscientific, and unsuited for analysing lawhood as used
by scientists.
By demonstrating that these theoretical roles are unsuccessful on any inter-
pretation of naturalness, I defend my cost-benefit analysis. These theoretical
roles – because they are unsuccessful – fail to confer any theoretical benefit to
deflationary-unfriendly interpretations of naturalness. Hence, my Deflationary-
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Friendly Naturalness continues to enjoy the same benefits as its rivals (but more
cheaply).
Finally, I discuss difficulties in analysing relative naturalness in ch.11. Lewis
(1983) seeks to analyse relative naturalness in terms of the complexity of the
perfectly natural definitions of properties. This runs into a variety of issues
regarding how complexity is to be measured. If it is measured by number of
definitional parts, then this means that properties of infinite definitional com-
plexity are all equally natural. This has counterintuitive results. I suggest that
we measure complexity by the relative size of appropriate sets or construction
trees. I provide detail on how this can be done without rendering relative nat-
uralness too partial an ordering on sets. My goal is to defend something like
Lewis’s analysis of relative naturalness. Regardless, I stress that the problem is
not a special one for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness: it is a problem for any
interpretation of naturalness. This chapter is therefore conciliatory towards
naturalness-theorists, under any interpretation.
Part 2 defends a deflationary-friendly interpretation of naturalness. It
therefore provides the deflationist with a defence against naturalness-variants
of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
Part 3
Part 3 consists of ch.12-ch.18. It considers grounding, and seeks to defend
a conceptual link between grounding and naturalness. Combining this result
with the result of Part 2, it provides a deflationary-friendly interpretation of
grounding.
In ch.12, I introduce the notion of metaphysical grounding. I note its link
with the ‘in virtue of’ locution, and give some detail about its grammar and
relational properties. There is some controversy on the nature of grounding
within the grounding literature, but I assume that it constitutes a partial or-
dering on facts. This means that it is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. I
also detail some distinctions within the concept of grounding. For example, I
outline Fine’s (2012) notion of weak (as opposed to strict) grounding, as well
as the more familiar notion of partial grounding.
In ch.13, I present the conceptual link between grounding and naturalness
that I want to defend (when ∆ is a set of sentences, φ is a sentence, and ‘∆ < φ’
is synonymous with ‘∆ grounds φ’):
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Ground-Naturalness Connection: ∆ < φ iff there is a <-derivation from
the set of natural grounding claims to ‘∆ < φ’.
The chapter seeks to explain the key notions involved in the Ground-
Naturalness Connection. I explain what is meant by a natural grounding claim,
such that
Natural Grounding Definition: ∆ naturally grounds φ iff there is a <-
derivation of ‘Λ < γ’, when Λ is a set of perfectly natural translations of
the sentences in ∆, and γ is some perfectly natural translation of φ.
This requires further explication of what a perfectly natural translation is.
Additionally, I need to set out what is meant by <-derivation. Ch.13 handles
both tasks. In brief, a perfectly natural translation is a translation of an English
sentence into Naturalish – a language whose predicates all refer to perfectly
natural properties. Meanwhile, <-derivation is captured by some infinitary
rules designed to reflect the logical behaviour of grounding. I provide full detail
on both of these notions, such that the Ground-Naturalness Connection is fully
explained. I also explain how we can help ourselves to our specific deductive
rules without committing ourselves to a deflationary-unfriendly notion of logical
grounding.
The rest of Part 3 seeks to defend the Ground-Naturalness Connection. In
ch.14, I consider conceptual arguments for the link between naturalness and
grounding. I argue that the right-to-left direction of the biconditional is prov-
able from assumptions that the grounding theorist should accept. The basic
thought is that our specific natural deduction rules should be acceptable to
grounding theorists. Hence, whenever it delivers a grounding claim, ground-
ing theorists should accept that claim. From there, I appeal to the idea that
perfectly natural translations of English sentences express the same fact, and
that grounding holds between facts. Hence, if the grounding theorist accepts
a grounding claim in Naturalish, they should be willing to accept the corre-
sponding grounding claim in English.
Meanwhile, I offer an argument in defence of the left-to-right direction. The
basic idea is that grounding can be ‘constructed’ out of a restricted, superve-
nience relation – one that preserves relevancy between facts and the correct
direction of relative fundamentality. I argue that this relation is precisely what
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is offered by the Ground-Naturalness Connection, such that we can construct
grounding out of naturalness and our specific natural deduction rules.
Later chapters continue to evidence the left-to-right direction of the Ground-
Naturalness Connection. In ch.15, I consider paradigmatic examples of ground-
ing. I argue that each of them vindicates something like the Ground-Naturalness
Connection. By this, I mean that each paradigmatic instance of grounding
‘∆ < φ’ should be such that there is a <-derivation from the set of natural
grounding claims to ‘∆ < φ’. Some of these instances straightforwardly vin-
dicate the Ground-Naturalness Connection, but others call for modification.
These modifications, however, are in the spirit of the Ground-Naturalness Con-
nection, such that they preserve the deflationary-friendliness of grounding.
My final defence of the Ground-Naturalness Connection comes in ch.16. I
consider theoretical applications for grounding and show that successful roles
are compatible with the Ground-Naturalness Connection. For example, the bi-
conditional is compatible with analysing fundamentality, intrinsicality, materi-
alism and certain three-dimensionalist positions in terms of grounding. This of-
fers further support for the Ground-Naturalness Connection, by which ground-
ing is rendered deflationary-friendly.
Ch.17 is a small chapter considering the ‘small-g relation’ objection to
grounding, presented by Koslicki (2014) and Wilson (2014). They argue that
grounding is an unnatural disjunction of small-g relations, and that there is
no metaphysical kind corresponding to grounding itself. This is broadly sup-
portive of my project, because it strengthens support for deflationary-friendly
interpretations of grounding, and undermines grounding-variants of hyperin-
tensional manoeuvre. In the chapter, I consider the arguments surrounding
the small-g relation objection, and note how they interact with my thesis.
Finally, ch.18 concludes the thesis. It assesses what has been achieved, and
quickly summarises the main points that I have argued.
1.3 A Concessionary Approach
To conclude this chapter, I want to make some brief remarks on the method-
ological principles I follow in this thesis.
Naturalness, grounding and fundamentality are difficult and controversial
notions. Some philosophers are inclined to reject them out of hand as confused
1.3. A CONCESSIONARY APPROACH 23
or obscure. For example, Hofweber (2009) argues that grounding is too myste-
rious, whilst Oliver (1996, 48) complains that ‘we know we are in the realm of
murky metaphysics by the presence of the weasel words ‘in virtue of”. Taylor
(1993) criticises naturalness for its obscure appeal to carving at the joints of
nature.
Simply rejecting hyperintensional, metaphysical primitives like these offer
an alternative defence to the deflationist. When the substantivist makes a
hyperintensional manoeuvre, the deflationist might respond that she doesn’t
know what it means for one notion of free will to be more fundamental. Indeed,
Chalmers (2011) makes this explicit response.
I don’t adopt these kinds of argument in this thesis. This is for a number
of reasons. The primary reason is that it is unnecessarily standoffish. Simply
rejecting these primitives as meaningless creates an immediate, argumentative
impasse between the deflationist and the substantivist. More importantly, it
does little to convince the neutral observer who has not yet decided whether a
dispute is substantive. My thesis targets such a neutral observer, who is not
convinced by seriously metaphysical primitives, but open to them.
I am therefore happy to concede to the substantivist that these primitives
are meaningful. I believe that this strengthens the argument of my thesis. By
adopting a concessionary approach, there is less room for the substantivist to
resist my conclusions. If successful, my arguments show that these primitives
are deflationary-friendly by the substantivist’s own lights. I accept that these
primitives play useful, theoretical roles, but demonstrate that my interpreta-
tions allow them to play those roles more cheaply.
Finally, I am not convinced that wholesale rejections of metaphysical prim-
itives are particularly persuasive. More and more work is being done on these
metaphysical primitives, seeking to elucidate and explain what they amount to.
Metaphysicians are finding conceptual links between their primitives, applying
them to theoretical roles, and finding increasing agreement on examples. This
precisifying work will only continue, until some kind of consensus will have
formed. At this point, it is not clear to me how we can justifiably claim that
these notions are meaningless – entire schools of thought seem able to use them
with consistency. Though this consensus may not yet have been achieved, there
is no obvious reason to be pessimistic about their future. As metaphysicians
continue to work with their notions, they will become more precise. Reject-
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ing these primitives wholesale threatens to be increasingly unpersuasive as this
work continues.
I therefore avoid wholesale rejections of metaphysical primitives. My thesis
defends the deflationist from within the substantivist’s camp. I now turn to
delivering on that project.
Chapter 2
Deflationary Metaphysics and
Hyperintensional Manoeuvres
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the context for this thesis. First, I introduce the idea
of merely verbal disputes, and deflationary heuristics that are used for arguing
that some metaphysical disputes are deflatable. It is these heuristics that I
want to defend in this thesis. Second, I introduce the notion of hyperintensional
manoeuvres that I defend deflationary heuristics against.
Modern deflationism is heavily influenced by the work of Carnap (1950).
Carnap is concerned with showing that talk of numbers, propositions, prop-
erties and other abstract objects is consistent with empiricist scruples. For
example, he argues that the existence of numbers follows analytically from
non-controversial claims such as ‘3 is a prime number’. If 3 is a prime number,
then 3 is a number and there is something that is 3: hence, there are numbers.
Carnap recognises that the triviality of this reasoning renders incomprehen-
sible the dispute between Platonists and nominalists of his day. He therefore
makes a distinction between two kinds of ontological question, relative to a
framework. How frameworks are to be understood is contentious, but Eklund
(2016) argues that they are best seen as conceptual worldviews.1
The first kind of ontological question is internal to the framework, and
1An alternative notion of framework is given by Thomasson (2009, 2016) in terms of the
use/mention distinction. See §5.2 for further discussion.
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allows for trivial reasoning as just described. The second is external to the
framework. Carnap suggests that external questions are questions about what
should be accepted into the framework. These questions are pragmatic, turning
on the interests of the disputants.
Carnap took this to be an interpretation of the Platonist/nominalist dispute
which gives the dispute some content. If the claim ‘there exist numbers’ is
internal to the framework, then it follows trivially from claims such as ‘3 is
a prime number’. Given the Platonist and the nominalist do not think that
their dispute is trivial, we cannot interpret ‘there exist numbers’ as internal.
However, if the claim is external to the framework, then it lacks factual content.
Interpreting the dispute as pragmatic avoids the dispute from being nonsense.
As Button (2016), Eklund (2016) and Sidelle (2016) have identified, modern
deflationism is influenced but distinct from Carnap’s metaontology. Button
highlights at least three vectors of dissimilarity. The first is a matter of scope.
As Button (2016) puts it, ‘Carnap’s internal/external dichotomy will allow us
to brush aside almost all of metaphysics. Neo-Carnapians tend to focus on
more specific disputes’. The second is a matter of formality. Button notes that
Carnap wants to explicate informal talk using some formal framework, such
that some questions can be internal to that framework. Modern deflationists,
if they speak of frameworks at all, rarely assume that they are formalised. The
third is a matter of empiricism. Carnap is a devoted empiricist, whilst modern
deflationists scarcely mention empiricism at all.
Nonetheless, modern deflationists are influenced by Carnap. In the next
three chapters, I consider the deflationary methodologies of Hirsch (§3.2),
Chalmers (§4.2) and Thomasson (§5.2). Of these, it is perhaps Thomasson
(2009, 2015, 2016) who has the best claim to neo-Carnapianism: explicitly
working with frameworks and interpreting them in terms of the use/mention
distinction. This is not to suggest, however, that there are no Carnapian influ-
ences operative in Hirsch and Chalmers.
In §2.2, I expand on the idea of a merely verbal dispute and defend my
analysis as properly shallow. This is because deeper analyses of mere verbality
invite counterexamples (as they are too global) and controversy (because it is
often controversial whether a philosophical dispute is merely verbal). In §2.3,
I introduce the general notion of a hyperintensional manoeuvre. In the next
three chapters, we see that variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre threaten
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some prominent deflationary heuristics.
2.2 Merely Verbal Disputes
Intuitively, some disputes are merely verbal rather than substantive. Rather
than turning on a factual matter, they are instead based on implicit disagree-
ment over the meaning of key expressions. Moreover, the idea that a dispute
can be merely verbal is not an invention of philosophy – not a philosophical
posit of Hirsch (2009) or some other deflationist. Instead, it is a pre-theoretical
concept with extensive application and clear utility.
To demonstrate that the concept has a wealth of pre-philosophical appli-
cation, consider a few examples. Suppose that persons A and B disagree over
the truth value of the sentence ‘Hilary Clinton’s policies are right wing’. A is
American, whilst B is European. Both A and B are fully informed on Clinton’s
range of policies, and informed on the political mainstream of both America
and Europe. Intuitively, they do not disagree on any relevant fact, but just
mean different things by ‘right wing’. A, being American, uses ‘right wing’ to
mean ‘right of the American political centre’, and correctly argues that Clin-
ton’s policies are not right wing. B, being European, uses ‘right wing’ to mean
‘right of the European political centre’, and correctly argues that Clinton’s
policies are right wing. Their dispute is merely verbal.
Another example is as follows. Claire has been working until 7pm for the
last week. Persons C and D disagree over the truth value of the sentence ‘Claire
has been working late this week.’ C asserts that the sentence is true, whilst D,
remembering themselves having worked until 9pm for the last month, retorts
that the sentence is false. Suppose further that C and D are fully informed as
to Claire’s actual work hours, her work hours according to her work contract,
and so on. Again, it is intuitive that C and D do not disagree on any relevant
fact, and are engaged in a merely verbal dispute due to disagreement over the
meaning of ‘working late’.
These two examples are intended only as illustrative. I am confident that
the reader could supply many non-philosophical examples. The phenomenon
of merely verbal dispute is ubiquitous.
The two examples also demonstrate some important features of merely ver-
bal disputes. Firstly, as Chalmers (2011) notes, merely verbal disputes need
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not be unimportant. Though it may be merely verbal whether or not Clinton’s
policies are right wing, an opinionated resolution to the dispute may influence
how Americans vote. Moreover, merely verbal disputes may offer insight into
the use of our concepts. Though it may be merely verbal whether or not Claire
is working late, societal attitudes regarding what it means to work late may
shape our attitudes regarding the proper balance of work and personal life.
Sometimes merely verbal disputes can have legal significance. A 1991 court
heard on whether or not Jaffa Cakes were cakes. There was no disagreement
over the composition of Jaffa Cakes, how they are made or how they are mar-
keted. Intuitively, it was merely verbal whether or not Jaffa Cakes are cakes,
turning on disagreement over the meaning of ‘cake’. Nonetheless, it was of
great importance to determine an answer to the question – deciding whether
or not Jaffa Cakes would be taxed as cakes or biscuits.
Consequently, it is not that merely verbal disputes do not matter, but
rather that the matter turns on a linguistic disagreement. This, of course,
may sometimes serve to deflate a dispute as unimportant. We use the word
‘merely’ because often such disputes were supposed to turn on some relevant,
non-linguistic fact. This is typically the case when considering philosophical
applications of mere verbality. The dispute over whether personal identity
consists in psychological continuity is supposed to be non-linguistic, turning
on non-linguistic facts about the world. Finding that the dispute was merely
verbal would undermine the interest philosophers have in it.
Just as not all merely verbal disputes are unimportant, not all merely verbal
disputes should be neutrally resolved. Hirsch (2009) notes that, insofar as
both sides purport to speak ordinary English, one disputant may be mistaken.
Suppose that persons E and F look up at a clear sky and disagree over the
truth value of the sentence ‘it is cloudy’. Suppose that neither E nor F have
committed any basic, perceptual error, but that F thinks that ‘cloudy’ means
what we might communicate by ‘clear’. Though the dispute is merely verbal,
there is an intuitive sense in which F has made a mistake. We operate on the
presumption that both E and F are attempting to speak ordinary English, and
F has used ordinary English incorrectly. Hence, resolving their merely verbal
dispute might involve F accepting that they were mistaken.
Chalmers (2011) gives another example where one side may be wrong in
a merely verbal dispute. Suppose that Sue made a false statement that she
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did not believe to be false. Persons G and H agree on this, and also agree as
to the moral status of Sue’s assertion. However, they initially disagree over
the truth value of ‘Sue lied’, with G denying the sentence and H affirming
the sentence. H affirms the sentence because they use the term ‘lied’ without
reflection, initially acting as though ‘lie’ refers to any false statement. However,
throughout the course of the dispute, H reflects on their use of ‘lie’ and comes
to accept that Sue did not lie. Chalmers suggests that their dispute is merely
verbal, but notes that the dispute is resolved by H accepting that they made
a mistake.
Hence, disputants in merely verbal disputes can retract their positions, and
with good reason. What makes the dispute merely verbal is not that it should
be neutrally resolved, but that the dispute rests only on linguistic disagreement,
when it was supposed to turn on non-linguistic facts.
With this in mind, we start with the following analysis of an deflatable
dispute:
A dispute is deflatable iff the disputants do not disagree on any relevant
fact.
However, this analysis does not quite fit our purpose. Suppose that the dis-
putants disagree such that one asserts ‘p’ and the other asserts ‘not-p’. Suppose
further that there is no fact of the matter about whether p. It is plausible that
the two disputants are both substantively wrong: that they should conclude ‘it
is indeterminate whether p’.
The lesson is that our analysis is problematic if we allow for indeterminate
existence. The solution is to employ a caveat excluding such cases:
A dispute – in which worldly indeterminacy is not a live option – is
deflatable iff the disputants do not disagree on any relevant fact.
I adopt this approach because the disputes I have in mind for this thesis are
those in which worldly indeterminacy is not a live option. Deflationists want
to deflate mereological disputes such as whether complexes exist, or whether
persons survive bizarre mind-machine cases.2 Typically, substantivists in such
disputes think that there are determinate facts that settle the dispute. Further-
more, deflationists are normally more concerned with whether there is merely
2See §2.2.
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linguistic disagreement at play, rather than if there is genuine, metaphysical
indeterminacy in whether a person survives or a complex exists. With this
in mind, we might think that the caveat boils away to nothing in the present
context.
I then propose that merely verbal dispute are a species of deflatable dispute,
such that
A dispute is merely verbal iff the dispute is deflatable and arises solely in
virtue of linguistic disagreement.
An important feature of this analysis is that it does not decide which dis-
putes are merely verbal. It can be contentious whether the disputants disagree
on any relevant fact. There may be disagreement over which facts are relevant
to the dispute. Furthermore, there may be disagreement over whether some
facts – relevant or not – obtain, and thus exist. It is useful to pause on this
point, and provide an example of each. To do so, some set-up is required.
Consider a dispute over the nature of personal identity. A Neo-Lockean
argues that personal identity consists in psychological continuity.3 Hence, B is
the same person as A iff B is psychologically continuous with A. Meanwhile, an
Olsonian (1997) argues that personal identity consists in biological continuity.
Hence, B is the same person as A iff B is biologically continuous with A.
The Neo-Lockean and the Olsonian agree on most everyday cases of personal
identity. Both can agree that you are identical with the person associated
with your body two years ago, for example. However, they disagree on a
variety of more unusual cases. For example, suppose that scientists construct
a ‘mind-machine’, that can ‘read’ the data of a brain, store that data, and
then ‘download’ that data onto another (otherwise ‘empty’) brain. Person
A plugs into the mind-machine. At this point, A-body is destroyed in its
entirety. Another body, B-body, is brought in. The data on the mind-machine
is downloaded onto B-brain, which is otherwise empty. The question is what
happens to A in this procedure.
The Neo-Lockean would say that A survives the procedure. This is because
the person in B-body is psychologically continuous with A. The Olsonian would
say that A does not survive the procedure. The person in B-body has no
biological continuity with A.
3See Noonan (1989) for a survey of Neo-Lockeanism.
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Suppose (contra to fact, but for sake of example) that the Neo-Lockean and
the Olsonian make the same judgements about when one person is identical to
another, apart from in mind-machine cases. Whether or not their dispute is
deflatable depends on whether there are facts about mind-machine cases that
are relevant to the dispute.
We can imagine two arguments against the dispute. The first argument
is that facts about whether A survives mind-machine cases are irrelevant to
the dispute on personal identity. We can imagine a philosopher who argues
that mind-machine cases are metaphysically possible, but physically impossible.
They might add that facts about what would happen in physically impossible
scenarios are irrelevant to actual personal identity – that is, what personal
identity amounts to in the actual world. Hence, they argue that facts about
whether A survives mind-machine cases are irrelevant to the dispute. On this
basis, they say that the dispute is deflatable.
The second argument holds that mind-machine cases are metaphysically
impossible. For example, Van Inwagen (2001) complains that these kinds of
thought-experiment are wildly unrealistic. It follows that there are no facts
about whether A would survive the mind-machine procedure.4 Hence, we can
argue that there are no facts about whether A survives mind-machine cases.
On this basis, we say that the dispute is deflatable.
These arguments, however, are controversial. We can imagine them being
challenged by philosophers of personal identity. What this demonstrates is that
my analysis alone cannot decide which disputes are deflatable.
On the other hand, my analysis is enough to identify paradigmatic cases of
merely verbal disputes. We can intuitively see that A and B do not disagree
on any fact relevant to whether Hilary Clinton’s policies are right wing. In
short, my analysis correctly picks out non-controversial cases of merely verbal
dispute, and remains silent on controversial cases.
I propose that this is desirable. This is for largely two reasons. The first is
4Or too many facts, depending on our view of counterfactuals with metaphysically impos-
sible antecedents. Williamson (2008) defends the view that counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents are trivially true. Hence, it is true that A would survive a mind-machine proce-
dure and true that A would not survive a mind-machine procedure. If these truths correspond
to facts, then we have too many (contradictory) facts to be able to resolve the dispute. In
such a situation, it is intuitive that the dispute should be abandoned as deflatable.
Williamson’s view of counterfactuals with impossible antecedents is challenged by Wilson
(2016). Indeed, Wilson argues that grounding theorists require an alternative view of such
counterfactuals.
32
CHAPTER 2. DEFLATIONARY METAPHYSICS AND
HYPERINTENSIONAL MANOEUVRES
the acknowledgement that one philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus
tollens. Suppose that we have a dispute that many philosophers take to be
substantive. For example, consider the dispute between free will compatibilists
and incompatibilists. The compatibilist argues that free will is compatible with
determinism, and the incompatibilist argues that free will and determinism are
incompatible. Some philosophers5 may argue that the dispute is merely verbal.
Perhaps this result falls out their analysis of ‘merely verbal’. In response, a
philosopher who thought the dispute was substantive will take this result as
evidence that the analysis of ‘mere verbality’ is flawed.
My point is that any analysis of ‘mere verbality’ that makes controversial
judgements about which disputes are merely verbal will itself be a controversial
analysis. Any such analysis is therefore an opinionated one, which is unhelpful
when seeking to clarify the basic notion behind mere verbality. It is better to
have a non-controversial analysis to pin down the notion of a merely verbal
dispute, and then present local arguments as to whether a given dispute is
merely verbal. To smuggle such judgements into the analysis only serves to
obfuscate what is at issue.
What I mean by this is the following. It is more methodologically fruitful
to start with agreement on what an deflatable dispute is. This is because it
allows philosophers to identify precisely where they disagree. Consider again
the Neo-Lockean and the Olsonian, and the mind-machine example. Suppose
that everyone agrees on my shallow analysis of what it is to be an deflatable
dispute. On this basis, a philosopher argues that the dispute is deflatable
because there do not exist facts about whether A survives mind-machine cases.
This makes explicit a particular point of disagreement: whether mind-machine
cases are metaphysically possible. Rather than quarrelling over what makes
a dispute deflatable, philosophers can argue over whether mind-machine cases
are metaphysically possible.
Secondly, there is a concern that ‘deeper’ analyses are improperly global.
My analysis is shallow because it does not explain what it is for a fact to be
relevant to a dispute. Deeper analyses of mere verbality seek to clarify which
facts are relevant. However – intuitively – whether a fact is relevant is local to
the dispute in question. Attempts to make global judgements on which facts
are relevant are therefore problematic.
5Chalmers (2011) being an example.
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For example, Jenkins (2014) considers an analysis that declares linguistic
facts as irrelevant. Yet, by ruling that linguistic facts are never relevant, the
analysis is susceptible to counterexamples of substantive, verbal disputes, such
as whether ‘coffee’ is a noun. Intuitively, two individuals can substantively
disagree on whether ‘coffee’ is a noun. However, this disagreement will be
linguistic disagreement. Hence, if linguistic facts are never relevant to disputes,
then it follows that the dispute is deflatable: the wrong result.
To reiterate, then, the problem with ‘deeper’ analyses of mere verbality
is that they handle globally what should be local. Whether or not a given
fact is relevant is relative to the dispute at issue. Furthermore, it is often a
controversial issue whether or not a fact is relevant, or even whether that fact
exists. Trying to stipulate globally when a fact is relevant therefore invites
incorrect results and controversy into the analysis.
Rather than providing analyses of mere verbality, I propose that the defla-
tionist is better served finding heuristics for when a dispute is merely verbal.
These heuristics should be used to persuade the neutral observer that a dis-
pute meeting their conditions are merely verbal. As heuristics, these conditions
needn’t be sufficient nor necessary. Furthermore, they may admit of exceptions,
such that some substantive disputes meet the heuristic conditions. The impor-
tant thing is that the heuristics are reliable guides to whether a dispute is
merely verbal. If they are, then these heuristics can take their place in defla-
tionist, local arguments against disputes. Though they may not conclusively
prove that a dispute is merely verbal, this reflects the reality that it is often
controversial to call a dispute merely verbal.
The next three chapters consider some heuristics, provided by Hirsch (2005,
2009, 2016), Chalmers (2011) and Thomasson (2009, 2015, 2016) respectively.
In the next section, I consider a more general threat to these deflationary
methodologies: the threat of hyperintensional manoeuvres.
2.3 Introducing Hyperintensional Manoeuvres
Hyperintensional manoeuvres constitute a direct threat to deflationary heuris-
tics. In brief, they work as follows. The deflationist plausibly argues that there
is no disagreement over any relevant extensional or intensional fact in a dispute.
They therefore suggest that the dispute should be deflated. The substantivist
34
CHAPTER 2. DEFLATIONARY METAPHYSICS AND
HYPERINTENSIONAL MANOEUVRES
– making a hyperintensional manoeuvre – argues that there is disagreement
over relevant hyperintensional facts. This maintains the substantivity of the
dispute.
Consider the following example. The dispute pertains to the metaphysics
of free will. The compatibilist argues that free will is compatible with the
truth of determinism. The incompatibilist argues that free will is incompatible
with the truth of determinism. Suppose that a deflationist demonstrates that
the compatibilist and the incompatibilist agree on all relevant extensional and
intensional facts. For example, it may be argued that the disputants mean
something different by ‘free will’. Once we interpret the disputants accordingly,
it may be that there is no extensional or intensional disagreement between the
compatibilist and the incompatibilist. The deflationist thus suggests that the
dispute should be deflated.
To this, the substantivist makes a hyperintensional manoeuvre. She appeals
to disagreement over whether the compatibilist’s or incompatibilist’s notion of
free will is really free will. Given the compatibilist and the incompatibilist
mean something different by ‘free will’, the substantivist argues, there is room
for substantive disagreement over which property best aligns with the structure
of objective reality: which property is the more fundamental.
Different variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre work with different no-
tions of fundamentality. In the case we have just considered, the issue comes
down to which property is more fundamental. A substantivist might analyse
this in terms of Lewis’s (1983) naturalness, such that:
Fundamentality as Naturalness: A property α is more fundamental than
another property β iff (1) α is more natural than β; or (2) α is perfectly
natural and β is not perfectly natural.
Additionally, other hyperintensional manoeuvres might appeal to disagree-
ment over whether one fact is more fundamental than another. A substantivist
might analyse this in terms of metaphysical grounding, such that:
Fundamentality as Grounding: A fact p is more fundamental than an-
other fact q iff (1) p grounds q; or (2) p is not grounded by any fact and
q is grounded by some fact.
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Consider a dispute about the existence of tables. The setup of the dispute
is as follows. There is a world, w1, at which there exist simples arranged
‘tablewise’ and no other simples. A van Inwagen-style (1990, 1994) mereological
nihilist, who believes that only simples exists, asserts that there are no tables
at w1 (as tables are non-simple objects). A Lewis-style (1983) mereological
maximalist, meanwhile, believes not only that composite objects exist, but also
that any collection of simples forms an object. Consequently, they assert that
there is a table at w2: the fusion of those simples arranged tablewise.
Suppose that we apply to this dispute a deflationary heuristic. We may find
that the mereological nihilist, with some complications, is willing to interpret
the mereological maximalist’s ‘there are tables at w1’ as true in the mereo-
logical maximalist’s own language. For example, the mereological nihilist may
interpret the offending sentence ‘there are tables at w1’ (in the mereological
maximalist’s language) as ‘there are simples arranged tablewise at w1’ (in the
mereological nihilist’s language). On this basis, we might move to deflate the
dispute.
However, what we might call a ‘fundamental nihilist’ might make appeal
to the following hyperintensional manoeuvre. In response to the threat of
deflation, she backtracks and accepts that there exist tables at w1. On the
other hand, she insists that her point is that the existence of simples arranged
tablewise is more fundamental than the existence of a table at w1. We can
analyse fundamentality here in terms of grounding. The weaker mereological
nihilist asserts that the fact that there are simples arranged tablewise at w1
grounds the fact that there is a table at w1. We can also suppose that the
mereological maximalist also wants to preserve the substantivity of the dispute,
and denies this grounding claim: she argues that there is no hyperintensional
distinction between tables and simples arranged tablewise. This reformulates
the dispute as about whether there is such a hyperintensional distinction to
be found. This dispute, we can imagine, admits the existing, metaphysical
arguments of the mereological nihilist and mereological maximalist. Hence, this
hyperintensional manoeuvre has prevented the dispute from being deflated.
This represents a grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre. More
generally, the thought is that disagreements over the priority of certain facts
can be appealed to with grounding-variants of the manoeuvre.
We see something close to a grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeu-
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vre in Schaffer (2010b). Schaffer proposes that ‘the most interesting question is
not the question of what exists, but is rather the question of what is fundamen-
tal’ (2010b, 157, his emphasis). He adds that ‘not everything that exists is fun-
damental. Some entities are grounded in others’ (2010b, 157). These thoughts
can form the basis of a grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre. Sup-
pose that a deflationary heuristic argues that an ontological dispute should be
deflated. The substantivist mounts a hyperintensional manoeuvre, taking the
dispute about what exists, and reformulating it into a dispute about what ex-
ists fundamentally. They add that an individual a exists fundamentally iff the
fact that a exists is ungrounded. Hence, we analyse ‘fundamentality’ in terms
of grounding, and we have a grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
Additionally, it may be that many hyperintensional disputes about con-
cepts or properties can be reformulated as hyperintensional disputes about
the priority of facts. As such, grounding-variants may sometimes be nothing
more than grammatical variants of other hyperintensional manoeuvres. That
there is this grammatical flexibility may be important. Consider this the-
sis. I argue that both naturalness and grounding-variants of the hyperinten-
sional manoeuvre can be defanged. The substantivist might find my arguments
against naturalness-variants to be persuasive, but find reason to reject my argu-
ments against grounding-variants. Being able to reformulate disputes as about
grounding claims might therefore preserve disputes that would otherwise be de-
flated. It is therefore important for my purposes that I challenge both variants
of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
In this thesis, I focus on naturalness and grounding-variants. It should be
admitted here that there may be alternative variants of hyperintensional ma-
noeuvre, corresponding to different analyses of fundamentality. Wilson (2016),
for example, suggests that we might take fundamentality as primitive, whilst
Sider (2011) suggests analysing fundamentality in terms of his primitive struc-
ture. My thesis is incomplete in this sense. However, the thought is that these
alternative treatments of fundamentality are in relative infancy. More work
elucidating such notions is needed before I can apply analogous arguments
to their respective variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre. Naturalness and
grounding, by contrast, have received much contemporary interest. This aids
the conceptual grasp of these notions upon which my arguments rely. Conse-
quently, my position is that I will be able to provide analogous arguments only
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when these notions are more expansively elucidated upon.
2.4 Conclusion
I am now in a position to conclude the chapter.
This chapter is mostly elucidatory. My goal has been to introduce the
reader to modern deflationism, and to the idea of hyperintensional manoeuvres
that threaten deflationary heuristics.
The next three chapters concern some specific deflationary methodologies
as case studies, taken from Hirsch (2005, 2009, 2016), Chalmers (2011) and
Thomasson (2009, 2015, 2016) respectively. In §2.2, I presented arguments for
thinking that these methodologies should not be treated as giving analyses of
mere verbality, but instead should be treated as providing heuristics for when
a dispute is merely verbal. These heuristics are designed to form the basis of
deflationary, local arguments against philosophical disputes.
In §2.3, I introduced the idea of a hyperintensional manoeuvre and sketched
out how they threaten deflationary heuristics. In the next three chapters, we
see that variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre directly threaten each specific
heuristic.

Chapter 3
Case Study: Eli Hirsch and the
Equivalence Condition
3.1 Introduction
This chapter takes Hirsch’s (2005, 2009, 2016) Equivalence Condition as a case
study for understanding deflationary heuristics.
The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, in §3.2, I outline what Hirsch’s
Equivalence Condition is, to provide an example of a deflationary heuristic.
These deflationary heuristics are what I want to defend throughout this thesis,
so it is worth ensuring that the reader is familiar with a few specific exam-
ples. Second, in §3.3, I distance the Equivalence Condition from the thesis
of quantifier variance. Hirsch suggests that different speakers can mean dif-
ferent things by the quantifier. I review some problems with this thesis, and
argue that quantifier variance and the Equivalence Condition heuristic stand
independently of one another.
Third, in §3.4, I demonstrate that Hirsch’s Equivalence Condition heuristic
is vulnerable to a variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre. This demonstrates
the need for this thesis: that deflationists need an external defence against
hyperintensional manoeuvres. In §3.5, I conclude.
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3.2 The Equivalence Condition
Hirsch suggests that a merely verbal dispute ‘is a dispute in which, given the
correct view of linguistic interpretation, each party will agree that the other
party speaks the truth in its own language’ (2009, 239). Hirsch (2005) clarifies
that this is intended as a sufficient condition for a dispute being merely verbal,
not a necessary condition or full analysis.
Before clarifying this methodology, it is worth pausing to consider why
Hirsch’s suggestion is not an analysis. Chalmers (2011) and Jenkins (2014)
both note that sometimes an interpretation scheme will not be available such
that each party can recognise the other as speaking the truth in their own
language.
For example, suppose that two disputants disagree over the colour of grass.
A argues that grass is green. B, meanwhile, argues that grass is grue until
time t, and bleen after t.1 These two positions are equivalent, and the dispute
is intuitively merely verbal. Assuming that each party has sufficient linguistic
resources, they should agree that the other party speaks the truth in their own
language. However, we can suppose that neither party does have sufficient
linguistic resources. For example, we can imagine that the green-speaker does
not possesses any temporal vocabulary. This means that they cannot talk of
‘after t’ or ‘before t’. This makes it impossible for them to interpret the grue-
speaker as speaking the truth in their own language. Hence, Hirsch’s condition
cannot be a necessary condition of mere verbality.
As noted in §2.2, however, I am not seeking an analysis of mere verbality
from Hirsch. Instead, I consider Hirsch as offering a heuristic for determining
whether a dispute is merely verbal. With this in mind, let us clarify Hirsch’s
proposal.
Applying Hirsch’s own refinements, Hirsch (2016) argues that a dispute is
merely verbal if the three-part Equivalence Condition is met:
1. ‘For any side x in the dispute, and any controversial sentence C, there is a
sentence S such that, if x were to suppose that S as used by x is equivalent
to C as used by the other side, then x would no longer disagree with the
other side about C’ (Hirsch 2016, 110).
1For this example, a is grue iff a is green before t, and blue after t. Meanwhile, a is bleen
iff a is blue before t, and green after t.
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2. ‘For any controversial inference IC (i.e., an inference that is accepted
by one side but not the other) there are two noncontroversial inferences
IC1 and IC2 such that one side claims that IC is equivalent to IC1 and
the other side claims that IC is equivalent to IC2 (where two inferences
are equivalent when the premises and conclusion of one are equivalent,
respectively, to the premises and conclusion of the other)’ (Hirsch 2016,
106)
3. ‘Whichever side one adopts, one ought to agree that there is a possible
language in which the noncontroversial sentences remain as is and the
controversy-ending equivalences hold’ (Hirsch 2016, 111).
Before I proceed with a demonstration, it is worth considering what it is
for two sentences to be equivalent.
We might say that two sentences are equivalent if they have the same truth-
values in all possible worlds (that they are ‘cointensional’). In §3.4, I argue
that the Equivalence Condition heuristic is vulnerable to hyperintensional ma-
noeuvres. On the current proposal, it is easy to see why. The thought is that
– on this understanding of ‘equivalent’ – two sentences can be equivalent and
yet differ hyperintensionally. Intuitively, it follows that there can be substan-
tive, hyperintensional disagreement despite the positions in the dispute being
equivalent.
A limitation of the current proposal, however, is that it implies that all
sentences expressing necessary truths are equivalent. For example, it would
follow that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ and ‘for all x, x = x’ are equivalent. This is a coun-
terintuitive position. I think that this is a good reason to be suspicious of
equivalence-as-cointensionality. With this in mind, we might propose instead
that two sentences are equivalent iff they have the same meaning.
It might be responded that the substantivist is now owed a theory of mean-
ing. However, I think that this is an unfair demand. As aforementioned, I
treat the Equivalence Condition as a heuristic for exposing deflatable disputes.
This is compatible with proper disagreement over whether a dispute is deflat-
able. In some applications of the Equivalence Condition, a substantivist might
complain that the purported equivalences being appealed to are not genuine
– that there is some difference in meaning between the relevant sentences in
their respective languages. When this difference in meaning turns on a hyper-
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intensional difference – perhaps some difference with regards to some relative
naturalness or grounding claim, this represents a hyperintensional manoeuvre.
Otherwise, the substantivist may appeal to some other distinction between the
two sentences that bears on their meaning. I am content for the Equivalence
Condition heuristic to be mediated through different theories of meaning, such
that those with different theories of meaning may disagree on specific applica-
tions of the heuristic.
I turn to demonstrating the Equivalence Condition heuristic in practice.
Consider the following dispute. Suppose that we have van Inwagen-style (1990,
1994) mereological nihilist and a Lewis-style (1983) mereological maximalist, as
described in §2.3. Now consider the following possible world, w1. This possible
world contains two simples and no other simples. We then ask the question:
how many objects exist at this possible world?
The mereological nihilist responds that there are exactly two objects: cor-
responding to each simple. The mereological maximalist responds that there
are exactly three objects: two corresponding to each simple, and one corre-
sponding to the fusion of the two simples. This represents a dispute between
the mereological nihilist and the mereological maximalist.
Hirsch (2009) is inclined to take these kinds of mereological disputes as
merely verbal. We should therefore expect that we can apply the Equivalence
Condition to this case.
Both sides assert some sentence that the other side takes to be controversial.
Let us take each in turn. The mereological maximalist finds the mereological
nihilist to be asserting something controversial by C 1: ‘there are exactly two
objects at w1.’ By clause 1 of the Equivalence Condition, there should be
some sentence S1 such that, if the mereological maximalist were to suppose
that S1 as used by the mereological maximalist is equivalent to C 1 as used
by the mereological nihilist, then the mereological maximalist would no longer
disagree with the mereological nihilist about C 1.
Meanwhile, the mereological nihilist finds the mereological maximalist to
be asserting something controversial by C 2: ‘there are exactly three objects at
w1.’ By clause 1 of the Equivalence Condition, there should be some sentence
S2 such that, if the mereological nihilist were to suppose that S2 as used by the
mereological nihilist is equivalent to C 2 as used by the mereological maximalist,
then the mereological nihilist would no longer disagree with the mereological
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maximalist about C 2.
I propose that both C 1 (as asserted by the mereological nihilist) and C 2
(as asserted by the mereological maximalist) are equivalent to the following
sentence, S (as asserted by both sides):
S : There are exactly two simples at w1.
Hence S = S1 = S2. S is equivalent to the mereological nihilist’s assertion
that there are exactly two objects at w1 (that is, C 1), because they believe
that the only objects are simples. Similarly, S is equivalent to the mereological
maximalist’s assertion that there are exactly three objects at w1 (that is, C 2),
because they believe that any collection of simples forms an object. Straight-
forward mathematics delivers that, when there are exactly two simples at w1,
there are exactly three objects at w1 (using the mereological maximalist’s lan-
guage).
Both the mereological nihilist and the mereological maximalist should ac-
cept S as true. Hence, if the mereological maximalist supposes that S (as
asserted by the mereological maximalist) is equivalent to C 1 (as asserted by
the mereological nihilist), then they would no longer disagree with the mere-
ological nihilist about C 1. The case is analogous for the mereological nihilist
when considering C 2. This meets clause 1 of the Equivalence Condition for
this dispute.
Meanwhile, we can see that clause 2 of the Equivalence Condition is met
for this dispute. The mereological maximalist will make controversial infer-
ences such as ‘there are exactly two simple objects at w1, therefore, there are
exactly three objects at w1’. Following the reasoning above, the mereological
nihilist can take this controversial inference to be equivalent to the noncontro-
versial (and trivial) inference that ‘there are exactly two simple objects at w1,
therefore, there are exactly two simple objects at w1’.
Similarly, the mereological nihilist will make controversial inferences such
that ‘there are exactly two simple objects at w1, therefore, there are no other
objects at w1’. Again, we can apply the work above. The mereological maxi-
malist can take this controversial inference to be equivalent to the noncontro-
versial (and trivial) inference that ‘there are exactly two simple objects at w1,
therefore, there are no other simple objects at w1.
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We can see how this translation scheme will make any controversial inference
equivalent to noncontroversial inferences, such that clause 2 of the Equivalence
Condition is met for this dispute.
This leaves clause 3 of the Equivalence Condition. This is the condition that
the mereological nihilist should accept that there is a possible language where
their C 1 is equivalent to S, and that the mereological maximalist should accept
that there is a possible language where their C 2 is equivalent to S. Speaking
loosely, it is the condition that both sides should accept that the other side’s
language is a possible language.2
I propose that we should reformulate clause 3 as follows:
3*. Whichever side one adopts, one ought to agree that there is a possible
language in which the non-controversial sentences remain as is and the
controversy-ending equivalences hold, and it would be appropriate to in-
terpret each disputant as speaking this possible language.
This is to meet the objection that it is trivial to find a language in which
the non-controversial sentences remain as is and the controversy-ending equiv-
alences hold: by wilfully misinterpreting the disputant as simply asserting the
other side’s position verbatim in some gerrymandered language.3 We rule out
these wilful misinterpretations by insisting that each disputant must be appro-
priately interpreted as speaking in those relevant languages.
To demonstrate clause 3* in action, we can imagine a possible language,
Cat-Dog, in which the predicate ‘is a cat’ and the predicate ‘is a dog’ are
equivalent. In Cat-Dog, the words ‘cat’ and ‘dog’ refer to the same property
(perhaps the property of being a cat or a dog). This does not mean that we
cannot have substantive disputes over whether a given animal is a dog. For
such a dispute to be deflatable by the Equivalence Condition heuristic, it also
2Characterising the disputants as having different languages does encounter difficulties
with semantic deference, however. Burge (1979) suggests that speakers can semantically defer
to their linguistic community. If the mereological nihilist and the mereological maximalist
ostensibly belong to the same linguistic community, then it is implausible that they speak
different languages. On the other hand, we can adopt Hirsch’s characterisation of one side’s
language as ‘the language that would belong to an imagined linguistic community typical
members of which exhibit linguistic behaviour that is relevantly similar to X ’s’ (2009, 239)’.
Appealing to counterfactual languages avoids the issue of semantic deference.
3My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising this issue.
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must be charitable to interpret a disputant as speaking in Cat-Dog. This is
typically not the case.4
Hirsch (2009) stresses the importance of the principle of charity, such that
the correct interpretation of a speaker does not assign obviously false beliefs
to that speaker. He (2016) describes this as the ‘first degree’ of Carnapian
tolerance. Returning to the mereological example, suppose that the mereo-
logical nihilist did not take the mereological maximalist’s C 2 as equivalent to
S. Suppose that, instead, the mereological nihilist interpreted the mereological
maximalist’s C 2 as equivalent to what the mereological nihilist would mean
by C 2. This would imply that the mereological maximalist somehow thought
that there were three simple objects at w1, and had dramatically failed to con-
ceptually grasp the set-up of the debate. This would not be charitable. It is
not charitable to think that the mereological maximalist has somehow failed
to grasp the sentence ‘this possible world contains two simples and no other
simples.’ It is more charitable to think that there is a possible language where
the mereological maximalist’s C 2 is equivalent to the mereological nihilist’s S.
Analogous remarks can be made for the possibility of the mereological nihilist’s
language.
On this basis, we can support the claim that (an appropriately strength-
ened) clause 3 of the Equivalence Condition is met for this dispute. All the
clauses are met, so it follows that the dispute is merely verbal.
The substantivist might challenge the appropriateness of the interpretations
Hirsch gives for the mereological nihilist and maximalist. I will presently con-
sider two such challenges. I argue that Hirsch has the resources to handle the
first objection. Furthermore, I contend that the second objection ultimately
collapses into the first.
The first objection is that the two disputants might insist that Hirsch has
interpreted them incorrectly, given that they intended to disagree. From this,
we might think that there is something inappropriate about Hirsch’s interpre-
tations. Surely the disputants know what they mean!
However, Hirsch has the resources to meet this line of attack. Clause 3 of
the Equivalence Condition states that ‘whichever side one adopts, one ought to
4Where it is charitable to interpret a speaker this way, it is intuitive that the dispute
is deflatable. Suppose that Sherbie is a cat. Person A says that Sherbie is a dog, and
is charitably interpreted as speaking in Cat-Dog. Person B argues that Sherbie is not a
cat. Intuitively, their disagreement is not substantive, but instead turns on merely verbal
disagreement.
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agree that there is a possible language in which the noncontroversial sentences
remain as is and the controversy-ending equivalences hold’ (Hirsch 2016, 111,
my emphasis). That the disputants ought to agree on a certain interpreta-
tion is consistent with them neglecting to actually do so. This is because the
disputants may not apply appropriate interpretative principles as they should.
Indeed, Hirsch presumably must disagree interpretatively with the dis-
putants. This is because most philosophical disputes are not supposed to be
merely verbal. Hence, disputants will typically interpret their own positions as
supporting substantive debate. It would be too strong to give speakers absolute
authority on how they should be interpreted: otherwise unintentional, merely
verbal disputes would be impossible. Consequently, there is something suspect
about allowing self-regarding interpretations to trump Hirsch’s interpretations
without further debate. Hirsch offers interpretative principles to support his in-
terpretations. To challenge those interpretations, the substantivist should offer
arguments to undermine those principles, or offer plausible principles of their
own that support their own interpretations. I contend that Hirsch should not
be impressed by self-regarding, substantivist interpretations until these further
arguments have been made.
The second objection is more sophisticated.5 However, I argue that it ulti-
mately collapses into the first objection.
The objection is as follows. There will be disputes that are associated with
the dispute over how many objects exist at w1: disputes that use the same
terms and are argued by the same disputants. We might therefore expect the
same interpretations to hold – and it might speak to the inappropriateness
of those interpretations if they could not be applied consistently across these
disputes. However, the interpretations that might seem plausible with regard to
one dispute may seem less plausible with regard to another, associated dispute.
Take, for example, a dispute over the existence of parts. The mereological
nihilist asserts (in their language) C 3: ‘no object has a proper part’. The
mereological maximalist asserts (in their language) C 4: ‘some object has a
proper part’.
Given that the dispute is mereological, and many of the same terms are
employed, we might think that the same interpretations should apply across
the two disputes. As such, by ‘object’, the mereological nihilist should be in-
5My thanks to Jon Litland for raising this challenge.
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terpreted as uttering ‘simple object’ in the mereological maximalist’s language.
Hence, C 3 is equivalent to S3 (said in the mereological maximalist’s language):
S3: No simple object has a proper part.
However, we might think that the mereological nihilist’s complicated argu-
ments to advance this trivial, analytic truth makes trouble for our interpreta-
tion.
On the other hand, as in the case of the first objection, Hirsch might say
that the mereological nihilist has misinterpreted their own position. This mis-
interpretation has led them to make complex arguments in favour of a trivial
point. This collapses the second objection into the first. From there, the re-
sponse Hirsch should make is to present his interpretative principles and show
that they are plausible. This meets the accusation of unkindness, and the sub-
stantivist must show why Hirsch’s principles are flawed or incorrectly applied.
As noted, Hirsch offers the satisfaction of the Equivalence Condition as a
sufficient condition for mere verbality. This may be true. Nonetheless, for sake
of argument I treat Hirsch’s methodology as constituting a weaker condition:
namely a heuristic for determining when a dispute is merely verbal. A heuristic
for determining mere verbality is simply a reliable method for determining when
a dispute is merely verbal. This is consistent with the heuristic admitting of
the occasional exception: that is, where the Equivalence Condition is satisfied
but the dispute is not merely verbal.
I offer this concession not because I can think of such an exception, but
because this is all I think the deflationist really needs. As noted in §2.2, it is
normally a controversial, opinionated matter whether a philosophical dispute
is merely verbal. It is implausible to think that everyone will accept that if the
Equivalence Condition is satisfied by a dispute, then that dispute should be
abandoned as deflatable. On the other hand, the satisfaction of the Equivalence
Condition forms the basis of an effective argument to persuade a neutral party
that the dispute is merely verbal. We should not ask more of the Equivalence
Condition.
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3.3 The Equivalence Condition and Quantifier Variance
Hirsch connects his methodology with the idea of quantifier variance. It is
therefore important to understand what this amounts to. In this section, I
argue that it is difficult to pin down what quantifier variance is. On the other
hand, using the deflationary heuristic represented by the Equivalence Condition
does not commit the deflationist to quantifier variance.
In the example dispute above, the mereological nihilist and the mereological
maximalist disagree on how many objects there are in world w1. The mereo-
logical nihilist believes that there are exactly two objects, and the mereological
maximalist believes that there are exactly three objects. Further, we have
seen that the dispute satisfies the Equivalence Condition and so can be seen
as merely verbal. This raises the question of what the mere verbality of the
dispute consists in. Hirsch’s (2009) suggestion is that the mereological nihilist
and the mereological maximalist mean something different by ‘there are’. They
therefore talk past one another, in virtue of using different existential quanti-
fiers. That the meaning of the quantifier can differ in this way is the thesis of
quantifier variance.
The difficulty is spelling out precisely what it means for the meaning of
the quantifier to differ between the disputants. Thomasson (2016), who rejects
quantifier variance, argues that the meaning of the quantifier is given by its
introduction and elimination rules in natural deduction. Given that the mere-
ological nihilist and the mereological maximalist presumably agree on these
natural deduction rules for their quantifiers, it would follow from Thomasson’s
suggestion that they mean the same thing by ‘there are’.
To salvage quantifier variance, we need an alternative way of understanding
the meaning of the quantifier. A na¨ıve thought is to characterise quantifier
variance in terms of domain restriction. The thought is as follows. The meaning
of the quantifier cannot be separated from its interpretation (that is, its logical
interpretation) – namely, the domain of objects that the quantifier is taken to
range over. We might think that the mereological maximalist uses a quantifier
that ranges over a larger domain – given as the powerset of the set of simples.
We then say that the mereological nihilist’s quantifier is restricted, such that
its domain only contains the simples.
Philosophers find difficulty with this suggestion. Sider (2009) and van In-
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wagen (2009) argue that characterising quantifier variance in terms of domain
restriction assigns to the mereological nihilist a contradictory position. Sup-
pose that the mereological nihilist remarks that “existence’ in the language of
the mereological maximalist results from letting the quantifiers range over a
larger domain, one that contains fusions’. The issue is that this remark is given
in the mereological nihilist’s own language. It follows that the mereological ni-
hilist has just acknowledged that there is a domain that contains fusions. This
implies that there are fusions, contradicting the mereological nihilist’s position.
Hale & Wright (2009) take this as a reason to reject the notion of quantifier
variance – that it cannot be understood in terms of domain restriction, and
that there are no obvious alternatives for characterising the thesis. As it is, I
propose that we can use Hirsch’s Equivalence Condition without committing
ourselves to quantifier variance.
In the example dispute we have been considering, I identified some sentences
that form the basis of the dispute. These are the mereological nihilist’s ‘there
are exactly two objects at w1’ and the mereological maximalist’s ‘there are
exactly three objects at w1’. The Equivalence Condition heuristic works by
showing that there is a possible language whereby those controversial sentences
are equivalent to non-controversial sentences. In this dispute, I proposed that
both sentences when uttered by their respective sides are equivalent to ‘there
are exactly two simples at w1’ in some possible language. This demonstrates
that the controversy is merely verbal – that the controversial sentences are
actually equivalent to some non-controversial sentences. The important thing
is that we have not had to appeal to quantifier variance at any stage in this
argument. We have pinned down the offending sentences, and it is not obvious
that we have to further pin down the subsentential components that make the
dispute merely verbal.
The point is that there is no necessary link between quantifier variance and
the Equivalence Condition heuristic. The Equivalence Condition heuristic finds
equivalence between sentences, whilst quantifier variance is about subsentential
components. Meanwhile, there are some difficulties with explaining precisely
what quantifier variance amounts to. I therefore propose that the heuristic be
considered independently from the thesis of quantifier variance – adopting the
former does not commit us to the latter.
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3.4 The Equivalence Condition and Hyperintensional
Manoeuvres
The Equivalence Condition, in clause 3, suggests that there exist various pos-
sible languages. Further, it suggests that some disputes are merely verbal
because disputants use different languages. In the example considered in §3.2,
the thought is that there is a mereological nihilist language and a mereolog-
ical maximalist language. When one disputant correctly interprets the other
into their own language, the apparently controversial sentences are seen to be
equivalent to non-controversial sentences. Hence, ‘each party will agree that
the other party speaks the truth in its own language’ (Hirsch 2009, 239).
In this instance, an available hyperintensional manoeuvre is to ask which
language best represents reality.
Suppose that the only difference between the mereological nihilist’s lan-
guage and the mereological maximalist’s language is what is meant by the
quantifier. This accepts the thesis of quantifier variance. The substantivist’s
hyperintensional manoeuvre in this case is to ask which concept of existence is
more fundamental: which carves more closely at the joints of objective reality.
This might be understood in terms of Sider’s (2011) structure: which quantifier
is the more structural.
However, following the discussion in §3.3, we may be suspicious of the
thesis of quantifier variance. Alternatively, then, we can interpret languages
holistically. In this case, the substantivist’s hyperintensional manoeuvre is to
ask which language is more natural.6
The focus here seems to be on concepts and languages. If the relevant
distinctions are properties, we might analyse fundamentality in terms of nat-
uralness. However, in the mereological case described, concepts other than
properties may well be relevant: most saliently – if the substantivist accepts
the thesis of quantifier variance – the quantifier. In this case, the substantivist
might analyse fundamentality in terms of structure.
6It may be difficult to compare the relative naturalness of languages. This is because
a language can be more natural than its rival in some respects, and less natural in others.
For example, suppose L1 and L2 are languages. Suppose that L1 has predicates referring to
perfectly natural biological properties and L2 does not. In this respect, L1 is more natural
than L2. However, we can also suppose that L1 has predicates referring to imperfectly natural
chemical properties and L2 has predicates referring to perfectly natural chemical properties.
In this respect, L1 is less natural than L2. Combining the two scenarios, it is not obvious
which language is more natural overall. I leave this difficulty for the substantivist to answer.
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Either way, by arguing that one language might be more fundamental than
another, the substantivist raises problems for the Equivalence Condition heuris-
tic. Even if the Equivalence Condition is met, a dispute may still be substan-
tive in virtue of disagreement over which language is more fundamental. This
disagreement will turn on the existing, metaphysical arguments of the mere-
ological nihilist and mereological maximalist. Hence, such a hyperintensional
manoeuvre prevents the dispute from being reformulated or deflated at all.
3.5 Conclusion
This concludes my discussion of Hirsch’s Equivalence Condition heuristic. In
§3.2, I introduced what the deflationary heuristic amounts to. In §3.3, I argued
that the heuristic should be considered independently of the thesis of quantifier
variance. However, in §3.4, I demonstrated that the Equivalence Condition
heuristic is vulnerable to argument by hyperintensional manoeuvre.
This begins to build the case for the importance of this thesis. If deflation-
ists are to make use of the Equivalence Condition heuristic, they need a defence
from hyperintensional manoeuvres. In the next chapter, I build on this point
by considering another case study: that of Chalmers’s Method of Elimination
heuristic.

Chapter 4
Case Study: David Chalmers
and the Method of Elimination
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I consider Chalmers’s (2011) method of elimination as a defla-
tionary heuristic.
The structure of this chapter mirrors that of the previous chapter. In §4.2,
I detail the method of elimination and show how it should be considered a
deflationary heuristic. In §4.3, I distance the method of elimination from other
elements of Chalmers’s philosophy. Chalmers has complicated and interesting
ideas of hyperintensionality that are partly at odds with my defence of defla-
tionary heuristics from hyperintensional manoeuvres. I discuss these ideas – in
particular his notion of a ‘bedrock dispute’ – in that section.
Next, in §4.4, I show that Chalmers’s method of elimination heuristic is vul-
nerable to variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre. This further demonstrates
the need for my thesis to defend deflationists. In §4.5, I conclude the chapter.
4.2 David Chalmers and the Method of Elimination
Chalmers (2011) provides the method of elimination as a heuristic for detecting
merely verbal disputes. The basic principle is to eliminate use of a key term,
and to see whether a substantive dispute can be articulated without that key
term. If we cannot, then the dispute is wholly verbal. Note that Chalmers is
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writing about verbal rather than merely verbal disputes – Jenkins (2014) notes
that substantive, verbal disputes meet Chalmers’s criteria.
Suppose that there is a dispute over a sentence S that is potentially verbal
with respect to a key term t. The method of elimination proceeds as follows:
1. Bar the use of t.
2. Try to find a sentence S ′ in the restricted vocabulary such that the parties
disagree non-verbally over S ′, and the disagreement over S ′ is part of the
dispute over S.
3. If there is such an S ′, the dispute over S is not wholly verbal. If there is
not such an S ′, the dispute over S is wholly verbal.
To fully articulate this methodology, we need to spell out what it is for
a disagreement over S ′ to be part of the dispute over S. Chalmers offers two
glosses on the idea. The first is in terms of metaphysical grounding, such that
‘a dispute over S ′ is part of a dispute over S when the parties disagree over S
partly in virtue of disagreeing over S ′’(2011, 527, his emphasis). The second
is in terms of counterfactuals, such that a dispute over S ′ is part of a dispute
over S when ‘(i) if the parties were to agree that S ′ is true, they would (if
reasonable) agree that S is true, and (ii) if they were to agree that S ′ is false,
they would (if reasonable) agree that S is false’ (2011, 528).
The method of elimination cannot be an analysis of what it is for a dispute
to be verbal, as Chalmers notes. This is because the method of elimination
appeals to the notion of non-verbal disagreement (in clause 2), and thus would
be circular as an analysis. Instead, I treat the method of elimination as a useful
heuristic for determining when a dispute is merely verbal.
We can better apprehend the method of elimination with an example. Sup-
pose persons A and B dispute the sentence S, given as ‘Pluto is a planet’. A
thinks S is true and B thinks S is false. Further suppose that A and B agree on
the mass of Pluto, its size, its orbital behaviour, and so on. We might suspect
that the dispute is merely verbal with respect to the key term ‘planet’, playing
the role of t. We therefore apply the method of elimination.
We begin by barring the use of the expression ‘planet’. We then see if we can
find a sentence S ′ in the restricted vocabulary such that the parties disagree
non-verbally over S ′, and the disagreement over S ′ is part of the dispute over
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S. Intuitively, there are no such S ′, because A and B agree on all other facts
about Pluto. Consequently, we can conclude that the dispute over S is wholly
verbal, as is intuitive.
A special application of the method of elimination is what Chalmers calls
the subscript gambit. Suppose that we have a philosophical, ‘what is X?’
question, such as ‘what is justice?’ or ‘what is personal identity?’ Chalmers
suggests that the corresponding disputes are often wholly verbal. Suppose A
says ‘X is such-and-such’ whilst B says ‘X is so-and-so’. The subscript gambit
involves banning the term X and introducing two new terms, XA and XB, such
that XA is equivalent to ‘such-and-such’ and XB is equivalent to ‘so-and-so’.
We then proceed with the method of elimination and try to find a substantive
dispute between A and B regarding XA and XB, that is part of the original
dispute over X.
The subscript gambit closely resembles Hirsch’s Equivalence Condition heuris-
tic. It works on the same principle: providing interpretations that allow both
sides to recognise that the other is speaking the truth with their own terms.
Given Hirsch’s Equivalence Condition is more developed, it is perhaps a prefer-
able heuristic when the subscript gambit would be employed.
More generally, Chalmers’s method of elimination is sub-sentential, whereas
Hirsch’s Equivalence Condition is sentential. Chalmers asks the deflationist to
eliminate a particular term from the dispute, whilst Hirsch seeks equivalences
at the level of sentences. In this sense, Hirsch’s heuristic is broader and perhaps
more encompassing.
As a heuristic, the method of elimination admits of exceptions. Chalmers
discusses the possibility of vocabulary exhaustion. If the language of the dispute
has a limited vocabulary, then barring the use of a key term t may prevent the
formulation of any disagreement that is even part of the original disagreement
over S. This might be the case even if the dispute is not wholly verbal.
However, it seems to me that there is some tension between the subscript
gambit and the possibility of vocabulary exhaustion. This is because the sub-
script gambit allows the deflationist to introduce new terms that should prevent
vocabulary exhaustion.
Nonetheless, we can make sense of the method of elimination and see how
it applies in practice. I now turn to Chalmers’s notion of a bedrock dispute,
arguing that it represents a further conflict in the methodology Chalmers ar-
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ticulates.
4.3 Bedrock Disputes
Chalmers (2011) applies his methodology to argue that the dispute between
compatibilists and incompatibilists over free will is wholly verbal. Chalmers
applies the subscript gambit, introducing terms ‘free willA’ and ‘free willB’,
and argues that the disputants have no substantive disagreement regarding
free willA and free willB that is part of the original dispute. He concludes that
the original dispute is wholly verbal.
The details of this application of the method of elimination is not what con-
cerns me here. Instead, it is his response to the following objection. Chalmers
considers the response that the original dispute is about what free will really is:
whether free willA or free willB is really free will. This objection is an appeal to
hyperintensionality. Asking whether free willA is really free will is equivalent
to asking whether free willA is the more fundamental notion, the concept of
free will that carves most closely at the joints of reality.
Chalmers responds that it is hard to see what ‘really’ amounts to, if the
issue is meant to be philosophical. He notes that asking whether free willA is
really free will could be understood as asking whether free willA is the ordinary,
English concept of free will. However, if the appeal to ‘really’ is meant to be
anything deeper than this, then Chalmers suggests it is opaque what is being
appealed to.
I propose that this response is unpersuasive. Increasingly, work is being
done on hyperintensional notions, seeking to clarify what is meant by appeals to
fundamentality. We might cash it out in terms of grounding, or else in terms of
naturalness, and there is contemporary work on understanding the theoretical
roles these concepts play. A wholesale rejection of the meaningfulness of such
notions threatens to become increasingly implausible to the neutral spectator
as this work continues.
Moreover, Chalmers’s response sits uneasily with what he writes about
bedrock disputes. A bedrock dispute is a substantive dispute that appears
wholly verbal by the method of elimination, but, due to vocabulary exhaus-
tion, represents an exception to the heuristic. The thought is that the dispute
involves ‘a concept so basic that there is no hope of clarifying the dispute in
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more basic terms’ (2011, 543).
Chalmers’s example of a bedrock dispute is that of the dispute over ‘only
particles exist’. He applies the subscript gambit, such that we take ‘exists1’
to range only over simple objects and ‘exists2’ to be such that ‘there exists2
an F ’ is equivalent to ‘there exist1 simples arranged F -wise’.1 Suppose that
both parties agree that only particles exist1 and that it is not the case that
only particles exist2. Despite this agreement, Chalmers suggests that there
is residual disagreement over whether particles exist – whether existence1 or
existence2 coincides with existence. Chalmers adds that once basic quantifiers
are barred, this dispute might be impossible to state, but that this is a case of
vocabulary exhaustion. Hence, the original dispute is a bedrock dispute.
Analogous reasoning, however, could defend the substantivity of the dis-
pute between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Both A and B agree that
free willA is compatible with the truth of determinism, and that free willB
is incompatible with the truth of determinism. However, we might appeal to
residual disagreement over whether free willA coincides with free will. This
dispute cannot be stated once we have barred use of the term ‘free will’, but
this is just a case of vocabulary exhaustion. Hence, the dispute is a substantive,
bedrock dispute.
Chalmers does not clarify what the substantive dispute between the existence1
theorist and the existence2 theorist amounts to.2 We can therefore interpret
him in a number of ways. My favoured interpretation is that Chalmers is mak-
ing an appeal to hyperintensionality when discussing the dispute over ‘only
particles exist’. The ‘bedrock manoeuvre’ – the manoeuvre that delegitimises
application of the method of elimination – can be interpreted as an appeal to
hyperintensionality. It is whether existence1 or existence2 is really existence,
or, equivalently, whether existence1 or existence2 is more fundamental, carving
more closely at the joints of logical nature.3 However, by this interpretation,
Chalmers’s scepticism regarding the appeal to hyperintensionality in the case
of free will should apply equally to the manoeuvre in the case of existence.
This might give us reason to find another interpretation of Chalmers. He
does not explicitly use the phrase ‘real existence’ or ‘hyperintensional’. An al-
1This application of the subscript gambit seems to appeal to quantifier variance. In §3.2,
I argue that the thesis of quantifier variance is problematic. However, I ignore these issues
for the purposes of the present discussion.
2My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising this point.
3As per the discussions found in Sider (2011).
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ternative interpretation, then, is that the dispute concerns incompatible iden-
tity claims – whether existence is to be identified with existence1 or existence2.
However, this interpretation faces its own difficulty regarding the signifi-
cance of the notion of existence being appealed to in this dispute. If ‘existence’
refers to a metaphysically privileged notion of existence – a joint-carving no-
tion – then it is not obvious how to capture this metaphysical privilege without
hyperintensional notions. We would say that ‘existence’ refers to real exis-
tence, or the fundamental notion of existence. Hence, the dispute becomes
whether existence1 or existence 2 is hyperintensionally privileged. This trans-
forms bedrock manoeuvres into hyperintensional manoeuvres, collapsing our
current interpretation into my first.
We therefore need the status of the notion of existence in the dispute to
be different. The problem is that it is not clear what this could be – if not
metaphysically privileged – if we are to preserve the substantivity of the dis-
pute between the two disputants. For example, if ‘existence’ simply refers to
the ordinary, English-speaker’s notion of existence, then the significance of
the dispute becomes interest-relative. This is because establishing (say) that
existence1 is the English ‘existence’ is only important insofar as we are inter-
ested in ordinary English for our metaphysics. Some philosophers – such as
Sider (2011) – explicitly focus on other languages, such as ‘Ontologese’.
Chalmers offers the bedrock manoeuvre to preserve the substantivity of
the dispute over existence. Our second interpretation reflects this goal with
a significant caveat: the resultant dispute is not deflatable, but this comes
at the cost of its metaphysical significance. To avoid this caveat, I therefore
favour my first interpretation of Chalmers. This interprets him as making a
hyperintensional manoeuvre.
Chalmers acknowledges that he represents a moderate Carnapian, and that
a less moderate deflationist would reject the idea of bedrock disputes. On my
favoured interpretation of Chalmers, then, it seems that the appeal to hyper-
intensionality is sometimes legitimate and sometimes not. However, Chalmers
does not provide a methodology for determining when the appeal to hyperinten-
sionality is legitimate. This represents a significant lacuna in our interpretation
of his deflationary heuristic.
Perhaps more can be said about when the appeal to hyperintensionality is
legitimate. Some appeals to hyperintensionality seem more implausible than
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others. For example, we might think that a necessary condition for an ap-
peal to hyperintensionality to be legitimate is that the key term t relates to
an objective, mind-independent phenomenon. This reflects the idea that no
subjective, mind-dependent concepts are fundamental, or part of the deeper
structure of reality. Recall again the dispute over ‘Hilary Clinton’s policies are
right wing’. An appeal to hyperintensionality is illegitimate here, because the
key term ‘right wing’ does not relate to an objective, mind-independent phe-
nomenon: being right of a political centre is too much of a human, subjective
matter. If we could sketch out such heuristics in more detail, addressing when
the appeal to hyperintensionality is known to be legitimate, then this would
help fill our lacuna.
An alternative approach, and one I favour, is to abandon moderate defla-
tionism and resist the phenomenon of bedrock disputes. As noted, this treats
what we might call the ‘bedrock manoeuvre’ as a form of hyperintensional
manoeuvre. Parts 2 and 3 provide strategies for defanging hyperintensional
manoeuvres and protecting deflationary heuristics from them. Avoiding this
problem for the method of elimination provides an additional motivation for
such efforts.
4.4 The Method of Elimination and Hyperintensional
Manoeuvres
As detailed in §4.3, Chalmers considers something that can be interpreted
as a hyperintensional manoeuvre. Consider again the dispute between com-
patibilists and incompatibilists. Chalmers applies the method of elimination,
banning the term ‘free will’ and arguing that the heuristic demonstrates the
dispute to be wholly verbal.
In response, the substantivist argues that the dispute is actually about
which concept of free will is really free will. This question cannot even be
asked if we bar the use of ‘free will’, such that we have a case of what Chalmers
calls ‘vocabulary exhaustion’: a limitation of the method of elimination. The
dispute over which concept is really free will – or is the fundamental con-
cept of free will – is conducted with the existing, metaphysical arguments of
the compatibilist and incompatibilist. Hence, this hyperintensional manoeuvre
prevents the dispute from being reformulated or deflated at all.
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Given the focus on the property of free will, substantivists making this hy-
perintensional manoeuvre may analyse fundamentality in terms of naturalness.
The question is which concept-candidate for free will is most natural – which
carves most closely at the joints of nature.
As noted in §4.3, Chalmers argues that the appeal to hyperintensionality
in this instance is obscure. However, as discussed, Chalmers may need to
provide more detail of why appealing to hyperintensionality is obscure in some
instances, but correct in others. Alternatively, we can abandon Chalmers’s
‘moderate deflationism’, and offer the assistance of my thesis to protect the
method of elimination from hyperintensional manoeuvres.
4.5 Conclusion
Here, I conclude my case study on Chalmers’s method of elimination. In §4.2,
I detailed the method of elimination as a deflationary heuristic. In §4.3, I dis-
cussed Chalmers’s views on hyperintensionality. I argued that the method of
elimination heuristic can be considered independently from Chalmers’s moder-
ate deflationism, and suggested abandoning the latter. In §4.4, I argued that
abandoning moderate deflationism renders the method of elimination vulner-
able to hyperintensional manoeuvres. This further motivates the work of this
thesis in defending deflationary heuristics from hyperintensional manoeuvres.
The next chapter considers our last case study: that of Thomasson’s easy
ontology.
Chapter 5
Case Study: Amie Thomasson’s
Easy Ontology
5.1 Introduction
This chapter represents my third and final case study of a deflationary heuristic
that is challenged by hyperintensional manoeuvres. In this chapter, I consider
Thomasson’s (2009, 2016) easy ontology heuristic.
This chapter is shorter than the two preceding it. In §5.2, I present Thomas-
son’s easy ontology. Then, in §5.3, I argue that the easy ontology methodology
is vulnerable to hyperintensional manoeuvre. In §5.4, I conclude.
The reason that this chapter is shorter is because I do not present further
discussion about the philosophical ideas that Thomasson employs. This is
not because they are uninteresting or do not merit comment. However, such
discussions are rather specific to Thomasson’s easy ontology.1 Consequently,
they are not of direct relevance to the idea of deflationary heuristics, or to the
notion of hyperintensional manoeuvres that threaten them.
1I would qualify this point: some of the criticisms levelled against Thomasson’s easy
ontology are inherited from criticisms of Carnap. For example, Eklund (2016) argues that
Thomasson relies on the analytic/synthetic distinction, which is vulnerable to Quine’s (1951)
influential arguments. I believe that Quine’s arguments are undermined by the counterargu-
ments of his contemporaries, in particular Grice & Strawson (1956). Thomasson (2007) also
appeals to these arguments to defend her methodology.
Similarly, Hofweber’s (2016) complaint that a framework analysis is uncharitable to the
nominalist applies to Thomasson, but is directed at Carnap. Other criticisms of Thomasson’s
easy ontology are more directed, such as Evnine’s (2016) ‘too much content’ objection. I
believe that Thomasson (and Carnap) can be defended from these objections: see Button
(2016) and Creath (2016) for presentation of such defences.
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5.2 Amie Thomasson’s Easy Ontology
Thomasson (2009, 2016) provides an ‘easy’ approach to ontology, inspired by
Carnap’s (1950) thoughts on ontological questions. Hofweber (2016) describes
Carnap’s ‘big idea’ as the thought that there are two kinds of ontological ques-
tion. As noted in §2.1, some ontological questions are internal to the framework,
whilst others are external. Precisely what this means depends on what is meant
by ‘framework’. Thomasson (2016) and Price (2009) suggest that Carnapian
frameworks are best understood in terms of the use/mention distinction.
On this interpretation, ontological questions made internally use the rele-
vant concepts rather than mention them. Thomasson’s (2009, 2016) thought
is that linguistic competency of such concepts come with an understanding of
a concept’s application and co-application conditions. The application condi-
tions govern when the concept can be first applied (in some sense, its conditions
for existence or instantiation) and the co-application conditions govern when
the concept can be re-applied (its individuation conditions). In this section,
my focus is on application conditions. By appealing to application conditions,
ontological questions are straightforward to answer. When we ask ‘do Ks ex-
ist?’, we check the application conditions for ‘K ’ and then undergo the relevant
analytic or empirical work to check whether those conditions are met. If they
are met, then K s exist. If they are not met, then Ks do not exist.
For example, suppose that the concept of chairs has the application condi-
tion such that there is a chair iff there are atoms arranged ‘chair-wise’. Suppose
someone asks whether chairs exist. Thomasson suggests that we look at the
application conditions of ‘chair’ and undertake the relevant tests to check if
the application conditions have been met. In this case, we undertake empirical
checks to confirm that there are atoms arranged chair-wise. By the application
conditions, it follows, straightforwardly, that chairs exist.
Thomasson (2016) notes that what is easy about this ontology is its method-
ology. Philosophical work is required to discover the application conditions
behind a concept. Once we have a good grasp of the application conditions,
analytical or empirical work is then required to test if the application con-
ditions have been met. That this methodology is straightforward does not
preclude these two stages being cognitively or practically difficult. For exam-
ple, discovering the application conditions behind ‘free will’ might involve some
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difficult conceptual work. Meanwhile, the empirical work required to check if
the application conditions of ‘black hole’ have been met may involve difficult
empirical work. Nonetheless, on Thomasson’s methodology, the philosopher’s
role is limited. The philosophical work is in making explicit our linguistic
competencies when it comes to certain concepts, rather than making direct,
ontological arguments.
To head off a potential misconception, the result is not anti-realism: that
existence is only relative to a framework. Once the follower of Thomasson’s
methodology is in a position to say that chairs exist, they are also in a position
to say that chairs exist language-independently: the obtaining of application
conditions can be an objective matter. Instead, ‘the point is the simple, almost
trivial observation that for a question to be asked meaningfully the terms in it
must be governed by rules of use’ (Thomasson 2016, 126).
Further, it should be noted that Thomasson’s easy ontology is not commit-
ted to disputants speaking different languages or using different frameworks, as
we have seen in Hirsch’s Equivalence Condition heuristic or Chalmers’s method
of elimination. External disputes (if not nonsense) are disagreements over
which concepts should be adopted into the framework by those occupying the
same framework.2
Consider the example dispute from §3.2. We have a world, w1, described
as containing exactly two simple objects. The mereological nihilist says that
there are exactly two objects at w1, corresponding to the two simples. The
mereological maximalist says that there are exactly three objects at w1, two
corresponding to the two simples, and one corresponding to their fusion. In a
nutshell, the two disputants dispute the truth-value of the claim ‘fusions exist’.
We can apply Thomasson’s methodology to this dispute.
Suppose that theoretical work found that the application condition of ‘fu-
sion’ is as follows:
If there are some things, then there exists a fusion of those things.
Having provided these application conditions, it is not charitable to inter-
pret ‘fusions exist’ as internal to the framework. This is because ‘fusions exist’
is trivially true if it is internal. After all, both the mereological nihilist and the
mereological maximalist agree that there are some things at w1. It follows from
2My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for this clarification.
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the application condition of ‘fusion’ that fusions exist. By contrast, the mere-
ological nihilist denies ‘fusions exist’, treating the matter as both non-trivial
and difficult. It would be uncharitable to interpret the mereological nihilist as
making such a basic, conceptual mistake.
However, if ‘fusions exist’ is not an internal sentence, then ‘fusion’ is not
governed by rules of use. It seems to follow that ‘fusions exist’ is incomprehen-
sible, and that the mereological nihilist and the mereological maximalist are
arguing over nonsense. This does not seem particularly charitable either.
The solution is to treat ‘fusions exist’ as external to the framework. Ex-
ternal questions (or sentences) mention rather than use the relevant concepts.
External questions are questions about whether the relevant concept should
be adopted into the framework. However, this question is pragmatic, turning
on issues of fruitfulness, simplicity and our interests. Nonetheless, it is a way
of interpreting the two metaphysicians such that their dispute is neither triv-
ial nor meaningless. In the present example, we interpret them as disputing
whether the concept of fusions should be adopted.
Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology therefore has a deflationary impact
on this dispute. Either ‘fusions exist’ is internal or it is not. If it is internal,
then it is trivially true, and the dispute should be settled. If it is not internal,
then it is either nonsense or external. If it is nonsense, then the dispute should
be abandoned. If it is external, then the dispute is reformulated into a dispute
about the pragmatics of accepting the concept of fusions. This deflates what
was a serious, metaphysical dispute into a pragmatic issue. Consequently, I
am minded to treat Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology as constituting a
deflationary heuristic.
5.3 Easy Ontology and Hyperintensional Manoeuvres
When we make a hyperintensional manoeuvre to Thomasson’s methodology,
the idea is that some frameworks are objectively privileged. The substantivist
goes along with Thomasson in reformulating the original dispute as an external
question. This means that the relevant concepts are mentioned, rather than
used. However, the substantivist denies that it is a pragmatic matter as to
whether the relevant concept should be adopted. Instead, they insist that
some frameworks are objectively privileged: that they are more fundamental
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than other frameworks, such that their concepts ‘cut more closely at the joints
of objective reality’. The thought is that we should adopt the fundamental
framework – the question is then the substantive, metaphysical one of whether
the relevant concept is contained in the fundamental framework.
Consider the mereological dispute over how many objects exist at w1. We
have seen how this dispute is deflated by Thomasson’s easy ontology.
When responding with a hyperintensional manoeuvre, the substantivist ac-
cepts that whether fusions exist at w1 – when construed internally – is trivially
answered. They therefore agree that the dispute should be seen as over an
external question about whether the concept of fusions should be introduced
to the framework. However, they deny that this dispute is pragmatic. This
is because there is a privileged, fundamental framework that either contains
the property of being a fusion, or does not. This is the question of whether
the property of being a fusion is fundamental. The substantivist argues that
determining which properties are in the privileged framework is a substantive,
non-pragmatic issue. The arguments that bear on the matter are those existing,
metaphysical arguments given by the mereological nihilist and the mereolog-
ical maximalist. Hence, the dispute has not been meaningfully reformulated
or deflated. This is a naturalness-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre, as
fundamentality is applied to properties.
Consequently, Thomasson’s methodology needs defence against hyperinten-
sional manoeuvres.
5.4 Conclusion
This concludes the final case study of deflationary heuristic. In §5.2, I out-
lined Thomasson’s easy ontology methodology. In §5.3, I demonstrated its
vulnerability to hyperintensional manoeuvres.
As previously noted, the aim of these case studies is to motivate my the-
sis. These deflationary heuristics are what I want to defend. Meanwhile, I
want to defend them from hyperintensional manoeuvres. It is therefore helpful
to demonstrate what some of these deflationary heuristics amount to, and in-
deed show that they are vulnerable to hyperintensional manoeuvres. The next
Part gets to the task of providing an external defence against hyperintensional
manoeuvres.
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My thesis defangs hyperintensional manoeuvres by providing ‘deflationary-
friendly’ interpretations of those primitives. The thought is as follows. Suppose
that I can show that the correct interpretation of naturalness is such that it
is a subjective, interest-relative matter whether one property is more natu-
ral than another, or whether one property is perfectly natural. If we analyse
‘fundamentality’ in terms of naturalness, then whether a property is more fun-
damental than another becomes a subjective, interest-relative matter. This
renders fundamentality deflationary-friendly.
To see why deflationary-friendly interpretations help the deflationist against
hyperintensional manoeuvres, consider the following. The substantivist argues
that an otherwise deflated dispute is substantive, because there is disagreement
on some matter of fundamentality. However, if matters of fundamentality are
subjective and interest-relative, this reformulation of the dispute fails to pre-
serve its substantivity. Even the reformulated dispute fails to be about anything
objective or deeply metaphysical. This meets the substantivist’s argument di-
rectly.
It is perhaps worth noting that the subjectivity of fundamentality does not
prevent disagreement about fundamentality. However, it does mean that such
disagreement will be subjective disagreement. This is typically insufficient to
preserve the substantivity of metaphysical debate: which are normally meant
to concern objective matters.
The main argument of this thesis is that naturalness and grounding should
be given deflationary-friendly interpretations. Applying the argument above,
this defangs naturalness and grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeu-
vre. My thesis therefore defends deflationary heuristics from two variants of
hyperintensional manoeuvre.
Part II
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Chapter 6
Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness
6.1 Introduction
In Part 2, I focus on the hyperintensional primitive of naturalness. I present
a deflationary-friendly interpretation of naturalness. This provides an inter-
nal response to the naturalness-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre against
deflationary heuristics.
I defend the following biconditional:
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness: Property α is perfectly natural iff α
is a property referred to by a primitive predicate in the language of ideal
science.
Throughout Part 2, I use ‘perfectly scientific’ as follows:
Perfectly Scientific: α is a perfectly scientific property iff α is referred to
by the primitive predicates of the language of ideal science.
It follows that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is equivalent to the claim
that α is a perfectly natural property iff α is a perfectly scientific property.
The thought is that the choice of language for ideal science is partly sub-
jective and interest-relative. If this is so, then this interest-relativity pushes
through Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, such that it is interest-relative whether
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α is perfectly natural. This allows the deflationist to mount a response blocking
hyperintensional manoeuvres.
In this chapter, I introduce the concept of naturalness and explain this
deflationary-friendly interpretation. In §6.2, I introduce naturalness and rel-
ative naturalness. In ch.11, I return to the subject of relative naturalness –
here, I only provide a gloss of the notion. In §6.3, I reintroduce Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness and explicate what is meant by ‘ideal science’. In §6.4,
I argue that the language of ideal science is such that my interpretation is
indeed deflationary-friendly. I also sketch out my strategy for showing that
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is the correct interpretation of naturalness.
In §6.5, I conclude.
Throughout, I sometimes use italics to indicate that I am talking about a
property. For example, I may write ‘being green’ rather than ‘the property of
being green’. This convention is adopted for sake of readability.
6.2 Introducing Naturalness
(Perfect) naturalness is standardly understood as a metaphysical primitive, not
admitting of analysis. Lewis (1983, 346) introduces the natural properties as
an ‘elite minority of special properties’. The thought is that some properties
are objectively privileged by the structure of the world. For example, Lewis
suggests that the microphysical properties used by physicists, such as being a
quark, might well be perfectly natural.
A paradigmatic example of naturalness is seen in the difference between the
property of being green, and the property of being grue. An individual a is grue
iff a is green before time t, and a is blue after t, for some specified, future t.1 It
is intuitive that there is something deficient about being grue when compared
to being green. This can be understood in terms of naturalness. The property
of being green is said to be relatively natural, whilst the property of being grue
is unnatural. The property of being green carves relatively well at the joints of
objective reality, whilst the property of being grue does not.
This is a case of relative naturalness – the property of being green is not
perfectly natural. Taylor (1993) notes that Lewis takes perfect naturalness to
1There are alternative analyses of ‘grue’. Goodman’s (1955) original notion is such that
an individual a is grue iff a is green and unexamined, or a is blue and examined. However,
when discussing naturalness, nothing depends on which analysis of grue I work with.
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be primitive, and analyses relative naturalness in terms of perfect naturalness.
Examples of perfectly natural properties are found in physics, which ‘is relevant
because it aspires to give an inventory of natural properties’ (Lewis 1983, 356-
7). Science is constantly evolving, so it only gives us an educated approximation
of which properties are perfectly natural. Hence, it is reasonable to think that
the property of being a quark is perfectly natural, whilst the property of being
a chair is not.
Lewis (1983) defines relative naturalness in terms of definitional complexity.
As Guigon (2014, 391) puts it, the degree to which a property is natural is ‘a
mere function of the relative complexity of the way less-than-perfectly natural
properties are defined out of their perfectly natural basis’.
For sake of example, suppose that the properties of being green, of being
red, and of being yellow are perfectly natural. Suppose that an individual
that is green or red is gred, and an individual that is green, red or yellow is
grellow. On these suppositions, the perfectly natural definition of the property
of being gred is given by ‘x is gred iff (x green or x is red)’. Meanwhile, the
perfectly natural definition of the property of being grellow is given by ‘x is
grellow iff (x is green or x is red or x is yellow)’. The perfectly natural definition
analyses the property in terms of perfectly natural properties. Furthermore,
the perfectly natural definition of grellow is more complex than the perfectly
natural definition of gred – it mentions a greater number of perfectly natural
properties, and utilises a greater number of logical connectives. On this basis,
we conclude that gred is more natural than grellow.
There are some difficulties with the definition of relative naturalness. In
ch.11, I discuss these problems at length. However, these are not special prob-
lems for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. These problems must be answered
by any naturalness theorist, regardless of whether naturalness is interpreted to
be deflationary-friendly.
I turn to the grammar of naturalness. Naturalness is a second-order prop-
erty on properties. It is unclear whether second-order properties can be natural
or unnatural, but I presume not for Part 2: otherwise, we run into puzzles of
whether perfect naturalness is itself perfectly natural. Note that I treat rela-
tions as n-ary properties, such that relations can also be perfectly natural. I
assume that relative naturalness forms a partial, well-ordering on properties.
Secondly, (perfect) naturalness is a metaphysical primitive. This means
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that a conceptual grasp of the notion is aided by considering the theoretical
roles to which the concept is applied. These are as follows:
Similarity: Two individuals a and b are similar iff they both instantiate
some property, α, such that α is a relatively natural property.
Duplicates: Two individuals a and b are duplicates iff they instantiate
exactly the same perfectly natural properties.
Intrinsic Properties: A property α is intrinsic iff, for any two duplicates
x and y, αx ↔ αy.
Supervenience: Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B
iff A-duplicates are B-duplicates.
Events: An event is the set of properties of regions that are predominantly
intrinsic.
Causation: As per Lewis’s famous counterfactual account, when the an-
tecedent of a counterfactual C  E is a set of duplicate, initial world-
segments.
Materialism: Materialism is the claim that ‘among worlds where no nat-
ural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two differ without
differing physically; any two such worlds that are exactly alike physically
are duplicates’ (Lewis 1983, 364).
Mental Content: The content of an intentional state is constrained by
what is natural.
Law of Nature: A law of nature is a true generality in our best theory
of the world, when competing theories are presented in perfectly natural
terms.
In ch.7, I consider the theoretical roles which vindicate Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness: such that deflationary-friendly naturalness is compatible with
those roles. In ch.9 and ch.10, I consider the problem cases: Mental Content
and Law of Nature, respectively. In each chapter, I argue that these theoretical
roles fail for any interpretation of naturalness. It is therefore of no consequence
that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is incompatible with these applications.
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6.3 Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
It is worth repeating how deflationary-friendly interpretations of naturalness
undermine naturalness-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
The basic idea is that a deflationary-friendly interpretation of naturalness
makes it a subjective, interest-relative matter as to whether one property is
more natural than another. Hence, if fundamentality is analysed in terms
of naturalness, it is a subjective, interest-relative matter as to whether one
property is more fundamental than another.
Hyperintensional manoeuvres work by reformulating the dispute about what
is fundamentally the case. However, if fundamentality is subjective and interest-
relative, what is fundamentally the case is only of pragmatic significance.
Hence, such a manoeuvre would intuitively fail to preserve the substantivity of
the dispute. Instead, it becomes its own form of deflation.
This demonstrates my motivation in seeking a deflationary-friendly inter-
pretation of naturalness. I offer the following biconditional:
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness: Property α is perfectly natural iff α
is a property referred to by a primitive predicate in the language of ideal
science.
Conceptions of Ideal Science
It is important not to understand ‘ideal science’ even partly in terms of nat-
uralness, otherwise Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness becomes viciously circu-
lar. For example, it had better not be the case than an ideal science is one
that only works with perfectly natural properties. Otherwise, the deflationary-
friendliness of Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness would be in doubt, or fall into
incoherence.
Instead, by ‘ideal science’, I mean a specific, modal notion. It is worth
discussing the notion in some depth, and adopting a discursive approach to
highlight important points along the way.
By way of a first attempt, we might say that ideal science is a complete
science adopted by consensus of scientists at the closest world w to our own
where:
1. Some complete science is discovered at w.
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2. Science progresses at w in a way such that what is referred to as ‘science’
at w is recognisably the same discipline as what is referred to as ‘science’
at our world.
Let us say that a world w meeting these conditions is a ‘ideal science-world’.
It should be noted that if we actually discover a complete science in the future,
the actual world would be an ideal science-world.
However, there are some significant problems with our first conception of
ideal science.2 We have no guarantee that the closest ideal science-world is
anything like the actual world. Hence, the closest ideal science-world may not
share our world’s perfectly natural properties. In such a scenario, Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness fails to adequately capture our perfectly natural proper-
ties, and thus fails as an interpretation of naturalness.
On these grounds, we might be tempted to abandon a modal conception
of ideal science. For example, we might say ideal science is the most complete
science that will be discovered in the actual world. However, this is an over-
correction and has problematic results. We do not suppose that we presently
know all of the perfectly natural properties. For example, we might suppose
that some fundamental, quantum properties are yet to be discovered by sci-
ence, and that these properties may be perfectly natural. However, if the actual
world suffers a mass extinction event tomorrow, then the language of the most
complete science discovered at the actual world does not have predicates for
these undiscovered, quantum properties. It follows on our present conception
of ideal science and Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness that these properties are
not perfectly natural. This seems to be the wrong result.
This suggests that we are correct to adopt a modal conception of ideal
science. The key is to impose restrictions on the kind of ideal science-worlds
we are interested in. Importantly, the ideal science-worlds we consider must be
worlds w that are sufficiently like the actual world. I propose that this can be
captured by two restrictions:
3. w and the actual world share the same best theories.
4. Scientists in w and actual scientists (broadly) share the evaluative criteria
for determining the best theories.
2My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising this objection.
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I discuss the notion of best theories at length in ch.10. Lewis (1983) analyses
a best theory as one that optimally balances the theoretical virtues of simplicity
and strength. A simple theory is tractable and easier to understand. A strong
theory has comparatively many deductive consequences.
It is important to clarify that an ideal science – defined as a complete science
– is unlikely to be a best theory. This is because an ideal science does not seek
to balance simplicity against strength. By contrast, because an ideal science
must be complete, it is likely to afford a sub-optimal weight to strength over
simplicity. Hence, the notion of an ideal science is importantly distinct from
the notion of a best theory.
Nonetheless, worlds that share best theories are suitably similar for our
purposes. It is plausible that worlds that share best theories share perfectly
natural properties.
This brief discussion explains our first restriction. I offer a second restric-
tion because of the following worry. Lewis (1983) notes that any theory – if
presented in a suitably gerrymandered language – can be maximally simple
and strong.3 Lewis’s solution is to insist that we evaluate the simplicity and
strength of theories when they are presented in a perfectly natural language.
We cannot help ourselves to the same manoeuvre, because we are seeking
to offer an analysis of naturalness. It would be viciously circular to analyse
naturalness (even partly) in terms of naturalness. Our ‘substantive punt’ is
to consider modal situations where people use pretty similar methods for eva-
luting theories when compared to actual scientists. This avoids the problem,
because actual scientists evaluate theories in non-gerrymandered languages. A
theory that is maximally simple and strong when presented in a gerrymandered
language is likely to be highly complex and/or weak when it is presented in
a natural language. Given that choosing to evaluate theories in a highly ger-
rymandered language is a significant departure from the evaluative criteria of
actual scientists, the second restriction solves the problem of gerrymandering.
I call this the ‘substantive punt’ because the substantivist should also en-
dorse the idea that our current methods of best theory evaluation are broadly
correct – such that we should only be interested in worlds with similar evalu-
3This point shall be explored in more detail in ch.10. Lewis’s application of naturalness
does not cohere well with Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. This is because our deflationary
understanding seeks to define naturalness (partly) in terms of the notion of best theories.
Meanwhile, Lewis’s application of naturalness involves defining the notion of best theories
(partly) in terms of naturalness. This point is also discussed in more detail in ch.10.
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ative methods. Otherwise, we could not assume that our current theories are
even reliable approximations of a best theory. This would lead to a profound
scepticism of science that does not reflect the appeals of naturalness theorists
to fundamental physics. For example, Lewis treats fundamental physics as our
main epistemology for naturalness, noting that ‘physics is relevant because it
aspires to give us an inventory of natural properties’ (Lewis 1983, 356-7). This
does not tally with serious doubts about the progress of science – and it is hard
to see how we can be confident in the progress of science if we are not broadly
confident in how scientists evaluate their theories.
To recap, then, an ideal science is a complete science adopted by consensus
of scientists at the closest world w where:
1. Some complete science is discovered at w.
2. Science progresses at w in a way such that what is referred to as ‘science’
at w is recognisably the same discipline as what is referred to as ‘science’
at our world.
3. w shares with our world the best theories.
4. w (broadly) shares with our world the evaluative criteria for determining
the best theories.
Ideal science is ideal in this precise, modal sense. It is ideal because ideal
science may not be discovered at the actual world. This exhausts the sense
in which ideal science is ideal. In particular, ideal science does not assume
anything about scientists at w being idealised, epistemic agents.
I have noted that ideal science is complete. A complete science is such that
every non-modal fact is a theorem of that theory.4
Other Considerations
For the moment, I make the assumption that there is a unique, ideal science.
It is conceivable that there are numerous complete sciences: different theories
of the world with different primitives and different vocabulary. If this is the
4If desired, we can alternatively stipulate that the theory is complete iff every non-
nomological fact is derivable from the theory and a sentence detailing the initial conditions
of the universe.
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case, then ideal science is a (hopefully unique) complete science that would be
adopted by consensus of scientists.
In ch.8, I return to the assumption that there is a unique, ideal science.
There are complications, stemming from whether scientists would adopt a
unique theory by consensus, and whether they adopt the same unique the-
ory at each relevant, closest world. If they do not, then there is not a unique,
ideal science. This complicates my evaluation of Deflationary-Friendly Natu-
ralness. I propose that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness can be defended as
performing at least as well as its rivals in such scenarios, but I reserve that
discussion for ch.8.
Given that these theories are idealised and I am discussing counterfactuals,
it is epistemologically indeterminate whether a given predicate is primitive
in the language of ideal science. We don’t know for sure what ideal science
looks like. Even if we knew some complete sciences, we might not know which
particular science would be selected on the consensus of scientists at w.
I embrace this epistemological indeterminacy because it seems inherent in
the epistemology of naturalness for the substantivist as well. As noted above,
Lewis (1983) points to physics as central to our epistemology of naturalness.
Other than looking to the predicates of fundamental physics, he offers no epis-
temology for determining which properties are to be considered perfectly nat-
ural. Presumably, any naturalness theorist would accept that science is liable
to change with new scientific advances. Consequently, our current science only
offers an approximation of which properties are perfectly natural. Insofar as we
don’t know how science will turn out, there is epistemological indeterminacy
as to which properties are perfectly natural.
Lewis has materialist tendencies. However, this is not necessarily reflected
in Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. Suppose that the property of being a
belief turned out to be an indispensable primitive in all complete theories of
the cosmos. By how ‘ideal science’ is defined, it follows that being a belief
would correspond to a primitive predicate in the language of ideal science.
By Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, it would follow that being a belief is
perfectly natural.
If materialism turns out to be true, then being a belief is not perfectly
natural. However, materialism may be false. More generally, if contemporary
science turns out to be dramatically wrong, then our current approximation of
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the perfectly natural properties is entirely wrong. This would be a disaster, but
it is not clear how the naturalness theorist could avoid it. Insofar as they accept
that contemporary science is a guide to which properties are perfectly natural,
they are vulnerable to a dramatic failure of science (on any interpretation of
naturalness).
Hence, ideal science does not necessarily resemble contemporary science,
though it is reasonable to take contemporary science as our best approxima-
tion.5 A property referred to by a primitive predicate of the language of ideal
science may not be what we currently think of as a physical property. That
there is variation over time in what we take to be physical, or even scien-
tific, is no new phenomenon. Kuhn (1996, 104) notes that Molie`re ‘ridiculed
the doctor who explained opium’s efficacy as a soporific by attributing to it
a dormitive potency’, but that, by the 1740s, ‘electricians could speak of the
attractive ‘virtue’ of the electric fluid without thereby inviting the ridicule that
had greeted Molie`re’s doctor a century before’ (1996, 106).
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness reflects the idea that the perfectly natu-
ral properties are sparse. This is because the perfectly natural properties are
referred to by primitive predicates in the language of ideal science. If a predi-
cate is primitive, then it cannot be defined by other predicates in the language.
Hence, the predicate (and its corresponding property) is indispensable in the
complete theory of the world (ideal science). It follows that the property is
sparse.
I propose that my interpretation is plausible because of the close link be-
tween fundamental physics and the perfectly natural properties posited by
naturalness theorists. I have already quoted Lewis’s (1983) claim that physics
aspires to give an inventory of natural properties. Other philosophers have
also noticed this connection. Williams (2011, 3) remarks that ‘fundamental
physics, [Lewis] thought, would be our best guide to the perfectly natural
properties’. Meanwhile, Loewer (2007, 315) notes that ‘Lewis says that it is
the job of physics to find fundamental laws and because fundamental laws link
perfectly natural properties physics is our best guide to the latter’. Eddon and
Meacham (2015) also suggest that we can interpret naturalness in terms of the
predicates in an idealised, scientific language. This attention to fundamental
science is also seen in Sider’s related notion of structure: Sider (2011, 6) notes
5Putting aside issues of pessimistic induction, as discussed by Laudan (1981).
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that the perfectly fundamental concepts are ‘certain concepts of physics, logic,
and mathematics’.
On the other hand, I speak of an ideal science rather than an ideal physics.
In doing so, I mean only to make explicit that Deflationary-Friendly Natu-
ralness is compatible with the falsity of materialism. If materialism is true,
then perhaps ideal science is an ideal physics, and the distinction fades away
to nothing.
I want to defend Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness not only as offering a
viable interpretation of naturalness, but as offering the correct interpretation
of naturalness. This defence rests on two ideas: that naturalness is posited
explicitly to fulfil a number of theoretical roles, and that being wedded to claims
about the fundamental structure of objective reality confers a theoretical cost.
The thought is that a cost-benefit analysis favours my deflationary-friendly
interpretation of naturalness if it allows the concept to play the same theoretical
roles, but more cheaply.
I propose that this is what Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness offers. My
deflationary-friendly interpretation of naturalness does not wed naturalness
theorists to claims about the fundamental structure of objective reality. This
is because it renders naturalness subjective and interest-relative. I argue for
this point in the next section.
6.4 The Subjectivity of Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness
In ch.7, ch.9 and ch.10, I argue that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness keeps
faith with all the successful theoretical roles for naturalness proposed by Lewis
(1983). Hence, a plausible cost-benefit analysis favours my deflationary-friendly
interpretation of naturalness as the correct interpretation. This section exam-
ines this claim and defends it, on the basis that deflationary-friendly natural-
ness incurs fewer costs than deflationary-unfriendly naturalness.
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness equates the perfectly natural properties
with the perfectly scientific properties. I argue that it is a subjective, interest-
relative matter whether a property is perfectly scientific. Consequently, by
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, it is a subjective, interest-relative matter
whether a property is perfectly natural. I argue that it is less costly for natu-
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ralness theorists if it is subjective whether a property is perfectly natural. This
is because this avoids the costs associated with claims about the structure of
objective reality.
The Subjectivity of which Properties are Perfectly Scientific
The basic idea is that the choice of language for ideal science is likely to be an
interest-relative affair, guided as much by subjective as objective constraints.
Evidence for this contention can be found in the philosophy of science: the
familiar point being that scientists are guided by influences other than em-
pirical evidence in theory choice. Chakravartty (2017) discusses the idea that
the empirical evidence underdetermines our choice of theory, such that once
we have to hand all non-nomological data, we may still be left with various,
conflicting theories of the world. These arguments from underdetermination
have been extensively explored in arguments against scientific realism, tracing
back to the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ of Duhem ([1906] 1954) and Quine (1951).
If empirical evidence does not select a unique theory, then perhaps some
of theory choice can be guided by considering the theoretical virtues of the
competing theories: such as simplicity or strength. However, worries soon
emerge. Given we are talking about the choice of a complete, ideal science,
scientists have all the non-nomological data to hand. Hence, objective justifi-
cations of appeals to simplicity or strength on the basis of tracking truth or
avoiding overfitting do not seem applicable in ideal theory choice: see ch.10
for extensive discussion of this point. It is therefore unclear how appeals to
theoretical virtues could be justified as objective constraints on ideal theory
choice. Alternatively, if appeals to simplicity and strength are justified on sub-
jective grounds, then it follows that our choice of ideal theory will be a (partly)
subjective affair.
Adding to the worries, it is not obvious that scientists are guided only by
empirical evidence and theoretical virtues in theory choice. Social Construc-
tivism is the thesis that scientific theory choice is partly guided by ‘complex
social interactions that inevitably surround and infuse the generation of scien-
tific knowledge’ (Chakravartty 2017). Insofar as these social interactions are
interwoven with interest-relative concerns, subjective considerations influence
theory choice. Philosophers such as Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend (1975) ad-
vocate historicism: engaging in the history of science to expose the role played
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by accident and social interaction in theory choice, and in influencing which
concepts are thought of as scientific or unscientific. Though some of their con-
clusions are controversial, it is plausible that science faculties – made up of
fallible, human beings – are subject to these kinds of influences.
For example, Collins & Pinch (1993, 74) note that ‘the struggle between pro-
ponents and critics in a scientific controversy is always a struggle for credibility’.
They discuss a variety of scientific controversies which were influenced by social
considerations. For example, they argue that Pons and Fleischmann’s claims
to have achieved cold fusion faced an uphill struggle from physicists, partly
because ‘they had credibility as electrochemists but not as nuclear physicists’
(1993, 74).
The point is not that we should accept Pons and Fleischmann’s findings.
Physicists find good reason to take their claims as impossible, and it is not for
me to disagree. Moreover, we might think that it is perfectly rational to afford
greater weight to the educated opinions of well-respected physicists. However,
the history of the controversy suggests the role that social considerations have
in the practice of science. Collins & Pinch note that ‘a vast amount of money,
expertise, and equipment had already been invested in hot fusion programs and
it would be na¨ıve to think that this did not affect in some way the reception
accorded Pons and Fleischmann’ (1993, 74).
It is plausible that contemporary theory choice is partly guided by sub-
jective considerations. From this, it is reasonable to expect that scientists
are susceptible to the same kind of influences. Remember that ideal science is
ideal only in the sense that it is complete: this does not mean that the scientists
who propose ideal science are idealised, epistemic agents. If empirical evidence
underdetermines ideal science, then these social influences render the choice
of ideal science subjective. It is plausible that this is reflected in the primi-
tive predicates of the language of ideal science. Our choice of ideal science is
wrapped up in our choice of language for our ideal science. The language of
ideal science will not have a primitive predicate for being phlogiston, because
our ideal science does not take phlogiston to represent anything. It follows that
there is good reason to think that it is subjective and interest-relative whether
a property is perfectly scientific.
There is also a role for historical accident for determining the language of
ideal science. Hacking (2007) details how the reference of ‘jade’ was determined
82 CHAPTER 6. DEFLATIONARY-FRIENDLY NATURALNESS
both by commercial interests and historical accident, such that ‘jade’ refers to
both jadeite and nephrite. Analogous distinctions have been found in our
chemical kinds, such as distinctions between different types of oxygen. It is not
clear to me whether the language of ideal science will have a primitive predicate
for oxygen, rather than a primitive predicate for each isotope. Presumably, this
will be decided by what scientists find to be the most convenient language for
expressing their theories. However, what scientists find to be convenient will
plausibly be influenced by linguistic accident. Speakers find convenient what
they are familiar with. Hacking suggests that what is familiar to us may be a
result of historical accident. Hence, what scientists find convenient may be a
result of historical accident influencing scientific language.
There are therefore good reasons to think that it is an interest-relative,
subjective and accidental matter as to whether a property is perfectly scientific.
By Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, it follows that the same can be said
regarding whether a property is perfectly natural.
Avoiding the Costs of Deflationary-Unfriendly Interpretations
I have assumed that there is a cost involved in making assumptions about the
structure of objective reality. In this section, I expand on this point, and argue
that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness avoids this cost.
Naturalness is posited to fulfil a variety of theoretical roles. I propose that
it would be best if it fulfilled those theoretical roles without wedding natural-
ness theorists to deep, metaphysical theses about the fundamental structure of
objective reality. A deflationary-unfriendly interpretation of naturalness takes
naturalness to impose an objective, partial ordering on properties, such that
some properties are objectively privileged as more fundamental. Deflationary-
unfriendly interpretations of naturalness therefore require the assumption that
there is an objective structure on properties – that some properties carve at
the joints of objective reality in some literal sense. Such talk may be happily
accepted by some metaphysicians, but if another interpretation of naturalness
can fulfil the same theoretical roles without such assumptions, I propose that
this is preferable. These are controversial assumptions that have been met with
hostility by some. For example, Taylor (1993, 2006) complains that the notion
of carving at the joints is too mysterious.
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does not commit the naturalness theo-
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rist to joint-carving. Though the interpretation is compatible with those joints
existing, the existence of objective structure does not follow from deflationary-
friendly interpretations of naturalness. This is because Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness renders the perfectly natural properties unsuited for telling us
anything about the objective structure of reality. The objective structure of
reality should not depend on subjective, interest-relative or accidental matters
– if it did, then it would fail to be objective. Deflationary-Friendly Natural-
ness makes it subjective, interest-relative or accidental whether a property is
perfectly natural. Therefore, the perfectly natural properties cannot determine
the objective structure of reality.
I say that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is compatible with the exis-
tence of objective structure to the world. This is because the phenomenon of
a subjectively privileged set of properties does not rule out the world having
an objective structure. The point is that the posit of this objective struc-
ture is dispensable for certain theoretical roles being fulfilled. Assuming my
deflationary-friendly interpretation, the phenomenon of natural properties does
not justify the thesis that the world has objective structure. On the other
hand, the phenomenon of natural properties in no way contradicts such a the-
sis. Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness merely decouples the two ideas. As such,
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is compatible with acceptance, rejection or
agnosticism towards objective structure.
Though Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness – when considered independently
– is consistent with objective structure, it may play a role in wider arguments
against objective structure. Suppose that I was in a position to argue the
following claim:
If we can give sense to the concept of objective structure, some deflationary-
unfriendly interpretation of naturalness, grounding, or Sider’s (2011)
structure is correct.
This claim might be defended on the basis of current philosophical practice.
Many philosophers have sought to make sense of objective structure in terms of
naturalness, grounding, or Sider’s structure.6 Deflationary-friendly interpreta-
tions of such notions are insufficient to characterise objective structure, because
such interpretations render their concepts subjective.
6See Schaffer (2009a) and Sider (2011) for two such examples.
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Suppose, then, that this claim is true. My thesis makes the argument that
It is not the case that some deflationary-unfriendly interpretation of nat-
uralness or grounding is correct.
In Part 2, I argue that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is the correct
interpretation of naturalness. I make similar claims about grounding in Part
3.
Suppose that I also provided argument that
It is not the case that some deflationary-unfriendly interpretation of
Sider’s structure is correct.
Combining the three claims, we can straightforwardly derive that
It is not the case that we can give sense to the concept of objective
structure.
As such, we see that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness can play a role in
wider arguments against objective structure.
However, I do not insist on this argument in this thesis. I am not sure
about the first claim. For example, Wilson (2016) suggests that we should treat
fundamentality as a primitive concept. From there, primitive fundamentality
could be used to make sense of objective structure in the world.
The first claim could be amended to accommodate the possibility of primi-
tive fundamentality. However, the second claim would need analogous amend-
ment: that it is not the case that some deflationary-unfriendly interpretation of
naturalness, grounding, Sider’s structure, or primitive fundamentality is cor-
rect. My thesis does not demonstrate that deflationary-unfriendly interpreta-
tions of primitive fundamentality are incorrect, so further argument would be
needed on this point to defend this amended argument.
I therefore leave this discussion as merely indicative of a potential, future
project against objective structure.
Suppose that my deflationary-friendly interpretation allows naturalness to
fulfil a variety of theoretical roles without making assumptions about objective
reality, or the existence of structural joints. It follows that it enjoys the same
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benefits as a deflationary-unfriendly interpretation, but more cheaply. A plau-
sible cost-benefit analysis would therefore favour my deflationary-friendly in-
terpretation as the preferred interpretation of naturalness. In the next chapter,
I begin evaluating the claim that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is compat-
ible with naturalness’s theoretical applications.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced naturalness and my deflationary-friendly interpre-
tation: Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. I have argued that Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness incurs fewer costs than deflationary-unfriendly interpre-
tations of naturalness. This is because my interpretation does not wed natu-
ralness theorists to claims about objective reality.
However, this does not mean that a plausible cost-benefit analysis favours
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. I must also show that Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness enjoys all the same benefits as its rivals. The rest of Part 2 argues
for this claim, working through the list of theoretical applications introduced
in §6.2. The next chapter focuses on relatively easy cases – where Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness seems compatible with the theoretical roles. Later chap-
ters consider more difficult cases.

Chapter 7
Easy Roles for
Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness
7.1 Introduction
Lewis (1983) offers an impressive variety of theoretical roles for naturalness.
These theoretical roles help clarify what naturalness is, whilst also helping to
justify naturalness as a metaphysical posit. In this short chapter, I focus on the
theoretical roles that are unproblematically preserved under my deflationary-
friendly interpretation. These form a majority of the theoretical roles, offering
good support for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness.
The thought is as follows. If my deflationary-friendly interpretation can play
the same theoretical roles – enjoying the same benefits – but at a lower cost,
then a plausible cost-benefit analysis favours Deflationary-Friendly Natural-
ness. In ch.6, I demonstrated that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness avoids the
costs associated with its rivals. This chapter demonstrates that Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness can enjoy many of the same benefits as its rivals.
In §7.2, I outline the theoretical roles that are to be considered in this
chapter. I then argue that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness permits these
theoretical applications. In §7.3, I discuss analyses of similarity in terms of
naturalness. In §7.4, I argue that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness permits
the analysis of duplicates in terms of naturalness. From this, a variety of
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theoretical roles follow ‘for free’. This is because other theoretical applications
for naturalness do not refer to naturalness directly, but instead to duplication.
In §7.5, I consider analysing materialism in terms of naturalness and argue that
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is compatible with this application. Finally,
§7.6 concludes.
7.2 Theoretical Roles for Naturalness
In this chapter, I consider the following applications for naturalness:
Similarity: Two individuals a and b are similar iff they both instantiate
some property, α, such that α is a relatively natural property.
Duplicates: Two individuals a and b are duplicates iff they instantiate
exactly the same perfectly natural properties.
Intrinsic Properties: A property α is intrinsic iff, for any two duplicates
x and y, αx ↔ αy.
Supervenience: Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B
iff A-duplicates are B-duplicates.
Events: An event is the set of properties of regions that are predominantly
intrinsic.
Causation: As per Lewis’s famous counterfactual account, when the an-
tecedent of a counterfactual C  E is a set of duplicate, initial world-
segments.
Materialism: Materialism is the claim that ‘among worlds where no nat-
ural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two differ without
differing physically; any two such worlds that are exactly alike physically
are duplicates’ (Lewis 1983, 364).
The following sections argue that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness pre-
serves these theoretical roles for naturalness.
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7.3 Similarity
In ch.11, we see how some definitions of relative naturalness make trouble for
Similarity. In response to one of these problems, Guigon’s (2014) ‘similarity
supplement’ seeks to analyse relative naturalness (partly) in terms of similarity.
This means that it is viciously circular to then analyse similarity in terms of
relative naturalness. This puts Similarity at risk as a theoretical role for nat-
uralness. However, this is not a special problem for my deflationary-friendly
interpretation. Deflationary-unfriendly interpretations run into the same trou-
ble.
Assume, then, that the naturalness theorist has an analysis of relative nat-
uralness that is compatible with Similarity. Under these conditions, I propose
that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is also compatible with this theoreti-
cal role. Given that Lewis takes physics to be our best approximation of the
perfectly natural properties, it is plausible that the set of perfectly natural
properties is identical with the set of perfectly scientific properties. Hence,
my deflationary-friendly interpretation and a deflationary-unfriendly interpre-
tation makes the same judgements regarding the relative naturalness of a given
property. They thus deliver the same judgements on whether two individuals
are similar.
For example, suppose that a exemplifies the properties being red and be-
ing 1kg or round. Suppose further that b exemplifies the property being red,
and c exemplifies the property being 1kg or round. On this information alone,
Lewis would want to say that a and b are similar, but that it is not clear if
a and c are similar.1 This is because being red is relatively natural, whilst
being 1kg or round is not relatively natural. However, these judgements of
relative naturalness supervene on the set of perfectly natural properties. Con-
sequently, if the set of perfectly natural properties is identical to the set of
perfectly scientific properties, it follows that being red is relatively natural by
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, and that being 1kg or round is not relatively
natural by Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. Hence, my deflationary-friendly
interpretation of naturalness agrees that a and b are similar, but that it is not
clear that a and c are similar.
1a and c might be similar, depending on how they exemplify the property being 1kg or
round. If both a and c exemplify the property in virtue of being 1kg, then they are similar
in virtue of exemplifying the relatively natural property being 1kg.
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Consequently, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness keeps faith with Similar-
ity iff deflationary-unfriendly interpretations of naturalness keep faith with
Similarity. Both might fail to preserve Similarity, depending on how relative
naturalness is defined. For the purpose of my cost-benefit analysis, this is all
that is required: that my deflationary-friendly interpretation enjoys just the
same benefits as deflationary-unfriendly interpretations.
7.4 Duplication and its Corollaries
It is important to note that Intrinsic Properties, Supervenience, and Causation
make no direct reference to natural properties. Instead, they appeal directly
to the notion of a duplicate, which, in Duplicates, is analysed in terms of
perfectly natural properties. Meanwhile, Events appeals directly to the notion
of intrinsicality. Consequently, if Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness preserves
Duplicates, then these additional theoretical roles come ‘for free’.
Happily, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness preserves the theoretical role
represented by Duplicates. On my deflationary-friendly reading, Duplicates
is synonymous with the claim that two individuals a and b are duplicates
iff they instantiate exactly the same perfectly scientific properties. As Lewis
(1983) takes the perfectly scientific properties to just be those properties that
are perfectly natural, Duplicates produces the same set of duplicates on any
interpretation of naturalness.
For example, suppose that a exemplifies two properties: that of being a
quark and that of being north of point x.2 Similarly, b exemplifies two proper-
ties: that of being a quark and that of being south of x. Lewis would want to
say that a and b are duplicates, because they have exactly the same perfectly
natural properties. This is because Lewis takes being a quark to be perfectly
natural, but takes being north of x and being south of x to be properties that are
not perfectly natural. Adopting Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, we reach
the same result. being a quark is a perfectly scientific property, whilst being
north of x and being south of x are not perfectly scientific properties. Hence,
we maintain the result that a and b are duplicates on my deflationary-friendly
interpretation.
2For this toy example, assume that the world consists of a, b and x only.
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We may later discover, on my deflationary-friendly interpretation, that a
and b are not duplicates. This is because it may transpire that being a quark is
not a perfectly scientific property after all – we may ‘break down’ quarks into
more fundamental simples. In this instance, presumably we also find that a
and b each exemplify more than two properties: that they exemplify properties
corresponding to these more fundamental simples. However, given Lewis takes
physics as our best approximation of the perfectly natural properties, he would
also be motivated to deny that a and b are duplicates in this instance. The
deflationary-friendly and deflationary-unfriendly interpretations of naturalness
thus provide the same set of duplicates across all possible worlds, as desired.
From this, it follows that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness keeps faith with
Intrinsic Properties, Supervenience, Events and Causation. They come ‘for
free’ from Duplicates, and we have seen how my deflationary-friendly interpre-
tation delivers the same set of duplicates as a deflationary-unfriendly interpre-
tation.
7.5 Materialism
Materialism is a little more complicated, because of the appeal to alien, natural
properties. Lewis (1983) is anxious to refer to alien, natural properties in
his characterisation of materialism, so that materialism remains a contingent
thesis.3 The thought is that, if two worlds were to differ without differing
physically, this is because something radically different is instantiated at those
worlds that is not instantiated in the actual world. This allows materialism to
remain a contingent thesis, because the actual world could have instantiated
such properties.
We might be concerned by the appeal to alien, natural properties, because
it is difficult to make sense of alien, perfectly scientific properties. A perfectly
scientific property is a property referred to by a primitive predicate in the
language of ideal science. This seems to rule out the possibility of a perfectly
(or relatively) scientific property being alien – if a property is referred to in the
language of ideal science, then it is not alien.
3It might be better to call this thesis ‘physicalism’, to avoid an implicit commitment to
the existence of matter. However, Lewis (1983) calls the thesis ‘materialism’ and I follow
this convention here.
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One response to this concern is to abandon the idea that materialism is a
contingent thesis. Note that this is not to embrace the claim that materialism
must be true: only that, either materialism is necessarily true or material-
ism is necessary false. This might not be considered so great a cost for my
deflationary-friendly interpretation. However, a small cost is still a cost, and I
propose that we can do better. An alternative strategy is to make sense of an
alien, perfectly scientific property.
To achieve this goal, I appeal to counterfactuals. An alien, perfectly sci-
entific property is a property that would have been referred to by primitive
predicates in the language of ideal science if the world had been substantially
different. By Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, I then propose that a property
is an alien, perfectly natural property iff it is an alien, perfectly scientific prop-
erty. An alien, natural property is then an alien, relatively natural property:
a relatively natural property (partly) defined in alien, perfectly natural terms.
This counterfactual understanding of an alien, perfectly scientific property
gives no clue as to what an alien, natural property would be like. However, this
is consistent with deflationary-unfriendly interpretations of naturalness. Part
of the point of an alien property is that it does not admit of examples or an
easy grasp on what such a property would be like – otherwise, it would not be
alien.
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness thus keeps faith with Materialism.
7.6 Conclusion
Consequently, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness preserves the majority of the-
oretical roles proposed for naturalness. It follows that my deflationary-friendly
interpretation of naturalness enjoys many of the benefits of deflationary-unfriendly
interpretations, but without the costs. A plausible cost-benefit analysis there-
fore begins to favour Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness.
However, this happy result faces a significant challenge in the next chapter.
In this chapter, I have assumed that there is a unique, ideal science. We see
that, by challenging this assumption, all the positive results of this chapter are
thrown into doubt. This has the potential to be disastrous for Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness. However, in the next chapter, I argue that Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness does at least as well as its rivals when there is no unique
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science.
An important point worth remembering throughout Part 2 is that my cost-
benefit analysis of Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is comparative. I argued
in §6.4 that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness avoids a cost associated with
its rivals, by avoiding metaphysical commitments to claims about the objective
structure of the world. As long as it also enjoys all the same benefits as its rivals
– even if there are no such benefits – then Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
is defended as the best interpretation of naturalness.

Chapter 8
The Uniqueness of Ideal Science
8.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, we saw how Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness keeps faith
with a variety of naturalness’s theoretical roles. So far, I have assumed that
there is a unique, ideal science. Though, in §6.3, I conceded that there may
be numerous, complete sciences, there I suggested that ideal science is the
candidate theory that would be adopted by the consensus of scientists (when
our attention is restricted to certain kinds of worlds). In this chapter, I apply
more scrutiny to this suggestion and the assumption that there is a unique,
ideal science. As we shall see, the cost-benefit analysis in favour of Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness is complicated by these kinds of considerations.
To remind the reader, an ideal science is a complete science adopted by
consensus of scientists at the closest world w where:
1. Some complete science is discovered at w.
2. Science progresses at w in a way such that what is referred to as ‘science’
at w is recognisably the same discipline as what is referred to as ‘science’
at our world.
3. w shares with our world the best theories.
4. w (broadly) shares with our world the evaluative criteria for determining
the best theories.
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Let us say that an ‘best-world’ is a world meeting the criteria above.
Whether or not there is a unique, ideal science therefore depends on which
best-worlds are closest. In this chapter, I consider three scenarios in which
ideal science is not unique:
1. There is a unique, closest best-world, but there is no consensus among
scientists to adopt a unique theory at that best-world.
2. There are multiple, closest best-worlds, and at each best-world, the con-
sensus of scientists decides on a different complete theory.
3. There is no best-world.
In §8.2, I present the immediate problem for Deflationary-Friendly Natural-
ness if there is not a unique, ideal science. The problem is that, if there is not a
unique, ideal science, the analyses considered in ch.7 become relative to a mul-
titude of distinct theories. This seems to compromise the cost-benefit analysis
in favour of Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness over rival interpretations.
The rest of the chapter pushes back on this point. I argue that Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness does at least as well as its rivals. In §8.3, I consider the
first two scenarios listed above and motivate their possibility. Depending on
how these scenarios are presented, they either pose no threat to Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness’s ‘easy’ theoretical roles, or they are utterly disastrous.
However, I argue that Lewis’s deflationary-unfriendly interpretation of natu-
ralness is equally affected across these scenarios. In §8.4, I consider the third
scenario listed above and motivate its possibility. Again, my argument is that
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does at least as well as its rivals across dif-
ferent specific scenarios, once sensible modifications to the meaning of ‘ideal
science’ are made. In §8.5, I conclude.
8.2 Complicating Easy Theoretical Roles
The scenarios considered in §8.1 are cases where there are either multiple, ideal
sciences, or no ideal science at all.
In the first two scenarios, there are multiple, ideal sciences. In the first
scenario, there is a unique, closest best-world. However, scientists do not find
consensus on a unique science to adopt. By consensus, they instead adopt a
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variety of complete sciences – perhaps for different interests and uses – and
each of these theories is an ideal science. Remember that an ideal sciences
is simply a complete theory adopted by consensus of scientists in the closest
possible best-world to our own.
The second scenario is analogous. There are multiple, closest best-worlds.
At each such best-world, a consensus of scientists decides on a distinct, com-
plete theory. Each of these theories is therefore an ideal science. Each are
complete theories adopted by the consensus of scientists in a closest possible
best-world to our own.
The third scenario presents a case where there is no ideal science. There
is no best-world, so there is no complete theory adopted by the consensus of
scientists in the closest possible best-worlds to our own.
These results impact on the cost-benefit analysis for Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness. In ch.7, I argued that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness keeps
faith with a variety of ‘easy’ theoretical roles. By ‘keep faith’, I mean that
the concepts analysed by naturalness in these theoretical roles are coextensive
across different interpretations of naturalness: that the extensions provided by
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness are identical to the extensions provided by
Lewis. However, if there is no unique, ideal science, this result is put into
doubt.
Consider duplication. By Duplicates, two individuals a and b are duplicates
iff they instantiate exactly the same perfectly natural properties. However, if
there is no unique, ideal science, then there is no unique set of perfectly natural
properties. Suppose that there are multiple ideal sciences. It seems possible
that a and b can be duplicates relative to one ideal science, but fail to be
duplicates relative to another ideal science. Given that Lewis’s deflationary-
unfriendly interpretation of naturalness does not render duplication’s extension
relative to theory, the extension of duplication given by Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness is distinct from the extension of duplication given by Lewis.
Similarly, suppose that there is no ideal science. This result is more dis-
astrous for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. As there is no ideal science,
there are no perfectly natural properties. It follows that all objects trivially
instantiate exactly the same perfectly natural properties. By Duplicates, this
means that all objects are duplicates of one another. This provides an exten-
sion for duplication that is both utterly inadequate, and entirely distinct from
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the extension of duplication given by Lewis.
Meanwhile, as noted in §7.4, many of the theoretical roles for naturalness
analyse concepts in terms of duplication. When we adopt Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness, these issues are inherited across these theoretical roles.
As noted, this complicates the cost-benefit analysis in favour of Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness. At best, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness appears to
diverge from its rivals in the extensions it provides of duplication and related
notions. This means that it is no longer obvious that it enjoys all the same
theoretical benefits as its rivals. At worst, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
offers inadequate extensions of duplications and related notions. This suggests
that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness fails to enjoy some of the theoretical
benefits as its rivals.
This puts into doubt the arguments of ch.7, and appears quite disastrous
for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. However, I propose that things are not
as bad as they first appear for my interpretation.
8.3 No Unique Consensus
In §8.1, I offer three scenarios where there fails to be a unique, ideal science.
The first two types of scenario can be grouped, because they are both kinds of
cases where there is a failure of consensus.
Neither kind of scenario is particularly implausible. In the first, there is a
unique, closest best-world where a number of complete sciences are discovered.
However, at this world, there is no consensus among scientists to adopt a unique
theory. This could be the case if the different, complete sciences heavily overlap.
If they overlap, there may be no particular need to decide upon one theory as
the theory of science.
In the second, there are multiple, closest best-worlds where complete sci-
ences are discovered. Perhaps we can imagine that all the closest best-worlds
are such that substantial, social pressure prompts scientists to agree on a unique
theory. However, there is no reason to presume that consensus will not settle
on a different ideal science at each closest best-world.
Hence, we cannot rule out these types of scenario as implausible or impos-
sible. If things are optimal, then there is one closest best-world, and at this
best-world, consensus leads scientists to adopt a unique, complete theory. This
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provides a unique, ideal science. However, there is no reason to presume things
are optimal as described.
On the other hand, I propose that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does
at least as well as its rivals in these kinds of scenarios. To evaluate this, I
consider a number of sub-scenarios, depending on how lucky we are regarding
the complete sciences that are available at the closest best-worlds. In each
sub-scenario, I argue that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does at least as
well as Lewis’s interpretation of naturalness.
An important point running through this chapter concerns Lewis’s episte-
mology for naturalness. As detailed in ch.6, Lewis treats fundamental physics
as our guide to which properties are perfectly natural. He states that ‘physics
is relevant because it aspires to give an inventory of natural properties – not
a complete inventory, perhaps, but a complete enough inventory to account
for duplication among actual things’ (Lewis 1983, 356-7). This suggests that a
complete, fundamental physics would provide a complete inventory of perfectly
natural properties.
Furthermore, insofar as our actual, fundamental physics is a guide to nat-
uralness, this suggests that Lewis should be most interested in a complete,
fundamental physics discovered at the closest worlds meeting our restrictions.
If a complete, fundamental physics discovered at a very distant world provided
the correct, complete inventory, Lewis would have little reason to think that
our actual, fundamental physics is even a guide to naturalness. This is because
our actual, fundamental physics may not at all resemble a complete, fundamen-
tal physics at some distant world. By restricting our attention to the closest
world – which also shares its best theories with our world – we focus on the
same worlds that Lewis should be concerned with
Consequently, this suggests that Lewis should have similar concerns about
which complete, fundamental physics are discovered at the closest best-worlds.
I make use of this point in what follows.
We are Maximally Lucky
If we are maximally lucky, then there is a unique, complete science adopted by
consensus of scientists at the closest best-world(s). This means that there is a
unique, ideal science.
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To assume that we are maximally lucky is to assume that the three scenar-
ios laid out in §8.1 do not reflect reality. Hence, on the assumption that we
are maximally lucky, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does not render nat-
uralness relative to multiple theories. This avoids the problems discussed in
§8.2.
Similarly, when we are maximally lucky, Lewis’s interpretation of natural-
ness operates smoothly as well. If there is a unique, ideal science, then this
is presumably the science that provides a complete inventory of the perfectly
natural properties. This provides a clear extension for duplication and other
concepts by the theoretical roles considered in ch.7.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that we are maximally lucky in the
way described. We might be relatively lucky, or we might be unlucky.
We are Relatively Lucky
We might measure our luck as a function of various concerns. For example,
it might be partly measured by the number of candidate theories that are
adopted by consensus at the closest best-worlds, where the fewer the number,
the luckier we are. Additionally, an important measure of our luck is how
similar the favoured candidates are, with respect to their ontology. If we are
relatively lucky, the ideal sciences will not say dramatically different things
about what exists.
There are reasons to think that we might be relatively lucky. Given that
we are restricting our attention to best-worlds, we are concerned with worlds
that share best theories with our world. It is plausible that the ideal sciences
at those worlds have very similar ontologies.
Suppose, then, that we are relatively lucky. There are not many ideal
sciences, and they are very similar with regard to their ontologies. Lewis faces
an epistemological problem of knowing which properties are perfectly natural,
because he does not know which ideal science gives the correct inventory of
perfectly natural properties. However, he may nonetheless know the extension
of duplication. This is because distinct, ideal sciences can provide the same
set of duplicates, but provide different reasons for why two individuals are
duplicates.
Following an example given by Button (unpublished), suppose that we are
relatively lucky, and the choice at all closest best-worlds is between two ideal
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sciences, RGB and HSL. Both theories agree that there are properties cor-
responding to colours, that there are properties of Redness, Greenness and
Blueness, and that there are properties of Hue, Saturation and Luminance.
However, RGB treats the properties of Redness, Greenness and Blueness as
perfectly natural, and HSL treats the properties of Hue, Saturation and Lumi-
nance as perfectly natural.
Suppose we have what Button might call a ‘Rainbow World’, which consists
just of spacetime points, each of which has exactly one colour. Suppose that
spacetime points a and b are both in this Rainbow World, and are both a par-
ticular shade of orange. They both exemplify the same properties of Redness,
Greenness and Blueness. Further, they both exemplify the same properties of
Hue, Saturation and Luminance.
According to RGB, a and b are duplicates because they exemplify the same
properties of Redness, Greenness and Blueness. According to HSL, a and b
are duplicates because they exemplify the same properties of Hue, Saturation
and Luminance. The two theories disagree on why a and b are duplicates, but
agree on the extension of duplication.
If we are relatively lucky, then the ideal sciences form this kind of case. On
this assumption, the ideal sciences are definitionally equivalent, in the sense
that the primitives of one theory can be defined in the other theory, and vice
versa. They agree extensionally and intensionally, but differ hyperintension-
ally. In this case, Lewis does not know which properties are perfectly natural
– he does not know whether it is RGB or HSL that provides the correct in-
ventory of perfectly natural properties – but he can give a definitive extension
to duplication nonetheless. This situation is inherited across the theoretical
roles that rely on Duplicates. If we are relatively lucky, the benefits of these
theoretical roles are therefore preserved for Lewis.
However, the case is analogous with those adopting Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness. If we are relatively lucky, then the complete sciences that are
adopted by scientists at the closest best-worlds are few in number, and all have
very similar ontologies. Unlike with Lewis, this does not raise epistemologi-
cal issues with naturalness, but instead renders naturalness relative to distinct
theories. In the example given, and by Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, nat-
uralness itself is relative to our choice between RGB and HSL. On the other
hand, as with Lewis, the deflationary-friendly interpretation offers a unique
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extension for duplication. Duplication, relative to RGB or relative to HSL, has
the same extension. This provides a unique notion of duplication that avoids
the costs for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness discussed in §8.2, a good state
of affairs that is inherited across the theoretical roles that rely on Duplicates.
Consequently, when we are relatively lucky, the theoretical roles considered
in ch.7 are preserved on any interpretation of naturalness. Both Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness and its rivals enjoy the same benefits from these theoret-
ical roles. So far, my uncomplicated cost-benefit analysis is preserved.
We are Unlucky
However, we may not be relatively lucky either. If we are unlucky, the situation
becomes disastrous for both Lewis and those adopting my deflationary-friendly
interpretation.
Suppose that we are unlucky. The ideal sciences are many in number, and
they present remarkably different ontologies.
If this is the case, then Lewis is not in a position to even guess at which
of these theories provides the correct inventory of perfectly natural properties.
It follows that he cannot even guess at which properties are perfectly natural.
By Duplicates, this means that he cannot even guess at which individuals are
duplicates.
The situation for those adopting Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is not
much better. If we are unlucky, then there are many ideal sciences with re-
markably different ontologies. According to Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness,
naturalness (and thus duplication) is relative to the choice of ideal science.
This renders duplication and associated concepts highly relative. If there are
enough ideal sciences, the extensions become so variable relative to theory that
we might start to doubt that these concepts really form cohesive notions at all.
I propose that this situation is disastrous for both Lewis and me, but in
different ways. Those adopting my deflationary-friendly interpretation face a
situation where they possess a concept of duplication, but its extension dif-
fers wildly relative to a multitude of theories. In this case, we might think
that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness’s analysis of duplication is extension-
ally inadequate. Hence, the theoretical roles of Duplication and its related
roles are unsuccessful in these conditions, and confer no theoretical benefits to
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness.
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Lewis does not face this problem of extensional inadequacy when we are
unlucky. However, he achieves this only at the cost of providing no real analysis
of duplication at all. Duplication seeks to analyse duplication in terms of
perfectly natural properties. However, when we are unlucky, Lewis cannot
even guess at which properties are perfectly natural. Hence, the ‘analyses’
offered by Duplicates and its related roles are entirely uninformative. It follows
that Duplicates and its related roles confer no theoretical benefit to Lewis’s
interpretation of naturalness.
Lewis might object that Duplicates is not entirely uninformative when we
are unlucky: it tells us that two individuals are either duplicates, or they are
not duplicates, and there is no in-between. This might be important across
other, related, theoretical roles. Consider Materialism. When we are unlucky,
Lewis can nonetheless say that materialism is either true or false. It is just
that whether materialism is true is unknowable. By contrast, Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness provides the result that the facts of the matter as to
whether materialism is true are theory-relative. Further, it may be that some
metaphysician can prove some important claim p from the assumption that
materialism is true or materialism is false. This confers a substantial benefit
for Lewis’s interpretation of naturalness.
However, we can challenge this point. Our considered metaphysician rea-
sons as follows, when ‘M ’ expresses the truth of materialism, and ‘p’ is some
important metaphysical claim:
1. M ∨ ¬M
2. M→ p
3. ¬M→ p
4. p
However, the deflationist – relative to any ideal science – can simulate the
same reasoning. Hence, the result that p can be agreed upon by everyone,
non-relative to ideal science. With this in mind, it is not obvious that the
relativisation to ideal science imposes any cost here.
Hence, we see that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness and Lewis’s interpre-
tation both meet with equal disaster – when we are unlucky. This preserves the
cost-benefit analysis in favour of Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, because,
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if we are unlucky, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness still enjoys all the same
benefits as its rivals.
This completes my overview of the ways in which the first two scenarios can
come about. Across them all, I argue that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
does at least as well as Lewis’s interpretation. If we are lucky or relatively
lucky, then Duplicates is successful on both interpretations. Otherwise, both
interpretations face trouble. As noted earlier and in §6.3, a number of other
theoretical roles for naturalness follow from Duplication. They inherit the same
situation.
8.4 No Best-Worlds
In the third scenario presented in §8.1, there are no best-worlds: no possible
worlds where a complete science is discovered. By the letter of Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness, my interpretation would say that there are no perfectly
natural properties in such a scenario. As noted in §8.2, this is disastrous for
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness.
A better approach is therefore to modify what is meant by ‘ideal science’.
The thought is that we relax the restriction regarding the discovery of some
complete science at best-worlds. Call this the ‘completeness restriction’. This
allows there to be some best-worlds in the scenario we are considering. How-
ever, the appropriate modification depends on the way this scenario is realised.
I consider the following cases:
1. There exists some most complete sciences at some worlds.
2. There exists no most complete sciences at some world, but there is a
continuous scale of increasingly complete sciences across worlds.
3. There exists no most complete sciences at some world, and there is not
a continuous scale of increasingly complete sciences across worlds.
I argue that the first two realisations of the third scenario are such that
straightforward modifications of the completeness restriction are available. These
modifications prevent there from being no ideal sciences. Meanwhile, if the
third realisation reflects reality, then this is disastrous for Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness. However, I argue that it is equally disastrous for Lewis’s deflationary-
unfriendly interpretation of naturalness. This means that Deflationary-Friendly
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Naturalness does at least as well as Lewis’s interpretation across these scenar-
ios, protecting my cost-benefit analysis.
As before, I rely on Lewis’s epistemology for naturalness, which is reliant
on approximating some complete theory of fundamental physics.
For readability, it will be helpful to abbreviate ‘worlds meeting our restric-
tions 2-4’ as ‘best*-worlds’. As such, a best*-world w may or may not be such
that a complete science is discovered at w. However, a best*-world w is such
that
2. Science progresses at w in a way such that what is referred to as ‘science’
at w is recognisably the same discipline as what is referred to as ‘science’
at our world.
3. w shares with our world the best theories.
4. w (broadly) shares with our world the evaluative criteria for determining
the best theories.
There are Some Most Complete Sciences Discovered at Some
Best*-Worlds
In the first case, there is no complete science discovered at any best*-world,
but there are some sciences discovered at some best*-worlds such that no other
theory at any other best*-world is more complete. For example, there might
be principled limitations on what can be known, thus preventing scientists
discovering a complete science in any best*-world. However, this means that
we can have sciences up to this limit, forming the set of most complete sciences,
and the best*-worlds where they are discovered.
If we inhabit this kind of scenario, then the sensible modification for the
completeness restriction is as follows:
1a. The most complete science discovered (among all best*-worlds) is discov-
ered at w.
This avoids there being no ideal sciences. It may be that there are mul-
tiple ideal sciences. This occurs if there are multiple, most complete theories
adopted by the consensus of scientists at the closest best-worlds. However,
these cases are analogous to those discussed in §8.3. There, it is shown that
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Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does at least as well as Lewis’s interpretation
of naturalness.
There is a Continuous Scale of Increasingly Complete
Sciences Discovered across Best*-Worlds
In the second case, there is no complete science discovered at any best*-world,
nor is there a most complete science discovered at any best*-world. Instead,
there is an infinite chain of increasingly complete sciences across best*-worlds
where they are discovered. This scenario might come about if every possible
best*-world suffers a mass extinction event. If the completeness of science is
simply limited by time, it may be that science becomes more complete the later
the mass extinction event at that best*-world is.
If we inhabit this kind of scenario, then we should amend our notion of
ideal science in terms of the limit of this continuous scale, and eliminate the
completeness restriction entirely. We say that
Ideal science is a complete science adopted by consensus of scientists at
the (closest) limiting case(s) of this continuous scale of worlds w1, w2, ...
when
2a. Science progresses at each of w1, w2, ... in a way such that what is
referred to as ‘science’ at each of w1, w2, ... is recognisably the same
discipline as what is referred to as ‘science’ at our world.
3a. Each of w1, w2, ... shares with our world the best theories.
4a. Each of w1, w2, ... (broadly) shares with our world the evaluative criteria
for determining the best theories.
Again, this avoids there being no ideal sciences in this kind of scenario.
There may be multiple ideal sciences, but these cases are handled by §8.3,
where it is shown that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does at least as well
as Lewis’s interpretation of naturalness.
8.4. NO BEST-WORLDS 107
There is No Most Complete Science Discovered at Some
Best*-World, and No Continuous Scale of Increasingly
Complete Sciences Discovered across Best*-Worlds
In the third and final case, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness encounters sig-
nificant difficulty. There is no most complete science discovered at some best*-
world, so I cannot relax the completeness restriction in terms of most complete
theories. Nor is there a continuous scale of increasingly complete sciences dis-
covered across best*-worlds, so I cannot appeal to the idea of a limit on these
best*-worlds. This scenario might come about if every possible best*-world suf-
fers a mass extinction event, science becomes more complete over time at each
best*-world, and science is characterised at each world by periods of scientific
revolution, in which science dramatically changes.1
In this scenario, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness faces disaster. There is
no ideal science, and thus no set of perfectly natural properties. By Duplicates,
all individuals are duplicates: a disastrous result. This situation is inherited
across the related, theoretical roles for naturalness, such that Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness seems to constitute no theoretical benefit whatsoever.
Fortunately, it is plausible that Lewis’s interpretation of naturalness faces
analogous disaster in this scenario. In this scenario, no complete fundamen-
tal physics is discovered at any best*-world, so it is metaphysically impossible
to discover the correct (complete) inventory of perfectly natural properties.
Moreover, because science is characterised by periods of scientific revolution,
our current fundamental physics is unlikely to much resemble the fundamental
physics that provides the most complete inventory of perfectly natural proper-
ties. Hence, Lewis cannot even approximate at which properties are perfectly
natural.
It follows that Duplicates is entirely uninformative: Lewis cannot even guess
which properties are perfectly natural, so cannot even guess which individuals
are duplicates. This situation is inherited across all related, theoretical roles.
We therefore face a scenario in which Lewis’s interpretation of naturalness
renders naturalness entirely uninformative and mysterious, and my interpre-
tation of naturalness provides an empty set of perfectly natural properties.
Both interpretations – in this scenario – are utterly unsuited for their theoret-
1A` la Kuhn (1970).
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ical roles, and cannot enjoy any benefits from them. However, Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness still enjoys the same benefits as Lewis’s interpretation.
If naturalness is to play any theoretical roles on any interpretation, we had
better hope that we are not in this kind of scenario. On the other hand –
disastrous though they are – such scenarios do not threaten my comparative
cost-benefit analysis in favour of Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness.
8.5 Conclusion
I am in a position to conclude my discussion regarding the uniqueness of ideal
science.
If things are optimal, then there is a unique, ideal science. There is a unique,
closest best-world and scientists adopt a unique, complete theory by consensus
at that world. However, this chapter has raised the point that we cannot take
this optimal situation for granted.
I have considered a number of scenarios that range from unproblematic to
disastrous for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. However, where a scenario
has been disastrous, I have argued that Lewis’s interpretation of naturalness
faces an equally disastrous, epistemic problem. Though the problems fac-
ing each interpretation are distinct, they are plausibly equally bad. Hence,
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does at least as well as its rivals in a cost-
benefit analysis. This allows me to bracket concerns about the uniqueness of
ideal science in this thesis.
However, it is worth taking a moment to consider just how disastrous some
scenarios are for naturalness theorists. It may be that naturalness theorists are
making pivotal assumptions about how lucky we are, or which best*-worlds are
closest, upon which their entire metaphysics depend. At best, these assump-
tions require defence. At worst, the entire idea of there being natural properties
rests upon a foundation of sand. I leave this as a speculative concern that may
merit a future project.
Chapter 9
Mental Content
9.1 Introduction
This chapter considers a theoretical role for naturalness that is incompati-
ble with Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness: Mental Content. If this theoret-
ical role constitutes a theoretical benefit to deflationary-unfriendly interpre-
tations of naturalness, then this threatens the cost-benefit analysis in favour
of Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. I therefore seek to show that Mental
Content fails to confer any theoretical benefit on any interpretation of natural-
ness. This protects my cost-benefit analysis, because it defends the claim that
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness enjoys all the same benefits as its rivals.
Mental Content groups two related roles for naturalness. The first role is
to mount an objection to Putnam’s (1981) permutation arguments, and the
second is to meet Kripke’s (1982) rule-following paradox. I group the two roles
in Part 2 because they work in essentially the same way. Lewis’s (1983) thought
is that naturalness acts as an objective constraint on reference:
Mental Content: The content of an intentional state is constrained by
what is natural.
I consider Putnam’s permutation arguments in §9.2-§9.4. In §9.2, I explain
Putnam’s argument and Lewis’s appeal to naturalness in response. In §9.3, I
explain why deflationary-friendly interpretations of naturalness are incompat-
ible with this role. To meet this problem, I argue that this theoretical role
is problematic for any interpretation of naturalness, in §9.4. In §9.5-§9.7, I
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consider Kripke’s rule-following paradox. The structure of this discussion is
analogous. First, I introduce what is at issue, in §9.5. In §9.6, I show that
the deflationary-friendly interpretation makes naturalness unsuited to meeting
Kripke’s paradox. In §9.7, I argue that this theoretical role is problematic for
any interpretation of naturalness. Finally, §9.8 concludes.
9.2 Putnam’s Permutation Arguments
Putnam (1981) demonstrates, as Button puts it, that ‘any theory with a non-
trivial model has many distinct isomorphic models with the same domain’
(Button 2013, 15). From this, it seems to follow that reference is indeterminate.
It is to this problem that Lewis (1983) applies naturalness. To fully appreciate
the problem Putnam raises, and Lewis’s response, it is helpful to consider
Lewis’s theory of interpretation more generally.
Lewis (1984) argues that the correct interpretation is one that best balances
fit with eligibility. Williams (2011) explains what fit consists in. First, we pair
sentences with their truth-conditions, to form a pairing-list. We might discover
these truth-conditions by observing a community’s linguistic behaviour: for
example, when they are prepared to affirm a sentence and when they are not.
A semantic theory fits iff it assigns semantic values to sentences that match
the pairings on the pairing-list.
We can make fit more or less complex by stipulating what it means to
match the pairings on the pairing-list. Williams suggests that, ‘to keep things
simple, let’s understand ‘Fit’ in the most na¨ıve fashion as the requirement that
the semantic theory predicts a pairing of sentences and contents that exactly
matches those that appear on the target list’ (Williams 2011, 3). He notes that
Lewis (1975) provides more sophisticated elaborations of fit.
With Lewis’s theory of interpretation in mind, Putnam’s permutation ar-
gument shows that fit alone fails to uniquely select the correct interpretation.
Suppose that the target of Putnam’s argument has an ideal theory – one that
exemplifies all the theoretical virtues and makes predictions consistent with all
observable facts (it is ‘empirically adequate’). This theory has many, distinct,
isomorphic models. As they are isomorphic, we cannot single out which unique
model we are using by appealing to fit alone. Hence, if fit exhausts our inter-
pretative constraints, it is massively indeterminate which model we are using.
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Worse yet, the different models say wildly different things. Reference itself
seems indeterminate.
This is why Lewis (1984) takes the correct interpretation to be the semantic
theory that best balances fit with eligibility. The eligibility of a theory is the
degree to which its predicates refer to natural properties. This rules out many
permutations, drastically reducing the indeterminacy we have to deal with.
We can demonstrate these ideas with a toy example about two cats, Miaomi
and Celly, and one human, Laura. Consider the following model:
Domain:
{Miaomi, Celly, Laura}.
Constants:
a: Miaomi
b: Celly
c: Laura
Predicates:
Fx: x is a cat.
Gx: x is a human.
It follows that
Fa, Fb, ¬Fc, ¬Ga, ¬Gb and Gc.
Putnam points out that we can offer isomorphic permutations on this model.
One such permutation is as follows:
Domain:
{Miaomi, Celly, Laura}.
Constants:
a: Laura
b: Celly
c: Miaomi
Predicates:
Fx: x is a cat and x ≠ Miaomi, or x = Laura.
Gx: x = Miaomi.
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It follows, as before, that
Fa, Fb, ¬Fc, ¬Ga, ¬Gb and Gc.
For each model, we use Robinson’s diagram lemma to provide names for
each element of the model. It follows that the two models are indistinguishable
by the truth-value of their atomic sentences, and thus by the truth-value of their
non-atomic sentences as well. The concern is that regardless of our intention
to apply the first interpretation, there is no way of telling that we are not
working with the second. The problem intensifies, because we can offer many
more isomorphic interpretations. This makes reference indeterminate, because
saying ‘Fa’ says something different depending on the interpretation.
This is where Lewis’s response comes in. Both models equally fit. However,
the first is more eligible than the second. This is because the properties being a
human and being a cat are more natural than the properties being a cat that is
not Miaomi, or being Laura and being Miaomi. Hence the first interpretation
is better than the second.
This application of naturalness helps to wean out the correct interpretation
from its permutations. The isomorphic models equally fit, but some are more
eligible than others. Hence, the best balance of fit and eligibility favours the
model that is more eligible, and selects it as the correct interpretation.
Putnam (1984) responds to Lewis with his ‘just-more-theory’ manoeuvre.
The thought is that our theory of which properties are natural is just more
theory, which is susceptible to permutation. Hence the reference of ‘perfectly
natural’ or ‘relatively natural’ is indeterminate. It follows that naturalness
cannot constrain reference unless we already have a solution to Putnam’s ar-
gument.
However, this argument is criticised as question-begging. Lewis argues that
it is not the theory of natural properties that constrains reference, but instead
the theory-independent, natural properties themselves. The thought is that
these properties constrain reference before we have a theory of their natural-
ness. Hence, it is question-begging to say that it is indeterminate which model
of naturalness theory we are using: this assumes that those natural properties
have already failed to constrain reference.
This, then, is the theoretical role for naturalness in meeting Putnam’s per-
mutation argument.
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9.3 Putnam’s Permutation Argument and
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is unsuited for this theoretical role. This is
because my interpretation offers the naturalness theorist no defence against the
just-more-theory manoeuvre.
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness equates the perfectly natural properties
with the perfectly scientific properties. The latter are those properties referred
to by primitive predicates in a theory of a complete science. To determine
which properties are perfectly natural, we therefore must interpret a theory of
a complete science. However, this is straightforwardly just more theory.
Consider again Lewis’s (1984) response to the just-more-theory manoeuvre.
He argues that it is not the theory of naturalness that constrains reference,
but the natural properties themselves. Suppose I made an analogous response,
working with Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. The argument is that it is not
the theory of a complete science (that determine which properties are natural)
that constrains reference, but the natural properties themselves.
This argument is problematic. This is because theories of complete sci-
ences don’t simply discover which properties are perfectly scientific (and thus
perfectly natural). Instead, they determine which properties are perfectly nat-
ural. This is a disanalogy with deflationary-unfriendly interpretations of nat-
uralness. Lewis can claim that our theories help discover which properties are
perfectly natural – it is an objective, theory-independent fact which proper-
ties are perfectly natural. Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is incompatible
with this kind of claim. It is not an objective, theory-independent fact which
properties are perfectly natural: otherwise the interpretation would fail to be
deflationary-friendly.
Consequently, Putnam’s (1984) just-more-theory manoeuvre does not beg
the question when applied against Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. Hence,
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness cannot play this theoretical role.
We want to make the cost-benefit analysis between interpretations of nat-
uralness as straightforward as possible. Therefore, we want Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness to enjoy the same theoretical benefits as other inter-
pretations (but with fewer costs). We see that Deflationary-Friendly Natu-
ralness cannot enjoy this theoretical benefit. As such, I make the argument
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that deflationary-unfriendly interpretations of naturalness cannot enjoy this
theoretical benefit either.
9.4 Problems with Lewis’s Response to Putnam
In this section, I consider a dilemma affecting Lewis’s response to Putnam.
It shows that deflationary-unfriendly naturalness fails to enjoy a benefit that
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does not.
The dilemma’s structure is as follows. On the first horn, I assume that Lewis
is committed to a form of realism known as ‘external realism’, and with it the
credo of Cartesianism. This commits Lewis to the idea that an ideal theory
might be radically false. The next subsection argues that, on the assumption
of Cartesianism, appeals to naturalness fail to meet Putnam’s permutation
argument.
On the second horn, I assume that Lewis is not committed to external
realism. As Putnam’s target is the external realist, it follows that naturalness
plays no theoretical role in defending against Putnam’s permutation argument.
However, the Lewisian might insist that naturalness plays some role in fixing
reference. The second subsection argues that appealing to naturalness fails to
explain much about how reference is fixed. It follows that this theoretical role
fails to confer any theoretical benefits to naturalness.
The First Horn: Button and the Just-More-Theory
Manoeuvre
On the first horn, Lewis is committed to a particular form of realism: external
realism. The following discussion is owed to Button (2013) and his defence of
the just-more-theory manoeuvre.
Button emphasises that the just-more-theory manoeuvre must be taken
seriously by a particular kind of realist, and that this kind of realist is the
target of Putnam’s permutation arguments. Button argues that the just-more-
theory manoeuvre is defensible on the following three assumptions, adopted by
the external realist: Independence, Correspondence and Cartesianism:
Independence: The world is (mostly) made up of mind-, theory and
language-independent things.
9.4. PROBLEMS WITH LEWIS’S RESPONSE TO PUTNAM 115
Correspondence: Truth involves some unique correspondence relation be-
tween words etc. and external things etc.
Cartesianism: An ideal theory might be radically false.
Button links Cartesianism with a more general commitment to the ‘brack-
eting’ of appearances from what is true. Button writes that
the external realist generically worries about nightmarish Cartesian scep-
tical hypotheses. These essentially come down to the following worry: a
theory could get everything right with regard to appearances and still be
undetectably and radically false. In order to have this worry, the external
realist must think that it is possible to consider appearances whilst some-
how bracketing away their reference, designation, correspondence and so
forth. That is, she is happy to talk about bracketed appearances herself
(Button 2013, 46).
Suppose that the external realist characterises ‘appearances’ in terms of di-
rect, empirical evidence.1 For such an external realist, Cartesianism constructs
a border between what has empirical content and what does not. The ideal
theory – one that maximally meets the theoretical virtues, and is empirically
adequate – demarcates the boundary of empirical content: what is confirmable
by the empirical evidence that is available. Cartesianism is the thesis that our
ideal theory might be radically false. The thought is that all available, empirical
evidence could be the trick of some evil daemon, or the hallucination of a brain
in a vat. Button frames his defence of Putnam’s just-more-theory manoeuvre
around this commitment to Cartesianism. It is thus of vital importance that
the target of Putnam’s argument is the external realist.
Button constructs a dilemma for the external realist. The Lewisian exter-
nal realist appeals to objective (and therefore theory-independent) naturalness
as a constraint on reference. However, because Cartesianism draws a border
between our ideal theory and objective reality, we can construct the following
dilemma. Either the claim that naturalness constrains reference is part of the
1Button (2013) notes that the external realist can characterise ‘appearances’ in a number
of ways. However, he demonstrates that Putnam’s arguments apply against any kind of ‘veil’
the external realist constructs. The basic point is that each form of bracketing separates the
ideal from the true. For sake of simplicity, I focus on the typical case of the ‘bracketed
empiricist’.
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ideal theory, or it is not. If it is part of the ideal theory, then the just-more-
theory manoeuvre against appeals to naturalness cannot be accused of question
begging. The claim that naturalness constrains reference is explicitly part of
the theory, and thus liable to permutation.
On the other horn of the dilemma, the claim that naturalness constrains
reference is not part of the ideal theory. However, the ideal theory demarcates
the limits of empirical content. Hence, the idea that naturalness constrains
reference lacks empirical content. To appeal to naturalness as a constraint on
reference is to appeal to magic.
The external realist might seek to bite the bullet, and accept Putnam’s
permutation argument as presenting just one more sceptical scenario. The
thought is that Cartesianism already commits the external realist to accepting
the possibility of various sceptical scenarios, and that Putnam’s is just another
form of scepticism worth considering. Given that the external realist is used to
other forms of scepticism, the risk of accepting another should not lead them
to abandon external realism.
Button’s response is that this new form of semantic, sceptical doubt is
paradoxical. To express scepticism about successful reference is paradoxical,
because we are relying on successful reference to express scepticism about suc-
cessful reference.
The external realist, therefore, cannot appeal to semantic scepticism with-
out their position collapsing into coherence. Button (2013, 57) argues that
Putnam’s arguments ‘act as a machine that converts Cartesian angst into Kan-
tian angst’. Cartesianism commits the external realist to a bracketing of the
world, between ideal theory and truth. If the claim that naturalness constrains
reference is part of the ideal theory, then the just-more-theory manoeuvre is
not question-begging. If the claim is not part of the ideal theory, then ap-
pealing to naturalness is like appealing to magic – it lacks empirical content.
Meanwhile, the external realist cannot bite the bullet and accept semantic
scepticism, because that collapses their position into paradoxical incoherence.
The appeal to naturalness as a constraint on reference therefore fails against
Putnam’s permutation argument.
In response to Button’s dilemma, the external realist may make the follow-
ing, transcendental argument:
1. Our thoughts express claims about the world.
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2. For this to be possible, something must constrain reference.
3. Something fixes reference.
However, there are severe limitations with this argument. Firstly, there
are reasons to doubt that the second premise is true. Remember that Put-
nam’s argument applies directly to an external realist. Other theories, realist
or otherwise, aren’t susceptible to Putnam’s argument. Hence, we can abandon
external realism rather than commit ourselves to some constraint on reference.
Secondly, as Button notes, the conclusion of this transcendental argument
is very weak. All it allows the external realist to assert is that ‘something (one
knows not what) fixes reference’ (2013, 62). By Cartesianism, this ‘something’
– unspecified and thus not part of the ideal theory – lacks empirical content.
Hence, it is an appeal to magic.
Thirdly, and perhaps most directly relevant to this thesis, the transcenden-
tal argument does not find a theoretical role for naturalness. The argument
does not establish that naturalness constrains reference: only that something
does. Consequently, if the external realist makes this argument, appeals to
naturalness are redundant.
This undermines the theoretical role for naturalness in meeting Putnam’s
permutation argument. Appealing to naturalness does not help the external
realist in meeting Putnam’s permutation argument. Lewis can accuse the just-
more-theory manoeuvre of question-begging, but only if he is willing to abandon
external realism. Specifically, Lewis must reject the commitment to Cartesian-
ism. However, once external realism is rejected, then appeals to naturalness
against Putnam’s arguments are no longer required.
The Lewisian might respond that naturalness contributes something to ref-
erence. They might concede that appeals to naturalness are not required to
meet Putnam’s permutation argument, but contend that the ‘something’ that
fixes reference is naturalness. The next subsection undermines the theoretical
benefits of such claims.
The Second Horn: Naturalness as Unexplanatory
On the second horn, I assume that Lewis is not committed to external real-
ism. This abandons any theoretical benefits from defending against Putnam’s
permutation arguments: which, after all, target the external realist. However,
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naturalness may have a theoretical role in explaining how reference is fixed.
This subsection argues that this theoretical role fails to confer any theoretical
benefits to naturalness.
My argument is based on the fact that Lewis has not yet explained why the
natural properties constrain reference. The thought is that saying naturalness
constrains reference is unexplanatory, and thus confers no theoretical benefit.
Assume, for the time being, that naturalness-constraints on reference ade-
quately meet Putnam’s permutation argument. In other words, suppose that
if our reference is constrained by naturalness, then many permutations are
ruled out. This may motivate thinking that naturalness does, somehow, con-
strain reference. However, I propose that Lewis still owes an explanation of
how naturalness manages to do so.
Lewis suggests that the relatively natural properties are reference magnets.
However, this seems dangerously close to simply renaming the problem of why
naturalness constrains reference. The immediate response is to ask why the
relatively natural properties are reference magnets.
This forms a dilemma. On one horn, the naturalness theorist offers no ex-
planation of why natural properties are reference magnets. This means that
they are appealing to brute fact – that natural properties just are reference
magnets. This undermines the theoretical utility of appealing to naturalness
in the first place. We could instead just appeal directly to reference mag-
netism and argue that some interpretations are more magnetic than others.
This does not appeal to naturalness, because the phenomenon underpinning
reference magnetism may be something quite distinct from the phenomenon
underpinning, for example, duplication.
For example, suppose that we asked why the predicate ‘green’ refers to
the property of being green, and not the property of being grue. Lewis might
respond that the property of being green is a reference magnet and the prop-
erty of being grue is not. He might add that the property of being green is
relatively natural, and the property of being grue is unnatural. However, on
the first horn of this dilemma, he declines to explain the connection between
reference magnetism and naturalness. My point is that the appeal to natural-
ness is superfluous in this explanation of why the predicate ‘green’ refers to
the property of being green. Lewis could have stopped once he said that the
property being green is a reference magnet. It is not clear what explanatory
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value is gained by further appealing to naturalness.
On the second horn, the naturalness theorist explains that the natural prop-
erties are reference magnets because of some good-making feature that they
share. This undermines the theoretical utility of appealing to naturalness, be-
cause we could instead just appeal directly to that good-making feature and
not mention naturalness at all.
An example will help explain what I mean. Consider the following expla-
nation of why some properties are reference magnets:
How we think and conceptualise is partly determined by our biology
and how our brains function. This may be susceptible to evolutionary
influences, if it is better (for survival) to conceptualise in certain ways.
The properties that best correspond to these biological constraints are
reference magnets, because they best match with how we organically
conceptualise.
I am not wedded to this explanation being true, and I doubt that it is
complete (the explanation is likely to be much more complex, and involve
socio-linguistic factors). However, I propose that it is not entirely implausible
as an explanation of why some properties are reference magnets. The issue is
that the explanation doesn’t mention naturalness, nor does it need to. Instead,
it appeals to the good-making feature of being evolutionarily useful.
Hence, we can just appeal to this good-making feature and not mention
naturalness. This provides us with reference magnetism. It follows that we
can meet Putnam’s permutation argument without bringing in naturalness at
all. To demonstrate this point, suppose we adopted the above explanation of
reference magnetism. Some properties are reference magnets, such that we
organically favour models that fit our biological, conceptual schemes. Permu-
tations that are dramatically at odds with how we organically conceptualise
are ruled out, thus greatly diminishing the number of permutations that are
available.
The more general worry is that any explanation of why some properties are
reference magnets introduces a good-making feature that makes naturalness re-
dundant for meeting Putnam’s permutation argument. Rather than the good-
making feature corresponding to an explanation that underpins naturalness-
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constraints on reference, it corresponds to an explanation that constitutes an
alternative response to Putnam.
This completes the dilemma. On the first horn, the naturalness theorist
argues that it is brute fact that natural properties are reference magnets. This
threatens to make the appeal to naturalness redundant, because if we are not
in the business of offering explanations then we might as well appeal directly
to reference magnetism. On the second horn, the naturalness theorist explains
that natural properties share a good-making feature that makes them refer-
ence magnets. This again makes the appeal to naturalness redundant, because
we can instead appeal directly to this good-making feature to deliver refer-
ence magnetism. Either way, naturalness has no theoretical utility in meeting
Putnam’s permutation argument.
I conclude that these problems show that this theoretical role constitutes
no benefit for positing naturalness, even on a deflationary-unfriendly interpre-
tation.
9.5 Kripke’s Rule-Following Paradox
Kripke’s paradox, meanwhile, proceeds by noting that whenever we intend to
follow a rule, there are multiple interpretations of the rule that equally fit past
adherence to the rule. Hence, it is indeterminate which rule we are actually
following. As an example, assume person A has never performed addition on
numbers greater than n.2 Her past usage of the ‘+’ symbol, therefore, fits both
addition and quaddition, when quaddition is defined as follows:
Quaddition: When all numbers involved in a quaddition are equal to or
smaller than n, quaddition is identical to addition. When some number
involved in a quaddition is greater than n, the answer = 5.
The paradox, then, is that there is massive indeterminacy with regards to
which rule we are following. Kripke argues that various measures that might be
mustered to reduce this indeterminacy, such as intending to add rather than
quadd, are themselves rules that require interpretation. Such measures fall
prey to the paradox and so cannot help us escape it.
2For any individual, there is some n such that that individual has never performed
addition on numbers greater than n.
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As before, Lewis (1983) employs naturalness to provide a constraint on
mental content. Our mental content is constrained both by past adherence to
the rule (for which addition and quaddition are equally successful) and which
candidate is most natural (for which addition wins out over quaddition).
We can see that this theoretical role for naturalness closely resembles how
naturalness is supposed to meet Putnam’s permutation arguments. Lewis sug-
gests that the correct interpretation is that which achieves the best balance
of fit and eligibility. Addition and quaddition both fit the speaker’s linguistic
behaviour equally well, but addition is more eligible than quaddition. Hence,
interpreting the speaker as adding, rather than quadding, is the better inter-
pretation.
To draw an even closer analogy, we can make a comparison between Put-
nam’s just-more-theory manoeuvre and what we might call the ‘just-more-
interpretation’ manoeuvre. For example, Kripke might respond that taking
naturalness to constrain reference requires following a rule about interpreta-
tion, that is:
To select the correct interpretation, select the interpretation that best
balances fit and eligibility.
This rule must itself be interpreted, and so is just more interpretation.
Hence, we cannot use naturalness to constrain interpretation unless we have
already solved the paradox. In response, the Lewisian may accuse the just-
more-interpretation manoeuvre as question-begging. The thought is that nat-
uralness itself constrains our interpretations, rather than our interpretation of
rules about naturalness and interpretation. Hence, the just-more-interpretation
manoeuvre assumes that naturalness has already failed to constrain interpre-
tation, and is question-begging.
9.6 Kripke’s Rule-Following Paradox and
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is unsuited to the theoretical role of meet-
ing Kripke’s rule-following paradox. It renders naturalness relative to the-
ory. Hence, we need to be able to interpret that theory in order to appeal
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to naturalness-constraints on interpretation. It follows that the just-more-
interpretation manoeuvre is not question-begging against deflationary-friendly
interpretations of naturalness.
For more detail, the reader should refer to §9.3, as the case is entirely
analogous.
9.7 Problems with Lewis’s Response to Kripke
As with Putnam’s permutation argument, Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
is incompatible with this theoretical role in meeting Kripke’s paradox. To
avoid muddying the waters of our cost-benefit analysis between Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness and its rivals, I must show that deflationary-unfriendly
interpretations of naturalness cannot enjoy any benefits from this theoretical
role. I consider two problems with Lewis’s response to Kripke, both of which
mirror problems found with Lewis’s response to Putnam in §9.4. These parallels
should not surprise us, as naturalness is applied analogously in each case.
Merino-Rajme and the Just-More-Interpretation Manoeuvre
The first problem is raised by Merino-Rajme (2015). There are parallels be-
tween Merino-Rajme’s argument and Button’s (2013) defence of the just-more-
theory manoeuvre. However, they are dissimilar enough to justify detailing
Merino-Rajme’s argument in full.
As with Button, Merino-Rajme argues that Lewis fails to fully appreciate
the context in which Kripke’s paradox is raised. She argues that the real
Kripkean paradox is the apparent unavailability of meaning facts that can
guide a subject:
The Guidance Constraint: ‘meaning facts – i.e. facts determining what
a subject means by a sign or word – must be constituted by something
capable of guiding the subject in applying the sign or word in accordance
with what she means by this sign or word’ (Merino-Rajme 2015, 169).
Merino-Rajme’s point is as follows. Suppose that we are confronted with
the puzzle 124 + 235 = x, and we are told to solve for x. Suppose that we
write that x = 359. We might have written that x = 359 because we were
guided by meaning facts about addition. However, we might also have written
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that x = 359 by random, or due to some causal influences unknown to us. The
important intuition is that only the first instance of writing that x = 359 – only
when we are guided by some meaning facts about addition – is an example of
rule-following. This motivates something like the guidance constraint.
However, the natural property being addition cannot be grasped directly.
The property being addition is an infinite set of ordered triples {<1, 1, 2>, <2,
2, 4>, ...} and our minds are finite. Hence, Merino-Rajme notes, we either
grasp the natural property indirectly, or not at all.
Here, we can construct a parallel dilemma to that which Button raises
against the external realist. If we grasp the natural property being addition
indirectly, then we are grasping addition via interpretation. If this is the case,
then the just-more-interpretation manoeuvre cannot be accused of question-
begging, and the naturalness-constraint fails to meet Kripke’s paradox.
Alternatively, if we don’t grasp addition indirectly, then we don’t grasp
addition at all. This is because we cannot grasp addition directly. It follows
that the property of being addition cannot guide us. Instead, its influence is
akin to some causal influence that makes us write that x = 359 ‘randomly’.
Given that this is not what it is to follow a rule, Kripke’s paradox remains.
An analogous transcendental argument to that considered in §9.4 might be
considered:
1. We follow the rule given by addition.
2. For this to be possible, something must allow us to grasp addition.
3. Something allows us to grasp addition.
Without the commitment to Cartesianism, this transcendental argument is
not an appeal to a magical solution. However, it fails to explain what allows
us to grasp addition, and what the role for naturalness might be. This forms
the basis of the second problem.
Naturalness as Unexplanatory
The second problem is provided by the intuition that Lewis owes us an expla-
nation of why the natural properties constrain interpretation. The thought is
that it is not satisfactory to say that it is brute fact that the natural properties
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act as a constraint on interpretation: there should be something linking those
properties directly to how we think and interpret rules.
The argument is analogous to that given in §9.4, so here I only summarise
the case. The claim that natural properties constrain interpretation is either
brute fact, or admits of explanation. If it is brute fact, then this is unexplana-
tory and we might as well appeal directly to interpretative constraints. If the
claim admits of explanation, then such explanations will assign the natural
properties a good-making feature that explains their role in constraining inter-
pretation. This renders the appeal to naturalness redundant, because we could
appeal directly to this good-making feature. Either way, it appears that the
appeal to naturalness is redundant and of no theoretical benefit.
9.8 Conclusion
It is worth briefly summarising before moving on to another role for naturalness.
I have argued that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is incompatible with
the theoretical role of Mental Content. However, I have argued that deflationary-
unfriendly interpretations of naturalness cannot enjoy any comparative bene-
fit from this theoretical role. This is because it is plausible that appeals to
deflationary-unfriendly naturalness are unsuccessful in meeting the problems
posed by Putnam and Kripke.
This protects the cost-benefit analysis favouring Deflationary-Friendly Nat-
uralness. If Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness can enjoy the same theoretical
benefits of its rivals, but with fewer costs, then a plausible cost-benefit analysis
favours it as the correct interpretation of naturalness.
Chapter 10
Lawhood
10.1 Introduction
This chapter considers another theoretical role for naturalness that is incom-
patible with Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness: Law of Nature. As in ch.9, the
purpose of this chapter is to defend my uncomplicated cost-benefit analysis in
favour of Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. If Law of Nature constitutes a the-
oretical benefit to deflationary-unfriendly interpretations of naturalness, then
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness does not enjoy all the same benefits as its
rivals. In this chapter, I argue that Law of Nature fails to constitute a theoret-
ical benefit, on any interpretation of naturalness. It follows that Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness enjoys the same benefits as its rivals (but more cheaply),
thus protecting my cost-benefit analysis in favour of Deflationary-Friendly Nat-
uralness.
Lewis (1983) proposes that lawhood should be analysed (partly) in terms
of naturalness:
Law of Nature: A law of nature is a true generality in our best theory
of the world, when competing theories are presented in perfectly natural
terms.
This is known as Lewis’s Best Systems Analysis, or BSA. Note that Law
of Nature is an reductive analysis of lawhood, rather than simply presenting a
coextensional claim about laws. Law of Nature is not merely the claim that
the set of laws is identical with the set of true generalities in our best theory
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of the world. Instead, it offers an analysis that is purported to offer theoretical
benefits: helping to explain what lawhood amounts to, by appealing to the
notion of our best theory.
In §10.2, I fully explicate the BSA. In §10.3, I argue that Law of Nature is
incompatible with Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. I therefore turn to the
project of undermining Law of Nature – and thus the BSA – as a satisfactory
account of lawhood. In §10.4, I focus on Woodward’s (2014) argument that
appeals to simplicity, whilst justified in the context of ordinary science, are un-
justified in the context of the BSA. Furthermore, Woodward raises doubts that
the practice of actual scientists is adequately described by a trade-off between
simplicity and strength, as the BSA suggests. In §10.5, I propose expansions
to Woodward’s arguments. Any appeal to simplicity justified on the basis
of tracking truth cannot be justified in the context of the BSA, because the
theories being compared in that context are already known to be true. Fur-
thermore, I believe that Woodward’s arguments apply analogously to strength.
The consequence is that the BSA seems unscientific and thus unsuited as an
analysis of scientific lawhood.
In §10.6, I introduce and address an objection against Woodward’s argu-
ments. This holds that appeals to simplicity are justified in other contexts, and
that these justifications vicariously apply in the context of the BSA. I argue
that we should not identify appeals to simplicity in the context of ordinary
science with appeals to simplicity in the context of the BSA, such that a justi-
fication of the former cannot vicariously justify the latter. In §10.7, I conclude
this chapter.
10.2 The Best Systems Analysis
Lewis (1983) analyses lawhood as generalities in our best theory of the world.
The detail of the BSA is in determining which theory is best.
In the context of picking the best theory, it is supposed that we have avail-
able all non-nomological facts, past, present and future. This is a vital point:
there is no non-nomological data yet to be discovered. The candidate theories
for best theory should all match this non-nomological data – though some will
fail to account for all non-nomological facts, all of their theorems are true. In
what follows, I describe a theory as true iff all its theorems are.
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Hence, when picking the best theory, we are choosing between true theories.
The best theory is the candidate that makes the optimal trade-off between
simplicity, strength and fit.
Lewis does not offer a special analysis of simplicity, so it is natural to
assume that he means the conventional (if somewhat vague) notion of simplicity
referred to in ordinary speech. The strength of a theory, meanwhile, might be
understood as measured by deductive consequences. Hence, if the deductive
consequences of theory T1 form a proper subset of the deductive consequences
of theory T2, we say that T2 is stronger than T1.1 However, Woodward (2014)
suggests that a more relevant notion of strength is measured by deductive
consequences with respect to non-nomological facts about the world.2 Finally,
the fit of a theory is measured by how well the theory lines up with worldly
probability distributions.
Lewis (1994, 479) claims that it is objective which theory is best, ‘if nature
is kind’. The thought is that the best theory will outstrip its rivals sufficiently
such that it is obviously best, and that ‘our standards of simplicity and strength
and balance are only partly a matter of psychology’ (1994, 479). This will be
important when discussing descriptive simplicity in §10.4.
Consequently, lawhood is supposed to be objective and absolute. This might
raise a problem for the BSA, because the simplicity of a theory seems relative
to the language that it is presented in. For example, suppose that the predicate
F is such that, for all x, (Fx ↔ (Gx ∧ Hx)). A language with predicate F in its
1Here, I assume that the best theory is recursively enumerable. This is on the basis that
the optimal balance of simplicity and strength will favour a recursively enumerable theory.
There is some limited exegetical support for this contention: Lewis notes that he takes the
best system to be ‘as simple in axiomatisation as it can be without sacrificing too much
information content’ (1983, 367).
This is important for our current notion of strength. If the best theory was not recursively
enumerable, then we would have to work with some semantically characterised consequence
relation to measure strength by deductive consequence. This raises the question of which
consequence relation we would appeal to, and whether hyperintensional notions – such as
naturalness – would be implicit in our characterisation of that relation.
This would not be a problem for Lewis, because he is content to characterise the best
theory (partly) in terms of naturalness. However, there would be a problem for Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness, which hopes to characterise naturalness in terms of the best theory at
the actual world.
That said, I contend it is plausible that the best theory is recursively enumerable, thus
avoiding this issue. My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for demonstrating the
need for this clarification.
2Woodward (2014) also considers measuring the strength of a theory by its deductive
consequences with respect to non-nomological facts, when applied to a sentence detailing the
world’s initial conditions. This avoids those initial conditions being in our best theory.
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vocabulary can simply state that an object a is F. In another language, where
predicate F is not in the vocabulary, we must instead characterise this fact by
saying that Ga ∧ Ha. This is, on the face of it, a less simple characterisation.
Hence the same claim has differing levels of simplicity relative to the language
it is presented in. This calls for fixing the language in which we compare our
candidates for best theory.
Another potential problem is as follows. We can imagine a predicate E of
masked complexity, such that Ea says that a is such that all non-nomological
facts obtain. The theory described by ‘∀xEx’ is thus maximally strong, and, on
the face of it, maximally simple. It follows from the BSA that ∀xEx is a law.
This is problematic, because ∀xEx includes claims about accidental regularities
that are intuitively not lawful. This calls for precluding predicates like E from
the language of evaluation.
BSA theorists, therefore, must fix the language of evaluation for best theory,
but choose that language carefully. This is the problem to which naturalness
is applied. Lewis (1983) proposes that the language of evaluation should be a
perfectly natural language, whose predicates all correspond to perfectly natural
properties. The theory previously presented as ‘∀xEx’, when presented in a
perfectly natural language, is exposed as horrendously complex. Hence, it will
not be the best theory, as desired.
This, then, is the BSA and the role for naturalness in Law of Nature.
10.3 Law of Nature and Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness
It might be thought that Law of Nature poses a direct difficulty for Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness. According to my interpretation of naturalness, the lan-
guage of ideal science determines which properties are perfectly natural. How-
ever, in Law of Nature, which properties are perfectly natural helps determine
which theory is ideal science. Law of Nature therefore presupposes a grasp on
the perfectly natural properties before we know which theory is ideal science.
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness has things in the opposite direction, presup-
posing knowledge of which theory is ideal science before we have a grasp on
the perfectly natural properties.
Though I propose there is tension between Deflationary-Friendly Natural-
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ness and Law of Nature, the conflict is not as direct as the last paragraph
suggests. The reasoning above equivocates between ‘ideal science’ and ‘best
theory’, and the two concepts are distinct. In ch.6, I described ‘ideal science’
as a complete science that is hypothetically adopted by scientists. Though these
scientists may choose their ideal science on the basis of theoretical virtues such
as simplicity and strength, this is not built into the definition of what ideal
science is. By contrast, the BSA describes the ‘best theory’ as the most theo-
retically virtuous out of all true theories.
Consequently, Law of Nature presupposes a grasp of the perfectly natural
properties for determining the best theory, whilst Deflationary-Friendly Nat-
uralness presupposes knowledge of ideal science for a grasp of the perfectly
natural properties. This is not yet a direct conflict between Law of Nature
and Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. However, there is intuitively some ten-
sion at play. Insofar as the selection of ideal science involves some balance
of theoretical virtues, then selection of ideal science runs into the same issues
of language relativity highlighted by Lewis in the BSA. If scientists appeal
to a perfectly natural language of evaluation in response to solve the issue
of language-relativity, then a grasp of the perfectly natural properties is pre-
supposed and Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness becomes suspect: it takes our
grasp of the perfectly natural properties to fall out of a theory that presupposes
a grasp of the perfectly natural properties.
To avoid this conflict, scientists must reject the appeal to naturalness as a
solution to the problem of language relativity in theory choice – instead, per-
haps, simply conducting their evaluations in the standard scientific English of
their time (when we are considering English-speaking scientists). However, if
they are minded to do this, then this undermines Law of Nature as a theo-
retical role for naturalness. There is tension in rejecting naturalness’s role in
solving language-relativity in evaluation of our ideal theory, but wholeheartedly
accepting naturalness’s role in solving language-relativity in evaluation of our
best theory: especially as naturalness would solve the problem in an identical
manner for each.
This suggests that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness and Law of Nature
sit uneasily together. Though more might be said, the worry is that my
deflationary-friendly interpretation risks sacrificing Law of Nature. On the
other hand, if the BSA is an unsatisfactory account of laws of nature (on
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any interpretation of naturalness), then the problem for Deflationary-Friendly
Naturalness disappears. If Law of Nature does not represent a successful, the-
oretical role for any interpretation of naturalness, then there is no theoretical
benefit for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness to be incompatible with. My
goal is comparative – as long as there are no theoretical benefits for other
interpretations not shared by my deflationary-friendly interpretation, and my
deflationary-friendly interpretation incurs fewer theoretical costs, then a plau-
sible cost-benefit analysis favours my interpretation.
With this in mind, I turn to the argument that Law of Nature is unsuccessful
on any interpretation of naturalness.
10.4 Woodward and Simplicity
Woodward’s (2014) paper raises two general issues. One is whether the BSA
accurately describes the actual practice of scientists; the second is whether
appeals to simplicity, in the context of the BSA, admit of standard, scientific
justifications.
To the first point, Woodward proposes that scientists require their theories
to meet a minimal strength. For example, Woodward, discussing astronomy,
notes that ‘there is some pre-specified domain of results (or phenomena) that
competing theories are expected to account for – this would include facts about
planetary trajectories’ (Woodward 2014, 100-1). Regardless of how optimally
the loss of strength is balanced with increased simplicity, a theory must meet
a minimal level of strength.
This reflection is not fatal to the BSA, but does suggest that the BSA
could be fleshed out to discuss the balance of simplicity and strength in more
detail. The practice of theory choice in actual science is not straightforward.
The relationship between theoretical virtue and strength is non-linear: a min-
imal level of strength is incredibly important, but a little extra strength for
an already strong theory is less important. Similar remarks apply to simplic-
ity: when a theory is already relatively simple, a little more simplicity at the
expense of strength is sub-optimal. Providing these details would boost the
BSA’s scientific credentials, and I propose that they should be adopted by the
Lewisian.
My focus, however, is whether appeals to simplicity in the BSA are justified.
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Woodward notes that we can justify scientific appeals to simplicity, and that
these justifications are inapplicable in the context of the BSA.
For example, scientists sometimes appeal to simplicity to guide curve-fitting.
Suppose that a scientist has a set of data points and is considering whether
to graph them by a linear or quadratic equation. Typically, the scientist will
choose the lowest degree polynomial that fits the data well – or the ‘simplest’
equation.
This practice admits of Bayesian justification. Suppose that the researcher
has reason to believe that,
‘considering families of polynomials of every degree, the domain under
investigation is such that each family is equally likely to contain the
true curve and that within each family the probability density for which
particular curve is correct is spread in a fairly uniform way over each
member of the family.’ (Woodward 2014, 111)
It follows that individual curves of higher degree are less probable than
those of lower degree, because they share more competitors for their ‘share’ of
the probability mass.
From this example we draw two, important conclusions. Firstly, this notion
of simplicity appealed to by scientists is not the simplicity of ordinary parlance.
It has a precise meaning – an equation is simpler iff it is a polynomial of lower
degree. Secondly, this notion is such that we can directly justify appeals to it.
Woodward considers another example. The Akaike information criterion
(AIC ) framework assesses curves by ‘some measure that reflects both fit to
the data so far received and that discounts for the number of free parameters
in the fitted curve’ (Woodward 2014, 114). We might, considering the BSA,
identify strength with fit to the data, and simplicity with the number of free
parameters. This provides a different (but, again, precise) notion of simplicity.
We can justify appeals to this simplicity on the basis that the AIC framework
avoids our curves ‘overfitting’ the data. By finding the optimal balance between
simplicity and strength, we increase the predictive reliability of our equations
regarding future data.
It is not necessarily important whether these justifications are successful.
The important point is that these justifications are inapplicable in the context
established by the BSA. Remember from §10.2 that, when picking our best
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theory, we have available all non-nomological data. Hence, there is no further
data to be predicted. Consequently, concerns about reliably predicting future
data are irrelevant, and there is no need to appeal to the AIC framework to
avoid overfitting. Furthermore, because we possess all non-nomological data,
all the candidate theories are known to be true. It follows that the Bayesian
justification of lower polynomials is similarly inapplicable. As all the theories
are true, they have a probability of 1. Measures of simplicity that increase
the probability of our theories therefore seem redundant – at the very least,
appeals to such notions cannot be justified on this basis.
Finally, Woodward considers another notion of simplicity: descriptive sim-
plicity. This can be identified with the folk notion of simplicity found in or-
dinary parlance. We might think that scientists favour descriptively simpler
theories because they are easier to understand and work with. Increased com-
plexity gives rise to pragmatic costs that might not be sufficiently outweighed
by increased predictive accuracy.
Such pragmatic justifications of appeals to simplicity are inappropriate in
the context of the BSA. As noted in §10.2, lawhood is supposed to be objective
and absolute. If we justify appeals to simplicity on pragmatic grounds, then
we infect lawhood with interest-relativity. This is because different pragmatic
considerations demand different levels of simplicity. Suppose that an engineer
and a physicist are giving theories regarding a particular bridge. We can imag-
ine that the engineer rounds to fewer decimal places – for the sake of simplicity
in calculations – whereas the physicist does not. The engineer’s theory is sim-
pler, but not as strong as the physicist’s theory. However, this is pragmatically
justified by the varying interests of the engineer and the physicist. The en-
gineer may just want to generally account for why the bridge stands, whilst
the physicist might want to go into further detail regarding the underlying
physics. Following this pragmatic justification, the optimal balance of simplic-
ity to strength shifts from prioritising simplicity for the engineer to prioritising
strength for the physicist.
As the optimal balance between simplicity and strength becomes interest-
relative, so does our choice of best theory. Our best theory becomes relative to
what we want the theory for, and for whom. Hence lawhood becomes interest-
relative rather than objective: this is typically considered a bad result by those
defending the BSA.
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Woodward therefore highlights problems with the BSA. Scientific justifi-
cations of simplicity don’t seem applicable in the context of the BSA, and
it is questionable how well the BSA, as it stands, describes actual, scientific
theory-choice. In the next section, I extend these results further.
10.5 Extending Woodward’s Argument
In §10.6, I consider an objection to Woodward’s argument. In the meantime, we
can extend Woodward’s argument to apply more generally to scientific notions
of simplicity, and to the BSA’s appeal to strength.
Any pragmatic justification of an appeal to simplicity is inappropriate in
the context of the BSA. Such a justification renders the optimal balance be-
tween simplicity and strength interest-relative. Hence, by the BSA, whether a
regularity is a law becomes interest-relative.
We can make similar remarks about any appeal to simplicity that is jus-
tified in terms of tracking truth. Putting aside the details of the Bayesian
justification, or the AIC framework, Woodward’s point holds quite generally.
Suppose that we have a specific notion of simplicity, S, and we justify ap-
pealing to S on the basis that theories of greater S are more likely to be true
(perhaps when in an appropriate balance to strength – the justification can be
as complex as is wished). Regardless of the specifics of this justification, it is
inapplicable in the context of the BSA. The context that the BSA establishes
is one in which we have all non-nomological data. Our candidate theories for
best theory are all true, and hence we don’t need to appeal to S to increase
any probabilities. Similarly, any justification of S concerning predictive accu-
racy is inapplicable, because, in the context of the BSA, there is no further,
non-nomological data to be predicted. Consequently, Woodward’s arguments
apply to any notion of simplicity that is meant to help in truth-tracking or
predictive accuracy.
Analogous arguments can be made about strength. The first step is to ask
why scientists favour strong theories. A natural answer is that strong theories
say more about phenomena that we care about. This justifies seeking strong
theories, because weak theories are not useful. However, this justification is
pragmatic and thus interest-relative. We have already seen that pragmatic
justifications are inapplicable in the context of the BSA. If we justify appeals
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to strength relative to our interests, then different researchers will evaluate
theories as variably strong, depending on their interests. This affects which
theory optimally balances simplicity and strength, and thus renders the best
theory interest-relative. It follows that lawhood is interest-relative: a bad
result.
We might consider how else appeals to strength might be justified in theory
choice. Arguably, Popper’s (1959) notion of falsifiability can be roughly iden-
tified as a notion of strength. The reasoning is as follows. The more numerous
the deductive consequences that a theory has, the more falsifiable the theory
becomes. The theory is more falsifiable because there are more theorems and
consequences of the theory that might be found false.
Meanwhile, we appeal to falsifiability (and thus a notion of strength) in
theory choice on the basis that it helps science progress. The trouble is that
this is a truth-tracking justification. The progression of science is presumably
measured by the verisimilitude of its theories.3 Hence, this justification of the
appeal to strength is inapplicable in the context of the BSA. As we already
have all non-nomological data, none of our candidate theories will be falsified
by further data. Any appeal to strength justified in terms of falsifiability will
fail to apply in this context.
Typically, stronger theories are less likely to be true. This is what justifies
linking strength with falsifiability. However, we also see that appeals to falsifi-
ability are concerned with truth – Popper argues that the best route towards
truth is to aggressively falsify wherever we can. Such indirect justifications are
inapplicable in the context of the BSA, as we already know that the competing
candidates for best theory are true. Moreover, we cannot appeal to strength on
pragmatic grounds without rendering the notion of lawhood interest-relative.
Woodward’s arguments against simplicity in the BSA apply analogously to the
BSA’s appeals to strength.
This extends Woodward’s arguments, but does not offer a knockdown ar-
gument against appeals to simplicity or strength in the context of the BSA. It
may be that there is some justification of simplicity or strength in the context
of ordinary science that is equally applicable in the context of the BSA that I
have not considered. However, I have considered two of the most plausible and
3We might consider alternative measures, such as increasing utility, but this results in a
pragmatic justification of strength. We already know such justifications are inappropriate in
the context of the BSA.
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commonplace kinds of justification for simplicity and strength: that they track
truth (and avoid predictive accuracy), and that they have pragmatic utility.
It is hard to see what form other justifications of simplicity or strength in the
context of ordinary science might take. I therefore provide a challenge to the
BSA – to find such a scientific justification that is applicable in the context of
the BSA. Now I defend this challenge against objections.
10.6 An Objection to Woodward’s Argument
I propose that Woodward’s extended argument is persuasive in showing that
scientific justifications of appeals to simplicity and strength are inapplicable
in the context of the BSA. From this, we might conclude as follows. Firstly,
we might argue that appeals to these theoretical virtues in the context of the
BSA are unjustified. Alternatively, we could argue that the BSA’s notions
of simplicity and strength are unscientific, and that the BSA’s claim to track
actual scientific practice is unwarranted.
Our detractor objects to these conclusions as follows. First, she insists
that the BSA’s notions of simplicity and strength are to be identified with
scientific notions found in actual, scientific practice. Second, she notes that
whilst appeals to these notions are not justified in the context of the BSA, they
are justified in other contexts. The thought is that it is generally justifiable
to appeal to simplicity and strength. Hence, when we appeal to them in the
context of the BSA, those appeals are vicariously justified.
In response, I note that the appeals to simplicity and strength across differ-
ent contexts are distinct. Crucially, I am not talking about justifying simplicity
(or strength) itself. It is not clear what it would mean to ‘justify’ a concept in
this way. Instead, we are justifying an appeal to that notion: justifying a way
that we put the concept to use. Once this is seen, we find that the objection
is problematic as it stands.
An appeal to simplicity in the context of ordinary science is distinct from
an appeal to simplicity in the context of the BSA – not only are the contexts
different, but simplicity is being put to different uses in each case. In the
context of ordinary science, scientists appeal to simplicity to guide them in
theory choice: to evaluate competing theories, not all of which are true, to
seek the true theory. In the context of the BSA, we appeal to simplicity not to
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guide us in choosing the true theory, but in choosing the best theory. I propose
that these are distinct projects.
It follows that justifying the first kind of appeal to simplicity does nothing
to justify the second. There is no vicarious justification because we are talking
about entirely different kinds of appeal to simplicity or strength. Theory choice
in ordinary science is not best theory choice. Consequently, we should resist
this objection to Woodward’s extended arguments.
10.7 Consequences and Conclusions
I have outlined Woodward’s arguments against the BSA, extended them to
apply more generally, as well as to strength. I have considered an objection
against Woodward’s arguments, and sought to show that it is flawed. It follows
that the justifications of appeals to simplicity and strength made in the context
of ordinary science are inapplicable when applied in the context of the BSA.
This is because the BSA establishes a context where we have available all non-
nomological facts, and all the candidate theories are already known to be true.
Hence, justifications based on tracking truth, or making better predictions
about further data, are inapplicable in the context.
I propose that the arguments show that the BSA’s notion of lawhood is un-
scientific, and thus a problematic analysis of scientific lawhood. Consequently,
I conclude that the BSA faces important issues.
Insofar as the BSA faces important issues, Law of Nature as a theoretical
role for naturalness is in doubt. If naturalness cannot play this theoretical role,
then Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness’s tension with Law of Nature puts no
theoretical benefit at risk. This preserves the favourability of Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness in a plausible cost-benefit analysis between interpreta-
tions of naturalness.
This completes my defence of Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. I have
argued that it enjoys all of the theoretical benefits enjoyed by rival interpreta-
tions. However, I maintain that it enjoys these benefits more cheaply, because
it does not commit us to claims about the objective structure of reality. A plau-
sible cost-benefit analysis therefore favours Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
as the correct interpretation. This defangs naturalness-variants of hyperinten-
sional manoeuvre, defending deflationary heuristics.
Chapter 11
Relative Naturalness
11.1 Introduction
This chapter considers Lewis’s analysis of relative naturalness in more detail.
As we shall see, there are complexities, but this chapter defends something like
Lewis’s analysis. In Part 3, the practice of measuring relative naturalness by
the definitional complexity of perfectly natural definitions is commonplace. It
is therefore important to defend that practice here.1
As noted in ch.6, Lewis (1983) defines relative naturalness as a function of
the complexity of perfectly natural definition. A perfectly natural definition is
a definition of a property in perfectly natural terms. For example, the property
of being red might be perfectly naturally defined in terms of wavelengths and
frequencies of light (assuming that wavelengths and frequencies correspond to
perfectly natural properties).
Suppose that α and β are properties. Suppose further that γ is a perfectly
natural definition of α, and δ is a perfectly natural definition of β. Lewis
suggests the following:
1We find a similar project in Bennett (2017). Bennett accounts for relative fundamen-
tality in terms of ‘building relations’, such as composition. However, there are reasons to
think that we cannot straightforwardly apply an analogous account to relative naturalness.
Bennett relies on the availability of asymmetric building relations to provide for the direction
of relative fundamentality. Yet, when considering the relative fundamentality of properties,
the most obvious building relation to appeal to is relative naturalness. Intuitively, attempts
to define building relations such as ‘definitional complexity’ are attempts to define relative
naturalness itself. Hence, it is not clear that relative naturalness reduces to more basic build-
ing relations. This is a significant disanalogy and suggests that we cannot use something like
Bennett’s account of relative fundamentality to account for relative naturalness.
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Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition: α is more natural than β iff γ is
less complex than δ.
An immediate question is how to measure the relative complexity of γ and
δ. A standard measure is to compare the number of connectives used in those
perfectly natural definitions.
For example, suppose that α and β have the following perfectly natural
definitions, when the properties being F, being G and being H are perfectly
natural:
αx iff (Fx ∧ Gx).
βx iff (Fx ∧ Gx ∧ Hx).
This defines properties in terms of their respective predicates. This permits
the use of logical connectives, so that we can count the number of connectives
used in perfectly natural definitions.2
An immediate problem with this suggestion is that a property may have
various perfectly natural definitions of varying complexity.
As before, suppose that α has the following perfectly natural definition:
αx iff (Fx ∧ Gx).
Instead of stating this with conjunction, we might have stated this with
disjunction:
αx iff ¬(¬Fx ∨ ¬Gx).
The first perfectly natural definition of α has one ‘∧’ and thus one logical
connective. The second perfectly natural definition of α contains three ‘¬’ and
one ‘∨’, and thus four logical connectives. One is fewer than four, so the first
perfectly natural definition is less complex than the second. Hence, by Lewis’s
2The alternative would make the use of logical connectives ungrammatical. For example,
suppose that we defined α as follows:
α is the property of being F and being G.
In such a definition, the ‘and’ cannot be logical conjunction, as connectives must con-
nect sentences. It is therefore more straightforward to define properties in terms of their
predicates.
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Relative Natural Definition, α is more natural than itself. This is an absurd
result.
The solution is quite straightforward. We insist that when comparing the
relative naturalness of two properties, we compare the complexity of their sim-
plest perfectly natural definitions – that is, their perfectly natural definitions
with the fewest logical connectives.
To avoid gerrymandered logical connectives that make all definitions min-
imally simple, we insist on a canonical logical language for perfectly natural
definitions. For example, our canonical logical language might admit the stan-
dard logical connectives:
∧, ∨, →, ↔, ¬.
This, then, is a standard interpretation of Lewis’s relative naturalness. I
now turn to considering some problems with the definition, and responses that
Lewis might make.
In §11.2, I consider the epistemological availability of perfectly natural def-
initions. I argue that these epistemological problems are to be expected, and
can be downplayed due to the availability of epistemological heuristics. In
§11.3, I consider Williams’s (2007) argument that perfectly natural definitions
fail to capture genuine vagueness in the world. I argue that perfectly natural
definitions can capture genuine vagueness in the world, as long as the Lewisian
distances themselves from Lewis’s preoccupation with microphysicalism. In
§11.4, I explore difficulties regarding infinitely complex, perfectly natural def-
initions. I suggest that this problem merits considering other measures of
definitional complexity. These alternative measures raise the question of how
partial an ordering on properties relative naturalness constitutes. In §11.5, I
explore this point further and consider alternative measures of definitional com-
plexity. In §11.6, I explore cases where two properties have equally complex,
perfectly natural definitions, but do not appear to be equally natural. I discuss
Guigon’s (2014) suggestion that relative naturalness should be a measure of
both definitional complexity, and the degree of similarity between definitional
components. In §11.7, I consider taking relative naturalness as primitive, but
argues that this leaves relative naturalness with no structure or epistemology.
In §11.8, I conclude.
140 CHAPTER 11. RELATIVE NATURALNESS
The problems considered in this chapter do not constitute special problems
for Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. This is because any naturalness the-
orist must give an account of relative naturalness. This chapter is therefore
concessionary to the substantivist – defending the meaningfulness of relative
naturalness. However, as noted above, I make use of Lewis’s analysis of relative
naturalness throughout Part 3. Though this chapter is not necessary to defend
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness, it does serve a role in my defence against
grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
11.2 Epistemological Availability
Williams (2011, 8) notes that the project of reducing all properties to their
perfectly natural definitions is ‘grandly ambitious’. A concern is that we have
no guarantee that such perfectly natural definitions exist.
For example, consider what the perfectly natural definition of being human
might look like. Following Lewis’s materialism, we might try to reduce the
property to microphysical properties. Yet this will be fiendishly complex and
it is not obvious where to start. Perhaps there is no such definition.
A Lewisian might respond that the set of perfectly natural properties de-
scribe (the properties of) the world completely without redundancy. This is to
equate the perfectly natural properties with the sparse properties. This builds
in the guarantee that all properties are definable in perfectly natural terms.
If we were to find that being human could not be reduced to a microphysical
characterisation, all this would show is that being human is a perfectly natural
property.3
To this, Williams should respond that this problem is best viewed as epis-
temological: the problem of knowing a property’s perfectly natural definitions,
rather than the metaphysical problem of whether a property has some per-
fectly natural definitions. The thought is that we don’t have enough of a grasp
of such perfectly natural definitions to begin counting the number of logical
connectives involved in their simplest presentations.
The epistemological problem has more bite. If we cannot begin to con-
struct perfectly natural definitions of properties, then (even if those perfectly
3An alternative response is that being human cannot be given a perfectly natural defini-
tion because it is too vague a property. If the Lewisian were to argue that no vague properties
exist, then they could deny that being human needs a perfectly natural definition.
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natural definitions exist) we cannot begin to guess at the complexity of a prop-
erty’s simplest, perfectly natural definition. This raises severe epistemological
problems for determining when one property is more natural than another.
It follows that Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition is of limited practical,
epistemological help for determining claims of relative naturalness.
Call this the Epistemological Availability problem.
In response, I propose that Lewis should simply bite the bullet and accept
that sometimes it is hard to know whether one property is more natural than
another. Most naturalness-theorists will accept that it is sometimes difficult
to determine the relative naturalness of a property. Furthermore, the cost of
biting this bullet can be downplayed. This is because the difficulty of obtain-
ing knowledge admits of degrees. Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition can
provide heuristics and clues even when we can’t fully know the answer: it can
provide us with educated guesses. We can take educated guesses at the kind of
perfectly natural definitions that are available, and whether one is going to be
more complex than another. For example, on the materialist assumption that
the properties of fundamental physics are perfectly natural, we can guess that
some properties are more quickly reducible to microphysical properties than
others.
Consequently, Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition can be defended from
the Epistemological Availability problem.
11.3 Precisifying Vagueness
Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition faces other challenges. Williams (2007)
raises the worry that perfectly natural definitions do away with the genuine
vagueness of properties.
The worry is as follows. Suppose that the property being bald is genuinely
vague. However, to give a perfectly natural definition of being bald, on Lewis’s
presumption of materialism, reduces baldness to the microphysical. The prob-
lem is that microphysical properties don’t seem to be genuinely vague. Hence,
by giving a perfectly natural definition of being bald, we do away with the
genuine vagueness in the property.
Call this the Precisifying Vagueness problem.
As a supervaluationist, Lewis (1988) has the resources to meet this objec-
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tion. Lewis suggests that vague predicates have a variety of different, acceptable
precisifications. Suppose that F is a vague predicate and a is an individual.
If, on all acceptable precisifications, a is F, then we can say more generally
that a is F. For example, if all acceptable precisifications agree that a hairless
man is bald, then we can say more generally that the man is bald. If, on all
acceptable precisifications, a is not F, then we can say more generally that a
is not F. For example, if all acceptable precisifications agree that a man with a
full set of hair is not bald, then we can say more generally that the man is not
bald. Finally, if on some but not all acceptable precisifications, a is F, then
we say more generally that it is indeterminate whether a is F. For example, if
a man with thinning hair is declared bald on some acceptable precisifications,
but declared not bald on others, then we can say more generally that it is
indeterminate whether the man is bald. The point is that the vagueness is at
the level of language rather than in the world. Baldness is vague because it is
a vague predicate with numerous acceptable precisifications.
On this view, there will not be one perfectly natural definition of the prop-
erty being bald. This is because there is more than one acceptable precisification
of baldness. We can treat being bald as a bundle of overlapping, but distinct
properties, each of which has a precisification (given by a perfectly natural
definition). Alternatively, we can say that the perfectly natural definition of
being bald will reflect the variety of different, acceptable precisifications.
Against the supervaluationist, the substantivist might argue that there is
genuine, metaphysical vagueness in the joints of nature. The supervaluation-
ist places vagueness in language rather than in the world. Some varieties of
substantivist might think that this is a mistake, and that the supervaluationist
response is not available in response to the Precisifying Vagueness problem.
The immediate response to make is that the phenomenon of metaphysical
vagueness in the world does not imply the metaphysical vagueness of the per-
fectly natural properties. For example, it may be metaphysically vague whether
there is some object a that is F because it is metaphysically vague whether a
exists – rather than because F is a metaphysically vague property.4
Further, I think we should challenge the assumption that perfectly natural
properties cannot be vague, if there is genuine vagueness in the world. Re-
member from §11.2 that the perfectly natural properties completely account
4My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for offering this response on my behalf.
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for (the properties of) the world without redundancy. This is built into the
notion of naturalness. Suppose that there is genuine vagueness in the world. It
follows that there must be some perfectly natural properties that are genuinely
vague.
For example, suppose that the Lewisian decides to take similarity as a prim-
itive, and treats is similar to as a perfectly natural property.5 The Lewisian
can then insist that is similar to is a vague property despite being perfectly
natural. More generally, I do not feel the force of the intuition that perfectly
natural properties cannot be vague.
Perhaps the point is that microphysical properties are not vague, and
Lewis’s (1983) preoccupation with materialism results in only microphysical
properties being perfectly natural. If this is the case, then perhaps the problem
is not with Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition, but instead with his preoc-
cupation with materialism. As aforementioned, the perfectly natural properties
are sufficient to completely account for (the properties of) the world without
redundancy. If there is genuine vagueness in the world, then this should be re-
flected in the perfectly natural properties. Alternatively, if there is not genuine
vagueness in the world, then the Precisifying Vagueness problem can be met
with supervaluationism.
Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition can therefore be defended from the
Precisifying Vagueness problem.
11.4 Infinite Complexity
However, there are further problems associated with Lewis’s Relative Natural-
ness Definition. Sider (2011) notes that even the simplest, perfectly natural
definitions of some properties may be infinitely long. For example, consider
the property being red. We might (imperfectly naturally) define this property
as follows:
x is red iff (x is scarlet ∨ x is crimson ∨ ...)
and so on for every shade of red. To reach a perfectly natural definition of
being red, we then give perfectly natural characterisations XYZn of each shade
5Note that I treat relations as properties of degree greater than 1.
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of red:6
x is red iff (x is XYZ1 ∨ x is XYZ2 ∨ ...)
and so on for every perfectly natural characterisation of every shade of red.
This perfectly natural definition appears infinitely long.
It might be responded that perfectly natural definitions of infinite length
are avoidable. For example, we might define being red as follows:
x is red iff x possesses wave properties between XYZ1 and XYZn,
if XYZ1 and XYZn covered the range of all shades of red, and we could
make precise having wave properties between them. Sider (2011) similarly
suggests that some properties that seem to admit of infinitely long, perfectly
natural definitions could instead be given finite, functionalist perfectly natural
definitions.
However, it is not obvious how we can rule out a priori the possibility that
the simplest perfectly natural definitions of some properties are infinitely long.
If there is such a property, we can present the following problem.
Suppose that the simplest perfectly natural definitions of α have infinite
complexity. We can imagine another property β defined as follows:
βx iff (αx ∨ x is feline).
Suppose that an individual being α doesn’t imply that the individual is fe-
line (i.e. that α and β are distinct). Intuitively, we might want to say that α is
more natural than β. However, this result is not delivered by Lewis’s Relative
Naturalness Definition. This is because the simplest perfectly natural defini-
tions of β also have infinite complexity. It follows that the simplest perfectly
natural definitions of α and β are equally complex. By Lewis’s Relative Natu-
ralness Definition, it follows that α and β are equally natural. This produces
a counterexample to Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition.
Call this the Infinite Complexity problem.
To meet this issue, the Lewisian might consider alternative measures of
simplicity than the number of definitional components. Suppose that γ is a
perfectly natural definition. We can correspond γ with the set of perfectly
6These characterisations might be seen as perfectly natural ‘property-bundles’ regarding
wavelengths and frequencies of light.
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natural properties that are referred to in γ. Call this set a definitional toolbox
set of γ.
For example, suppose that γ is given by the predicate ‘being a quark or
being a lepton’. γ corresponds with a set of perfectly natural properties that
are referred to in γ, given as Ω = {being a quark, being a lepton}. We can then
say that Ω is a definitional toolbox set of γ.
Hence, when γ is a perfectly natural definition:
Definitional Toolbox Set Definition: Ω is the definitional toolbox set of γ
iff ∀x(x is a property referred to in γ ↔ x ∈ Ω).
The idea is to compare the sizes of definitional toolbox sets as a measure
of definitional complexity between properties. However, we want to appeal to
definitional toolbox multisets.
A multiset is a collection of unordered elements, where every element x oc-
curs a finite number of times. Glen (2017) notes that ‘the difference between
sets and multisets is in how they address multiples: a set includes any [ele-
ment] at most once, while a multiset allows for multiple instances of the same
[element]’.
I use ‘⟨’ and ‘⟩’ brackets to designate a multiset, such that ⟨Socrates,
Socrates, Aristotle⟩ is a multiset. Meanwhile, I use the standard ‘{’ and ‘}’
brackets to designate a set, such that {Socrates, Aristotle} is a set. The
distinction between sets and multisets can be demonstrated in the following
example:
⟨Socrates, Socrates, Aristotle⟩ ≠ ⟨Socrates, Aristotle, Aristotle⟩
{Socrates, Socrates, Aristotle} = {Socrates, Aristotle} = {Socrates, Aris-
totle, Aristotle}
I appeal to definitional toolbox multisets because the repetition of a prop-
erty can make a perfectly natural definition more complex.
For example, consider the two perfectly natural definitions below:
γ = ‘(Fx ∨ Gx ∨ Hx)’
δ = ‘((Fx ∧ Gx) ∨ (¬Fx ∧ Hx))’
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γ is less complex than δ. This is because γ employs three properties instead
of four. However, they have the same definitional toolbox sets, suggesting
that the relative size of definitional toolbox sets does not adequately measure
complexity. The solution is to appeal to multisets. γ and δ have different
definitional toolbox multisets, and the size of those multisets can be compared.
Hence, when γ is a perfectly natural definition:
Definitional Toolbox Multiset Definition: Ω is the definitional toolbox
multiset of γ iff ∀x(x is a property referred to in γ ↔ x is in Ω as many
times as it is referred to in γ).
Suppose that γ and δ are perfectly natural definitions (of properties α and
β, respectively). Suppose further that Ω is the definitional toolbox multiset of
γ, and that Π is the definitional toolbox multiset of δ. To reach our measure
of definitional complexity, we say that
Definitional Complexity by Definitional Toolbox Multiset: γ is less com-
plex than δ iff Ω ⊂ Π.
This involves a concept of proper sub-multisets. Once we have grasped the
notion of a multiset, however, the notion of a proper sub-multiset is straight-
forward:
Ω is a proper sub-multiset of Π iff
1. Ω and Π are multisets;
2. For all members x of Ω: if x is in Ω n times, then x is in Π n times
(when n is a number); and
3. Ω ≠ Π.
Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition then applies as before:
Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition: α is more natural than β iff γ is
less complex than δ,
when complexity is measured as indicated by Definitional Complexity by
Definitional Toolbox Multiset.
This alternative measure of complexity avoids the Infinite Complexity prob-
lem. This is because we can compare the sizes of definitional toolbox multisets
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even if the multisets contain infinitely many members. It can be the case that
Ω ⊂ Π even if Ω and Π are both of infinite size.
11.5 Partial Ordering
On the other hand, this alternative measure of complexity raises issues regard-
ing the ordering on properties that relative naturalness constitutes. Specifically,
it affects how partial that ordering is taken to be.
It is sometimes intuitive to think that relative naturalness constitutes only
a partial ordering on properties. To motivate this intuition, compare the prop-
erties being the logical connective tonk7 and being grue.8 Both concepts are
deliberately gerrymandered. However, it is not clear that either property is
more natural than the other, or that they are equally natural. I propose that
it is intuitive that they are simply not comparable regarding their naturalness.
Consequently, we might think that some properties cannot be compared
for their relative naturalness. On the other hand, measuring complexity by
the comparative size of definitional toolbox multisets results in a very partial
ordering on properties. To see this, note that we can compare the complexity
of γ and δ only if
(Ω ⊂ Π) ∨ (Ω = Π) ∨ (Π ⊂ Ω),
when Ω is the definitional toolbox multiset of γ, and Π is the definitional
toolbox multiset of δ. That is, only if Ω and Π are the same multiset, or one is
7Tonk is introduced by Prior (1967) as a problem for defining logical connectives by
inferential rules. Tonk’s introduction rule is analogous to ∨-introduction, and given as follows:
p
p tonk q
whilst its elimination rule is analogous to ∧-elimination, and given as follows:
p tonk q
q
The problem is that tonk licenses the derivation of q from p, regardless of their interpre-
tations.
8See Goodman (1955) for his discussion of grue and the ‘new riddle of induction’. ‘Grue’
admits of several standard definitions. One is that an individual a is grue iff a is examined
and green, or a is unexamined and blue. Another is that an individual a is grue iff it is
before t, and a is green, or else it is after t and a is blue (for some future time t).
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a sub-multiset of the other. This is not the case when Ω and Π both contain
perfectly natural properties that are not in the other.
This may be considered problematic. Consider two properties. The first is
given by the predicate ‘(x is oxygen ∨ x is my left foot)’. Call this property
‘α’. The second is given by predicate ‘βx iff (x is oxygen ∨ x is carbon)’. Call
this property ‘β’. We might think it intuitive that α is less natural than β.
However, by the present measure, it follows that α and β are not comparable
for relative naturalness. An (imperfectly natural) definitional toolbox multiset
corresponding to α is Ω = {being oxygen, being my left foot}, and an (imper-
fectly natural) definitional toolbox multiset corresponding to β is Π = {being
oxygen, being carbon}. Unfortunately:
¬((Ω ⊂ Π) ∨ (Ω = Π) ∨ (Π ⊂ Ω)).
It is plausible that perfectly natural, definitional toolbox multisets corre-
sponding to α and β inherit this problem. This means that it is not the case
that α is less natural than β. This is a problematic result.
It is plausible that there are many properties that are intuitively compa-
rable regarding naturalness, but do not correspond to comparable definitional
toolbox multisets. Consider the property being green and the property defined
by ‘x is the Eiffel Tower ∨ x is my nose’. Intuitively, we want to say that the
first property is more natural than the second. However, it is not obvious that
we can compare the size of their corresponding definitional toolbox multisets.
We might think to appeal to the number of members in their corresponding
definitional toolbox multisets: the first property has one and the second prop-
erty has two. However, this allows the Infinitely Complex problem to reassert
itself. If we measure complexity by counting the members of definitional tool-
box multisets, then we have problems when there are infinitely many members
in definitional toolbox multisets. It would mean that all perfectly natural defi-
nitions with infinitely large, definitional toolbox multisets are equally complex.
This is why we wanted to measure complexity by the relative size of defi-
nitional toolbox multisets. On the other hand, we have seen that this makes
the ordering on properties implausibly partial. Call this the Partial Ordering
problem.
The Partial Ordering problem suggests that we should continue looking for
an alternative measure of complexity. One is given by the idea of a sentential
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construction tree. It is a familiar idea that we can break down a sentence
sequentially by identifying its main logical operator. For example, we might
break down ‘((A ∧ B) ∨ C )’ as follows:
((A ∧ B) ∨ C )
(A ∧ B)
A B
C
We might use the notion of a property construction tree along analogous
lines. For example, we might break down the property defined by ‘((x is green
and x is round) or x is yellow)’ as follows:
((x is green ∧ x is round) ∨ x is yellow)
(x is green ∧ x is round)
x is green x is round
x is yellow
Suppose that we were interested only in the structure of a property construc-
tion tree. Whenever we come across a property, we assign it an uninterpreted
predicate. Hence, with the property construction tree above, we arrive at the
following structural property construction tree:9
9It should be noted that there are certain rules to structural property construction trees.
Importantly, we treat connectives as having arbitrary length. For example, the following is
‘ungrammatical’:
((Fx ∧ Gx) ∧ Hx)
(Fx ∧ Gx)
Fx Gx
Hx
Instead, we should have:
(Fx ∧ Gx ∧ Hx)
Fx Gx Hx
I make this stipulation to avoid ‘(Fx ∧ (Gx ∧ Hx))’ and ‘((Fx ∧ Gx) ∧ Hx)’ having distinct
structural property construction trees.
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((Fx ∧ Gx) ∨ Hx)
(Fx ∧ Gx)
Fx Gx
Hx
Because we have stripped away the interpretation and focused on the struc-
ture, the above is a structural property construction tree of various properties.
For example, it is a structural property construction tree of both the property
defined by ‘((x is green ∧ x is round) ∨ x is yellow)’ and the property defined
by ‘((x is mammal ∧ x is tall) ∨ x is lizard)’.
We can provide structural property construction trees of perfectly natu-
ral definitions. Suppose that γ and δ are perfectly natural definitions. The
following is an alternative measure of their relative definitional complexity:
Definitional Complexity by Structural Property Construction Tree: γ is
less complex than δ iff the structural property construction tree of γ is a
sub-tree of the structural property construction tree of δ.
A sub-tree is intuitively a part of a structural property construction tree.
Suppose that δ’s structural property construction tree is as above. Suppose
then that γ’s structural property construction tree is as below:
(Fx ∧ Gx)
Fx Gx
γ’s structural property construction tree is a part of δ’s structural property
construction tree. We say that the former is a sub-tree of the latter.
Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition then applies as before:
Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition: α is more natural than β iff γ is
less complex than δ,
when complexity is measured as indicated by Definitional Complexity by
Structural Property Construction Tree.
By focusing on structure, we avoid relative naturalness constituting a very
partial ordering on properties. Furthermore, it allows for flexibility in which
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properties are comparable. For example, suppose that a property α corre-
sponds to the following structural property construction tree:
(Fx ∧ Gx)
Fx Gx
Further, suppose that a property β corresponds to the following structural
property construction tree:
(Fx ∨ Gx)
Fx Gx
There are two ways of reading these structural property construction trees.
On the first reading, they are seen as identical structural property construction
trees. This is on the basis that the details of each node – that is, the connective
employed – are unimportant to the structure of the tree. On this reading, α
and β are equally natural. On the second reading, the two trees are seen as
distinct. This is on the basis that the nodes use distinct connectives. On this
reading, α and β are not comparable.
We can continue this theme of flexibility. We can imagine a naturalness
theorist who thinks that disjunctive properties are less natural than conjunctive
properties. To accommodate this intuition, such theorists should supplement
Definitional Complexity by Structural Property Construction Tree with rules
about what to do when two identical trees involve different connectives. First,
they would adopt the first reading of the trees, such that the details of each
node are unimportant to the structure of the trees. This will allow them to
find that the two trees are equally complex, on the standard measure given by
Definitional Complexity by Structural Property Construction Tree. Next, they
should apply their supplemental rules to this standard measure of complexity.
One such rule might be as follows:
Conjunction and Disjunction: If the structural property construction tree
of γ is identical to the structural property construction tree of δ, but the
former (unsubstituted) tree mentions ‘∧’ and the latter (unsubstituted)
tree mentions ‘∨’, then γ is less complex than δ.
The situation might become more complicated if the two trees contain both
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conjunction and disjunction. However, perhaps the right response at this point
is that neither perfectly natural definition is more complex than the other.
Alternatively, the naturalness theorist might appeal to multisets of disjunctions
contained in each tree. Perhaps the perfectly natural definition whose tree has
the smaller multiset of disjunctions is less complex than the other.
The current measure of definitional complexity is flexible. It is well-positioned
to accommodate various intuitions that the naturalness theorist might have.
The only cost involved is an increasing complexity of that measure. This pro-
vides the Lewisian a defence from the Partial Ordering problem.
It should be noted that two logically equivalent, perfectly natural definitions
can have distinct structural property construction trees. For example, the
perfectly natural definition given by ‘(Fx ∧ (Gx ∨ Hx))’ is logically equivalent
to the perfectly natural definition given by ‘((Fx ∧ Gx) ∨ (Fx ∧ Hx)’, but the
two perfectly natural definitions have distinct structural property construction
trees. This does not mean that there are symmetric instances of the relation
more natural than. This is because the relative naturalness of a property is
a measure of the definitional complexity of that property’s simplest perfectly
natural definition.
To determine which perfectly natural definition of a property is simplest,
we apply the measure given by Definitional Complexity by Structural Prop-
erty Construction Tree. If a property has multiple, simplest perfectly natural
definitions, we say that a property α is more natural than a property β iff
some simplest, perfectly natural definition is less complex than all simplest,
perfectly natural definitions of β.10,11
This current measure faces some limitations, however. Most notably, it is
not clear how to build a property construction tree involving quantification.
10Depending on how partial an ordering we want relative naturalness to impose, it may
happen that two perfectly natural definitions of a property are of incomparable complex-
ity. This is problematic, and provides motivation for treating nodal differences in trees as
structurally unimportant. Alternatively, the naturalness theorist can stipulate further rules
for determining what happens when a property has multiple perfectly natural definitions of
incomparable complexity.
11Alternatively, some substantivists might argue that
if two properties have distinct perfectly natural definitions (that are incomparable
with respect to relative naturalness), then those properties are distinct
– even when those perfectly natural definitions are logically equivalent.
I add the bracketed caveat to avoid the issue of trivial differences between perfectly natural
definitions. For example, we might balk at ‘Fx ∧ Gx’ and ‘(Fx ∧ Gx) ∧ ¬(p ∧ ¬p)’ defining
different properties. By insisting that the definitions must be incomparable with respect to
relative naturalness, we rule out these kinds of cases.
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This is because quantified sentences cannot be straightforwardly broken down
into atomic sentences.
As it is, this limitation is unproblematic in the context of this thesis. The
perfectly natural definitions that I appeal to throughout Part 3 do not involve
quantification.12 Hence, the current measure of definitional simplicity is suffi-
cient for comparing the relative naturalness of the perfectly natural definitions
that I want to use. With this in mind, I am happy to bracket these limitations
in this thesis.
On the other hand, the substantivist who wants to define relative natural-
ness in terms of perfect naturalness may need to offer a revision of our current
measure of definitional simplicity. As noted, I am content to leave the ball in
the substantivist’s court on this issue.
11.6 Variably Natural, Fixedly Complex
I now consider a final problem for Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition.
Nolan (2005) asks us to consider the property α given by the predicate ‘(x
is carmine ∨ x is vermillion)’, and the property β given by the predicate ‘(x is
carmine ∨ x is azure).’ Though the properties being carmine, being vermillion
and being azure are not perfectly natural, it is plausible that they are all equally
natural. This means that the simplest perfectly natural definitions of each
property are equally complex. It follows that the simplest perfectly natural
definitions of α and β are equally complex. By Lewis’s Relative Naturalness
Definition, α and β are equally natural.
Nolan suggests that this result is implausible. This is because β is more
‘improperly disjunctive’ than α. This is because α is a disjunction of shades
of red, whilst β is a disjunction of shades of red and blue. On this basis, they
argue that α is more natural than β, and that this produces a counterexample
to Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition.
Call this the Variably Natural, Fixedly Complex problem.
In response, Guigon (2014) presents the following solution. He advises us
to take more seriously Lewis’s idea that relatively natural properties are ‘made
so by families of suitable related universals’ (Lewis 1983, 347). The thought
is that relative naturalness is not merely a function of definitional complexity,
12See §15.3 for further discussion of this point.
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but a function of definitional complexity and the degree of similarity between
those definitional components.
To see how this solution works, consider Nolan’s example. We saw that it
is plausible that the simplest, perfectly natural definitions of each property are
equally complex. However, the properties being carmine, being vermillion are
more similar than the properties being carmine, being azure. This is because
carmine and vermillion are shades of red, whilst azure is a shade of blue.
Guigon’s suggestion therefore implies that α is more natural than β. This
meets Nolan’s case. This ‘similarity supplement’ can be added to any of the
measures of definitional complexity considered in §11.4 and §11.5.
However, the similarity supplement comes with a cost for Lewisians. Lewis
(1983) wants to analyse similarity in terms of naturalness:
Similarity: Two individuals a and b are similar iff they both instantiate
some property, α, such that α is a relatively natural property.
This analysis becomes viciously circular if we adopt the similarity supple-
ment for Lewis’s Relative Naturalness Definition. Adopting the supplement
means that relative naturalness is partly analysed in terms of similarity. This
causes trouble if we then try to analyse similarity in terms of relative natu-
ralness. Guigon’s solution to the Variably Natural, Fixedly Complex problem
therefore involves abandoning a theoretical role for naturalness.
Alternatively, the Lewisian could challenge Nolan’s intuition that α is more
natural than β. There are shades of red between carmine and vermillion,
and each shade actually corresponds to a range of colours (because there are
different shades of carmine, for example). α therefore singles out two, disjointed
ranges of colours and connects them by disjunction. β does the same. Though
the two ranges of colours singled out by α are all red – and this is not the case
with β – it is not obvious that this makes α more natural than β.
I propose that the Lewisian’s response should depend on their intuitions
about α and β. It seems available for them to deny that α is more natural
than β. However, if this does not square with their intuitions, then they can
adopt Guigon’s similarity supplement at the cost of abandoning Similarity.
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11.7 Primitive Relative Naturalness?
Rather than trying to supplement or modify measures of definitional complex-
ity, Williams (2007) considers abandoning analyses of relative naturalness in
the first place. This suggestion takes relative naturalness as primitive. Simi-
larly, Taylor (1993) expresses his surprise that Lewis treats perfect naturalness
rather than relative naturalness as primitive.
This approach avoids problems associated with measuring relative natural-
ness by the complexity of perfectly natural definition. Taking relative natural-
ness as primitive divorces relative naturalness from such measures.
However, these gains come with associated costs. Lewis’s Relative Natu-
ralness Definition gives relative naturalness structure: it provides information
about what relative naturalness amounts to. This means that, though primi-
tive, relative naturalness avoids the problems previously discussed, it may run
into analogous problems. For example, if relative naturalness is primitive, it is
unobvious how partial the ordering it constitutes is. It might be argued that
the Partial Ordering problem is more difficult, because now the answer doesn’t
‘fall out’ of various measures of definitional complexity.
Additionally, consider the Epistemological Availability problem. The prob-
lem as stated in §11.2 raises epistemological concerns about how we can know
the perfectly natural definitions of properties, and hence how we can know their
complexity. Primitive, relative naturalness removes the need for us to know the
perfectly natural definitions of properties. However, it does not replace mea-
sures of definitional complexity with some other epistemology for determining
whether one property is more natural than another. Instead, it merely does
away with an (perhaps flawed) epistemological methodology for answering such
questions. It might be argued that some, potentially imperfect epistemological
methodology is better than none at all. Consider the two properties defined
by ‘x is a bird’ and ‘x is a mammal’. How might we determine which property
is more natural (if either is), if we cannot compare the relative complexity of
their perfectly natural definitions?
The worry, then, is that primitive, relative naturalness throws the baby out
with the bathwater. It sees flaws with the structure given by Lewis’s Relative
Naturalness Definition, and responds by removing all structure from relative
naturalness altogether.
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Moreover, we have to balance the cost of losing this structure with the ben-
efits of avoiding problems associated with measures of definitional complexity.
In previous sections, I defend Lewis’s measures of definitional complexity and
argue that the associated problems can be met. Hence, appealing to primi-
tive relative naturalness does not constitute much benefit. The cost of losing
structure for relative naturalness is therefore not outweighed by any substan-
tial benefits. I therefore propose that the Lewisian is better served precisifying
and improving on measures of definitional complexity.
Suppose that Lewis abandoned his measures of definitional complexity and
instead adopted primitive, relative naturalness. It is worth considering how
primitive, relative naturalness could be afforded a deflationary-friendly inter-
pretation. I propose the following interpretation:
Deflationary-Friendly Primitive Relative Naturalness: α is a relatively
natural property iff α is a property referred to by a predicate in the
language of ideal science.
This differs from Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness by relaxing the require-
ment that α is a property referred to by a primitive predicate in the language
of ideal science. It is worth noting that the language of ideal science need not
be sparse: scientists will likely find it convenient to have predicates referring
to properties that are not perfectly natural. For example, the language of ideal
science will likely have a predicate for being water in addition to predicates for
being hydrogen and being oxygen. Hence, the property of being water will be
relatively natural on this interpretation.
When comparing properties for their naturalness, various measures might
be considered. Taylor (1993) suggests that the centrality of a property to a
theory can be measured by his ‘T-cosiness’ measure. We might therefore say
that a more central property in ideal science is a more natural property. Simi-
larly, we can consider Goodman’s (1955) notion of entrenchment. A property
is more entrenched relative to a theory insofar as it finds more work in the
inductive generalisations of the theory. We might therefore say that a more
entrenched property in ideal science is a more natural property. More work
would be needed to spell out these notions in more detail, but these ideas are
illustrative of the direction that the work would take.
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Meanwhile, we can define perfect naturalness as a limiting case of relative
naturalness.
Non-Primitive Perfect Naturalness: α is perfectly natural iff, for all prop-
erties X, it is not the case that X is more natural than α.
As Deflationary-Friendly Primitive Relative Naturalness is relative to ideal
science, the interpretation it offers is properly deflationary-friendly. I propose
that, with sufficient work, we can show that Deflationary-Friendly Primitive
Relative Naturalness fulfils the same theoretical roles as standard interpreta-
tions of primitive, relative naturalness. Hence, a plausible cost-benefit analysis
favours my interpretation as the correct interpretation of primitive, relative
naturalness.
That said, I believe that we should avoid positing primitive, relative natu-
ralness, for the reasons given earlier in this section. I therefore do not discuss
Deflationary-Friendly Primitive Relative Naturalness in further detail. On the
other hand, if primitive, relative naturalness became standard, it is helpful to
know that my deflationary-friendly strategy could proceed in an analogous way.
11.8 Conclusion
I have undertaken a review of some problems with Lewis’s Relative Natural-
ness Definition. I have sought to present solutions to these problems, and
highlighted the costs that come with those solutions.
It is worth repeating that these problems are not special problems for my
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. Any naturalness theorist who wants a no-
tion of relative naturalness must explain what that notion amounts to. Hence,
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness is no better or worse placed on this issue
than its rivals.
On the other hand, I want to link grounding to naturalness in Part 3.
Moreover, this conceptual link relies on relative naturalness being measured by
definitional complexity. I therefore have an interest in defending measures of
complexity of perfectly natural definition. This chapter provides that defence,
and lays the groundwork for Part 3.

Part III
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Chapter 12
Grounding
12.1 Introduction
The purpose of Part 3 of this thesis is to defend a theoretical link between
grounding and naturalness.
This is to block grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre against
the application of deflationary methodologies. It will be recalled from ch.2 that
hyperintensional manoeuvres work by insisting that an apparently merely ver-
bal dispute is actually substantive because each side asserts contrary positions
about what is fundamentally the case. Meanwhile, a popular analysis is that
a fact is fundamental iff it is ungrounded.
This motivates my interest in grounding. If a deflationary-friendly inter-
pretation of grounding is correct, then this will ‘push through’ to the present
analysis of ‘fundamentality’. Fundamentality will be deflationary-friendly, un-
dermining grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
This, then, is the goal of Part 3. The basic strategy is to connect grounding
with naturalness, and to then utilise my deflationary-friendly interpretation of
naturalness. This friendliness to the deflationist ‘pushes through’ to grounding
from naturalness, and from grounding to the present analysis of fundamentality.
We can frame the goals of Part 3 by considering a related argument made by
Dasgupta (2017). Dasgupta argues that, if we only want grounding to play ‘the
role of limning many issues of intellectual interest’ (2017, 16), then grounding
needn’t be primitive, a worldly relation or objective. His thought is that these
attributes are inflationary and incur a metaphysical cost. Given that these
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attributes are not required for grounding to play its limning role, Dasgupta
suggests that we might interpret grounding in a less inflationary fashion.
Dasgupta notes that his conclusion – while important – still represents a
relatively weak claim. This is because grounding theorists might argue that
grounding has more theoretical roles to play than limning issues of intellectual
interest. The grounding claims considered in ch.15 suggest further roles for
grounding, and, in ch.16, I consider some of these theoretical roles directly.
The goal of Part 3 might therefore be seen as an attempt to strengthen
Dasgupta’s conclusion. I want to show that my deflationary-friendly interpre-
tation of grounding allows us to enjoy all of grounding’s theoretical benefits,
but more cheaply. I conduct a wider survey of how grounding is used and ar-
gue that my deflationary-friendly interpretation is consistent with those uses.
Though my argument cannot be conclusive – some further uses for ground-
ing may yet be proposed – it represents a much stronger claim than the one
Dasgupta advances.
This chapter offers an introduction to what metaphysical grounding amounts
to. This provides the basic context by which we can talk about grounding at
length. In §12.2, I sketch out the intuitive underpinning behind grounding. In
§12.3, I discuss the grammar of ground, whilst in §12.4, I outline its relational
properties. In §12.5, I make some distinctions within the concept of ground,
and in §12.6, I conclude.
12.2 The Basics of Grounding
I use the convention of using corner quotation marks to denote the fact ex-
pressed by the sentence within the quotation marks. For example, ‘⌜φ⌝’ denotes
the fact expressed by the sentence ‘φ’. Moreover, I use upper case Greek letters
such as ‘∆’ to denote a (possibly singleton) set of sentences, and lower case
Greek letters such as ‘φ’ to denote single sentences. ‘⌜∆⌝’ then denotes the set
of facts expressed by the set of sentences in ∆.
The intuitive idea behind grounding is that some facts obtain in virtue of
other facts. When we say that ⌜φ⌝ obtains in virtue of ⌜∆⌝, we can rephrase
this as the claim that ∆ grounds φ. For example, grounding theorists claim
that, for any individual a, a is red in virtue of being scarlet. Using grounding-
talk explicitly, we reformulate this as the claim that (if a is scarlet, then) {a is
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scarlet} grounds a is red.
These two examples are cases of full grounding – where the grounded fact
obtains fully in virtue of the grounding fact. We can distinguish this from
partial grounding, where the grounded fact obtains partially in virtue of the
grounding fact. For example, grounding theorists claim that, for any individual
a, a is both red and round partially in virtue of being red. We can reformulate
this as the claim that (if a is red, then) {a is red} partially grounds a is red
and round.
Grounding provides a partial ordering on the structure of objective reality.1
The thought is that facts that fully ground other facts are more fundamental.
Hence, {ψ} fully grounds φ only if ⌜ψ⌝ is more fundamental than ⌜φ⌝.
Relatedly, facts that partially ground other facts are at least as fundamental.
Hence, {ψ} partially grounds φ only if it is not the case that ⌜φ⌝ is more
fundamental than ⌜ψ⌝.2
12.3 The Grammar of Ground
I follow Fine (2014) in treating grounding as an operator rather than a relation.
This operator links a set of sentences (on the left-hand-side) to a single sentence
(on the right-hand-side). It is therefore one-one. I use ‘<’ to express (strict)
full grounding, such that ∆ < φ iff ∆ (strictly) fully grounds φ.
As noted, grounding theorists distinguish full from partial grounding. How-
ever, partial grounding ‘≤’ can be defined in terms of strict grounding as follows:
Partial Ground Definition: Γ ≤ ψ iff there is some ∆ such that Γ ∪ ∆ <
ψ.
Moreover, following Korbmacher (2016), I adopt a worldly rather than con-
ceptual conception of ground. Both conceptions take grounding to connect sets
of sentences with sentences. However, the worldly conception takes those sen-
tences to express facts, whilst the conceptual conception takes those sentences
1There is some controversy as to whether this partial ordering is well-founded. Dixon
(2016) and Litland (2015) argue that there are infinitely descending sequences of ground,
and Rosen (2010) expresses agnosticism on the point. Further complicating matters, Dixon
(2016) and Rabin & Rabern (2016) note that there is some ambiguity on what it means to
say that grounding is well-founded. They suggest that grounding might be both well-founded
and such that there are infinite sequences of ground.
2Note that it does not follow from this that, if φ is ungrounded, then ⌜φ⌝ is fundamental.
This reqires a further theoretical posit characterising fundamentality in terms of ground.
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to express truths. The worldly conception is thus more coarse-grained than
the conceptual conception, as the following example demonstrates. Under the
worldly conception, ⌜φ ∨ φ⌝ = ⌜φ⌝. The conceptual conception treats the two
facts as distinct.
Though the worldly conception is coarser-grained than the conceptual con-
ception, it is nonetheless relatively fine-grained. For example, the worldly
conception holds that there are distinct facts that are necessarily equivalent.
For example, ⌜2 + 2 = 4⌝ is distinct from ⌜4 + 4 = 8⌝, despite being coextensive
in all possible worlds.
It is not obvious what analysis underlies the difference between the worldly
and conceptual conception of ground. The conceptions individuate facts and
truths differently. However, it is not obvious that we can provide individuation
conditions without appealing to grounding.3 I am not sure whether this is
problematic: perhaps grounding is the more primitive notion, and the difference
between the two conceptions turns on which grounding claims the theorist takes
to be true. For example, the worldly grounding theorist will deny that (if φ,
then) {φ} < (φ ∨ φ), whilst the conceptual grounding theorist will claim that
it is true.
As it is, my main arguments do not turn on adopting the worldly rather
than the conceptual conception of ground, nor do they turn on an analysis of
what that distinction amounts to. I therefore bracket these concerns in this
thesis.
As the worldly conception takes the grounding operator to hold between
sets of sentences and sentences that express facts, it follows straightforwardly
that grounding is factive. This means that from ∆ < φ we can conclude that
all of ⌜∆⌝ obtain, and that ⌜φ⌝ obtains.
It will aid readability to make use of a conditional grounding operator ‘⊲’,
such that
‘Γ ⊲ φ’ expresses that, if all the facts expressed by sentences in Γ obtain,
then Γ < φ
Similarly, I use ‘⊴’ as a conditional partial grounding operator, such that
3For example, Korbmacher (2016) provides individuation conditions for facts in terms of
factual equivalence (‘⇌’) and then defines factual equivalence in terms of weak grounding.
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‘Γ ⊴ φ’ expresses that, if all the facts expressed by sentences in ‘Γ’ obtain,
then Γ ≤ φ
By how ‘⊲’ and ‘⊴’ are defined, they inherit the stipulations about ‘<’ and
‘≤’ made in this chapter.
Given that the set on the left-hand-side of the grounding operator can
contain multiple sentences, we might speak loosely of the operator being many-
one. Expanding on this thought, we could replace sets on the left-hand-side
with plurals, such that
‘{φ, ψ} < φ ∧ ψ’ becomes ‘φ, ψ < φ ∧ ψ’.
On occasion, I may loosely speak of plurals instead of sets, where adopting
such a convention aids readability. For my purposes, these two manners of
speaking are interchangeable. I do not intend any full-blooded, ontological
commitment to sets with the convention I adopt.
12.4 The Relational Properties of Ground
Though I treat ground as an operator, we can nonetheless speak of its relational
properties. Given that I take grounding to constitute a partial ordering, I treat
grounding as irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive.
It is standard to assign these relational properties to ground.4 However,
there are various controversies regarding these relational properties. Various
counterexamples are advanced that challenge the irreflexivity (and thus asym-
metry) of ground.5 Similarly, some philosophers question whether grounding
is transitive.6
This lack of consensus might trouble the grounding theorist, but is not
problematic for present purposes. We will see that my Ground-Naturalness
Connection provides a conceptual link between grounding on one side, and
naturalness and certain deductive rules on the other. These deductive rules
4This is reflected in Fine’s (2014) introduction to grounding, or in the logics of ground:
see Correia (2016), Fine (2014) and Korbmacher (2016).
5For examples and discussion of the asymmetry of grounding, see Jenkins (2011), Kra¨mer
(2013), Lange (2013), Lowe (1998), Paseau (2009), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015), Trogdon (2013)
and Wilson (2014). For example, Jenkins notes that a materialist might want to say both
that ⌜S is in pain⌝ = ⌜S is in brain state c⌝ and that {S is in brain state c} < S is in pain.
6For examples and discussion of the transitivity of grounding, see Clark & Liggins (2012),
Lange (2013), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015), Trogdon (2013) and Wilson (2014).
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resemble those that govern the logical behaviour of ground. If a consensus
is reached whereby grounding is not transitive, these deductive rules can be
amended to reflect this consensus and invalidate transitive reasoning.
In addition to these standard relational properties, grounding theorists nor-
mally treat grounding as non-monotonic. This means that ∆ < φ does not imply
that ∆∪{ψ} < φ. For example, from {a is scarlet} < a is red, we cannot derive
that (if b is round, then) {a is scarlet, b is round} < a is red. The thought is
that all of the grounds must be relevant to what is grounded.
12.5 Some Important Definitions
I have made remarks on the grammar and relational properties of full and
partial grounding. However, there are further distinctions we can make within
the concept of ground.
Strict grounding is the notion that I have been explicating in this chap-
ter. Weak grounding is what we get by taking strict grounding and making it
reflexive. More precisely, we can define weak grounding as follows:
Weak Grounding: {ψ1, ψ2, ...} ≺ φ iff, for all sentences δ and all sets of
sentences Γ, if {φ} ∪ Γ < δ, then {ψ1, ψ2, ...,} ∪ Γ < δ.
In reverse, Korbmacher (2016) demonstrates that we can define strict ground-
ing in terms of weak grounding:
Strict Grounding Definition: {ψ1, ψ2, ...} < φ iff {ψ1, ψ2, ...} ≺ φ and for
no ψi there is a set of sentences Γ such that {φ} ∪ Γ ≺ ψi.
12.6 Conclusion
I am now in a position to proceed with Part 3.
This chapter is intended as elucidatory. It introduces the notion of ground-
ing that I will be working with, and makes explicit some assumptions I make
about its grammar and relational properties. Furthermore, the chapter intro-
duces some important distinctions within ground.
I intend for my introduction to be loyal to the existing literature on ground.
The next chapter discusses how we might interpret grounding as deflationary-
friendly.
Chapter 13
The Ground-Naturalness
Connection
13.1 Introduction
The target of this chapter is to introduce a conceptual link between grounding
and naturalness. The next chapters of Part 3 then provide evidence for this
conceptual link.
In Part 2, I argue that we should adopt a deflationary-friendly interpreta-
tion of naturalness. This deflationary-friendliness ‘pushes through’ the concep-
tual link, such that we should adopt a deflationary-friendly interpretation of
ground. In turn, this deflationary-friendliness pushes through to any charac-
terisation of fundamentality in terms of ground. Hence, we will block the route
to the grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre against deflationary
methodologies.
To remind the reader from ch.2, the block to the hyperintensional manoeu-
vre works as follows. Suppose that it is an interest-relative, subjective matter
whether ⌜φ⌝ is fundamental. It follows that finding a disagreement in a dispute
over the fundamentality of ⌜φ⌝ does not save the substantivity of a supposedly
objective dispute.
Firstly, however, I should make good on this offer of a conceptual link be-
tween grounding and naturalness. I introduce this link, the Ground-Naturalness
Connection, in §13.2. The Ground-Naturalness Connection consists of two
main, theoretical components: the idea of perfectly natural translation and
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certain deductive rules. Each are explicated fully, in §13.3 and §13.5 respec-
tively. In §13.4, I demonstrate that a deflationary-friendly interpretation of
naturalness pushes through the Ground-Naturalness Connection, to deliver a
deflationary-friendly interpretation of grounding. In §13.6, I conclude the chap-
ter.
13.2 The Ground-Naturalness Connection
I defend the following biconditional in Part 3:
Ground-Naturalness Connection: ∆ < φ iff there is a <-derivation from
the set of natural grounding claims to ‘∆ < φ’.
I then define ‘natural grounding claim’ as follows, when ‘∆ ◂ φ’ expresses
that ‘if all of the facts expressed by the sentences in ∆ obtain, then ∆ naturally
grounds φ’ (such that ‘◂’ is the conditional, natural grounding operator):
Natural Grounding Definition: ∆ ◂ φ iff there is a <-derivation of ‘Λ < γ’,
when Λ is a set of perfectly natural translations of the sentences in ∆,
and γ is some perfectly natural translation of φ.
The basic motivation behind the Ground-Naturalness Connection is that
we can generate all the grounding claims from certain deductive rules with a
starter pack of privileged grounding claims. By appealing to naturalness, we
have an extra-logical resource to get the process going.
To help show what is going on, consider the following example. The details
of this example will be clearer once I have detailed the notion of perfectly
natural translation and our deductive rules, which follows in later sections.
Consider the following claim:
{a is scarlet, a is a triangle} ⊲ a is red ∧ a is shaped.
When ‘a is red’ is translated into a perfectly natural language, the property
of being red can be translated as an (infinitary) disjunction, each disjunct
corresponding to the perfectly natural definition of each shade of red. To
simplify matters, suppose that the properties corresponding to each shade of
red are perfectly natural. ‘a is red’ might therefore be translated as γ = ‘a
is scarlet ∨ a is crimson ∨ ...’. Suppose that Λ = ‘{a is scarlet}’. Obtaining
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disjuncts ground their disjunctions. Hence, we can derive that Λ ⊲ γ. It
follows by Natural Grounding that ‘{a is scarlet} ◂ a is red’.
Analogous reasoning finds that {a is a triangle} ◂ a is shaped. When
‘a is shaped’ is translated into a perfectly natural language, the property of
being shaped can be translated as an (infinitary) disjunction, each disjunct
corresponding to a different, determinate shape. ‘a is shaped’ might therefore
be translated as γ = ‘a is a triangle ∨ a is a rectangle ∨ ...’. Suppose that Λ =
‘{a is a triangle}’. As obtaining disjuncts ground their disjunctions, Λ ⊲ γ. It
follows by Natural Grounding that ‘{a is a triangle} ⊲ a is shaped’ is a natural
grounding claim.
As obtaining conjuncts (jointly) ground their conjunctions, we can derive
that:
{a is red, a is shaped} ⊲ a is red ∧ a is shaped.
Meanwhile, we have shown that ‘{a is scarlet} ◂ a is red’ and ‘{a is a
triangle} ◂ a is shaped’. As grounding is transitive, we can therefore derive
from the set of natural grounding claims that
{a is scarlet, a is a triangle} ⊲ a is red ∧ a is shaped,
By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, we thus conclude that:
{a is scarlet, a is a triangle} ⊲ a is red ∧ a is shaped.
This is the desired grounding claim. The natural grounding claims provide
the resources from which we can generate all grounding claims via certain
deductive rules.
13.3 Natural Translations and Grounding
The Ground-Naturalness Connection consists of two main components: some
deductive rules, and perfectly natural translation. In §13.5, I discuss our de-
ductive rules in more detail. This section is concerned with explicating the
idea of perfectly natural translation.
Lewis’s (1983) notion of naturalness underpins perfectly natural translation.
Readers who need a reminder of what naturalness amounts to can consult ch.6
for a fuller explanation.
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The perfectly natural properties form a set such that all other properties can
be defined in terms of that set. For example, the property of being red might be
defined as an infinitary disjunction of wavelengths and frequencies of light.1 It
is built into the notion of naturalness that all properties are definable in terms
of perfectly natural properties. When the definition is relatively complex, then
we say that the property is relatively natural. When the definition is excessively
complex, we say that the property is unnatural.
A perfectly natural language is such that all the predicates in the language
refer to perfectly natural properties. As all properties can be defined in terms
of perfectly natural properties, it is always possible to translate a sentence in
an ordinary language – say, English – into the perfectly natural language. I
call this perfectly natural language Naturalish. Following the example above,
we can translate the English sentence ‘a is red’ into the following Naturalish
sentence:
a has wave properties XYZ1 ∨ a has wave properties XYZ2 ∨ a has wave
properties XYZ3 ∨ ...
This is an infinitary disjunction of wavelengths and frequencies of light (each
of which is a perfectly natural property) corresponding to shades of red. This
demonstrates that sentences of Naturalish can be infinitary. This means that
our deductive rules must be infinitary for the present purpose.
It is also important to note that a sentence may have multiple perfectly
natural translations. For example, rather than translate the English sentence
‘a is red’ into the Naturalish sentence above, we might instead translate it as:
(a has some wavelength between n1 and n2) ∧ (a has a wave frequency
between m1 and m2).
when the n and m are numbers. This translation avoids an infinitary Nat-
uralish sentence, but involves quantification. In any case, both sentences are
perfectly natural translations of the English ‘a is red’, and Natural Grounding
does not impose any demand for a unique perfectly natural translation:
1This definition deals with the colour of light rather than the colour of surfaces, which
might instead be defined in terms of reflective properties of surfaces.
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Natural Grounding Definition: ∆ ◂ φ iff there is a <-derivation of ‘Λ < γ’,
when Λ is a set of perfectly natural translations of the sentences in ∆,
and γ is some perfectly natural translation of φ.
13.4 Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness
In Part 2, I argue that the correct interpretation of naturalness is deflationary-
friendly. This means, amongst other things, that whether a property is per-
fectly natural is an interest-relative and subjective affair. This should ‘push
through’ to grounding through the Ground-Naturalness Connection. However,
it is worth making sure that this ‘push through’ is successful, to assure ourselves
of the project at hand.
Suppose that it is interest-relative whether a property is perfectly natural.
In other words, membership of the set of perfectly natural properties is an
interest-relative matter. Which properties are in this set directly affects which
perfectly natural translations are available.
To demonstrate this, consider the following toy example. Suppose that we
are considering two properties, the property of being green and the property
of being grue. It is well-documented that we can define being grue in terms of
being green and being blue, but also that we can define being green in terms of
being grue and being bleen.2 Suppose that the properties of being green and
being blue are perfectly natural, and the properties of being grue and being
bleen are not perfectly natural. This means that a Naturalish translation of the
English ‘a is grue’ is ‘a is green until time t, and a is blue after t’. Meanwhile, a
Naturalish translation of the English ‘a is green’ is ‘a is green’, as the sentence
is already in perfectly natural terms.
Alternatively, suppose that the properties of being grue and being bleen
are perfectly natural, and the properties of being green and being blue are not
perfectly natural. This means that a Naturalish translation of the English ‘a
is grue’ is ‘a is grue’ – it is already in perfectly natural terms. However, a
Naturalish translation of the English ‘a is green’ is ‘a is grue before time t, and
a is bleen after t’.
2Goodman (1955) makes this point. We can define ‘grue’ as ‘green before t and blue
after t’ for some future t. Alternatively, we can define ‘green’ as ‘grue before t and bleen
after t’, when an individual is bleen iff it is blue before t and green after t.
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We therefore see that, if it is an interest-relative matter as to which proper-
ties are perfectly natural, then the correctness of translations into Naturalish
from English is an interest-relative matter. A deflationary-friendly interpreta-
tion of naturalness therefore results in a deflationary-friendly interpretation of
perfectly natural translation.
This deflationary-friendliness will push through to grounding via the Ground-
Naturalness Connection. Note that
{a is green before t, a is blue after t} ⊲ a is green before t ∧ a is blue
after t.
This is because obtaining conjuncts (jointly) ground their conjunctions.
Consequently, if ‘a is green before t ∧ a is blue after t’ is Naturalish for the
English ‘a is grue’, then the Ground-Naturalness Connection implies that:
{a is green before t, a is blue after t} ⊲ a is grue.
By contrast, if ‘a is green before t ∧ a is blue after t’ is not Naturalish
for the English ‘a is grue’, then the Ground-Naturalness Connection will not
imply the grounding claim above. In this case, the thought is that being green
and being blue fails to be more fundamental than being grue, and thus the
direction of the grounding claim is false.
If the Ground-Naturalness Connection is true and perfect naturalness is an
interest-relative matter, then whether
{a is green before t, a is blue after t} ⊲ a is grue.
is true is itself interest-relative. This provides a deflationary-friendly inter-
pretation of grounding. Consequently, if the Ground-Naturalness Connection
holds, a deflationary-friendly interpretation of naturalness will ‘push through’
to grounding.
13.5 Deriving all Grounding Claims from the Natural
Grounding Claims
To complete my explication of the Ground-Naturalness Connection, the next
step is to provide details on the deductive rules to which I appeal. These deduc-
tive rules are used to derive all grounding claims from the natural grounding
claims.
13.5. DERIVING ALL GROUNDING CLAIMS FROM THE NATURAL
GROUNDING CLAIMS 173
We have seen in §13.3 that perfectly natural translations can be infinite in
length. For example, a perfectly natural translation of ‘a is red’ is as follows:
a has wave properties XYZ1 ∨ a has wave properties XYZ2 ∨ a has wave
properties XYZ3 ∨ ...
when each set of (perfectly natural) wave properties corresponds to each
shade of red. We want our deductive rules to deliver the result that a disjunct
grounds an infinitely long disjunction, such that {a has wave properties XYZ1}⊲ a is red.
Vocabulary and Grammar
As the following deductive rules involve infinitary reasoning, it is worth intro-
ducing some infinitary expressions to those readers who have not come across
them before. In addition to the standard logical vocabulary and the (strict)
full ground operator ‘<’, I use the following infinitary vocabulary:
the truth-functional connectives: ⋀, and ⋁.
‘⋀’ expresses (possibly infinitary) conjunction. When Γ is a set of sen-
tences, ‘⋀Γ’ expresses the (possibly infinite) conjunction of those sentences in
Γ. Similarly, ‘⋁Γ’ expresses the (possibly infinite) disjunction of the sentences
in Γ.
As indicated, ⋀ and ⋁ operate on sets of formulas rather than formulas
themselves. Given that sets can be infinite, this permits infinite conjunctions
and disjunctions. I follow the standard notational conventions. This means
that, for indexed (possibly infinite) sets of formulas, I also write ⋁i∈I ψi instead
of ⋁{ψi ∣ i ∈ I}, and analogously for ⋀. Furthermore, I sometimes write ψ1 ∨
ψ2 ∨ ... to indicate an infinitely long disjunction, and analogously for infinitely
long conjunctions.
Our Deductive Rules
In this thesis, I appeal to the following deductive rules:3
3Note that – by how ‘⊲’ is defined – we can use these rules to derive results using ⊲. Our
deductive rules operate by making a factivity assumption about some sentences, and then
deriving results from this assumption.
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for each i ∈ I : φi
{φi ∣ i ∈ I} < ⋀i∈I φi
for some j ∈ I : φj
{φj} < ⋁i∈I φi
for each i ∈ I : Γ, φi < ψ
{Γ,⋁i∈I φi} ≺ ψ
The notation ‘for each i ∈ I : φi’ should be read as ‘we have established each
of the sentences φi.’ Meanwhile, the horizontal line signifies that we can derive
the sentence below from the sentence above. Consequently, each of the rules
(taken in order) can be read as follows:
Whenever we have established each of the sentences φi, we can then
derive that the set of sentences φi strictly fully grounds the (infinitary)
conjunction of the sentences φi.
Whenever we have established some sentence φj that is one of the sen-
tences φi, we can then derive that the singleton set containing φj strictly
fully grounds the (infinitary) disjunction of the sentences φi.
Whenever we have established for each of the sentences φi that Γ, φi fully
grounds ψ (when Γ is non-empty), we can then derive that the set = {Γ,
the (infinitary) disjunction of the sentences φi} weakly fully grounds ψ.
In addition, I assume that grounding is
• factive
• non-monotonic
• irreflexive
Take, for example:
for each i ∈ I : φi
{φi ∣ i ∈ I} < ⋀i∈I φi
From this, we can derive that, from the factivity assumption that the the facts expressed
by A, B obtain, we can derive that {A, B} < A ∧ B. Another way to put this is that:
{A, B} ⊲ A ∧ B
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• asymmetric
• transitive
and derive results accordingly.
It is hoped that these deductive rules will be unobjectionable to most
grounding theorists. They can be expressed informally by the following credos:
• Obtaining conjuncts (jointly) ground their conjunctions.
• Obtaining disjuncts ground their disjunctions.
• Whatever, with any disjunct, grounds ψ, also, with their disjunction,
weakly grounds ψ.
This kind of reasoning can be found in the works of numerous grounding
theorists, such as Fine (2014), Correia (2016) and Schaffer (2016). Though it
is a step further to allow infinitary applications of these deductions, infinitary
reasoning can be explicitly found in the work other grounding theorists, such
as Dixon (2016) and Korbmacher (2016). Further, Fine (2014, 47) suggests
that the grounding operator can take an ‘infinite number’ of arguments to
its ‘left’, and his use of sets when setting out deductive rules for ground is
compatible with infinitary reasoning. Correia (2016) similarly has grounding
hold between sentences and sets of sentences. Meanwhile, Litland’s (2015)
discussion of Dixon’s (2016) use of infinitary associativity tacitly suggests that
he has no objection to infinitary reasoning about grounding in general.
Additionally, it should be noted that no deflationary-friendly assumptions
have been ‘smuggled in’ to this set of deductive rules. The deflationary-friendly
aspects of the Ground-Naturalness Connection come from certain interpreta-
tions of these rules and ‘<’ (see the next subsection), and from Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness. The substantivist grounding theorist can therefore ac-
cept our deductive rules without commitment to the rest of this thesis’s agenda.
With this in mind, I propose that the deductive rules set out should repre-
sent acceptable reasoning to most grounding theorists.
Deflationary-Friendly Deductive Rules
Suppose that we accepted that our deductive rules reflect the behaviour of
grounding. The worry is that the deflationary-friendliness of the Ground-
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Naturalness Connection is then put into doubt. The concern is that the sub-
stantivist will be able to make hyperintensional manoeuvres that turn on purely
logical matters of grounding. Given that purely logical grounding is not medi-
ated through Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness – it is provided solely by our
deductive rules – we cannot make sense of such a reformulated dispute being
deflatable. The thought is that a dispute over the correctness of those rules
can only be understood as a dispute over whether the rules adequately capture
some objective phenomenon of metaphysical grounding.
However, this concern can be downplayed. The first thought is that re-
stricting the substantivist to purely logical grounding-variants of hyperinten-
sional manoeuvre is a significant limitation. Purely logical grounding-variants
of hyperintensional manoeuvre can only preserve the substantivity of disputes
that turn on purely logical matters of ground. My contention is that these are
relatively rare outside explicit disputes about the logic of ground. Meanwhile,
explicit disputes about the logic of ground are relatively unlikely to be targeted
by deflationists: simply because they are about the pure logic of ground, and
these are of less interest to those inclined to deflate disputes about non-logical
grounding. Hence, it is not obvious that purely logical grounding-variants
of hyperintensional manoeuvre will preserve many disputes that are actually
threatened by deflationary heuristics.
The second thought is that, even once we conceive of a dispute that might be
preserved by purely logical grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre,
it is not obvious that such a hyperintensional manoeuvre would be endorsed by
any actual substantivist. To demonstrate this point, consider a metaphysical
dispute over whether there exists the cosmos, or whether there exist individual
parts of the cosmos. The deflationist is likely motivated to challenge this dis-
pute as deflatable, employing deflationary heuristics against it. Let us suppose
that she makes a plausible case against the substantivity of the dispute.
To avoid this result, the substantivist makes a hyperintensional manoeu-
vre. She reformulates the dispute as about whether the existence of the cos-
mos grounds the existence of the individual parts, or vice versa. The thought
is that the disputants disagree on whether the cosmos or its parts are more
fundamental, and that this question of relative fundamentality is expressed as
a disagreement over grounding. This reformulates the dispute as about what
is called priority monism.
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Suppose, however, that the substantivist accepts the deflationary-friendliness
of (not purely logical) grounding. To defend the dispute, she is therefore minded
to present this move as a purely logical grounding-variant of hyperintensional
manoeuvre. With this in mind, she suggests that we express the existence
of the cosmos by a conjunction of existence-claims about its individual parts,
when existence is expressed by the existential quantifier. To demonstrate this
idea, take the following toy example. In this example, there exist only two
individuals in the cosmos, a and b. We might therefore express the existence
of the cosmos as follows:
∃x(x = a) ∧ ∃x(x = b).
The disagreement over whether the cosmos or its parts are more fundamen-
tal, then, is captured in disagreement over which of the following grounding
claims is true:
{∃x(x = a), ∃x(x = b)} < ∃x(x = a) ∧ ∃x(x = b); or
{∃x(x = a) ∧ ∃x(x = b)} < ∃x(x = a).
The dispute therefore turns on whether the following rule really reflects the
behaviour of grounding:
for each i ∈ I : φi
{φi ∣ i ∈ I} < ⋀i∈I φi
This is a purely logical grounding-variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre:
it reformulates the original dispute as one about the pure logic of ground. The
dispute appears substantive, because there is no way to make sense of the
reformulated dispute unless we accept that our deductive rules are meant to
reflect some external, objective phenomenon of grounding.
The trouble for the substantivist is that this particular manoeuvre will not
be endorsed by any priority monist I know of. Priority monists do not deny
that conjuncts (jointly) ground their conjunctions. Schaffer (2010) argues for
monism on the basis of claims about quantum physics and emergent properties.
His arguments do not commit him to the claim that conjunctions ground their
conjuncts, for example, that
{a is red ∧ a is round} ⊲ a is red, a is round.
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Indeed, Schaffer’s (2016) discussion of ‘conjunctive-type dependence’ heav-
ily implies that he would reject such a claim.
This, then, is the challenge. It is not enough for the substantivist to present
a dispute that is the actual target of a deflationary heuristic, such that the
substantivity of that dispute can be preserved by a purely logical grounding-
variant of hyperintensional manoeuvre. They must also demonstrate that such
a hyperintensional manoeuvre would be plausibly endorsed by a substantivist.
My contention is that it will transpire that purely logical grounding-variants
of hyperintensional manoeuvre will find little use.
This severely limits the risk posed by deflationary-unfriendly, purely logical
grounding. This thesis aims to defend deflationary heuristics from hyperinten-
sional manoeuvres, focusing on deflationary heuristics as actually applied to
actual, philosophical disputes. It is not obvious that purely logical, grounding-
variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre threaten such applications of defla-
tionary heuristics. Hence, I might unconcernedly accept that purely logical
grounding is deflationary-unfriendly, and treat our rules as aiming to reflect the
external phenomenon of metaphysical grounding. Impurely logical grounding is
mediated through deflationary-friendly naturalness by the Ground-Naturalness
Connection, which is sufficient to defang any applied grounding-variant of hy-
perintensional manoeuvre.
Hence, even if our deductive rules reflect a deflationary-unfriendly notion
of logical grounding, it is not crucial for my thesis to avoid this result. On the
other hand, we can also downplay the thought that the use of our deductive
rules is deflationary-unfriendly.
The apparent problem began by treating our deductive rules as reflecting
some external, metaphysically substantive phenomenon. We can therefore pre-
vent the problem from getting started by resisting the claim that these rules
do reflect such a phenomenon.
Consider again our deductive rules:
for each i ∈ I : φi
{φi ∣ i ∈ I} < ⋀i∈I φi
for some j ∈ I : φj
{φj} < ⋁i∈I φi
for each i ∈ I : Γ, φi < ψ
{Γ,⋁i∈I φi} ≺ ψ
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According to a deflationary-friendly interpretation of these rules, ‘<’ is inter-
preted as a certain kind of explanation, whereby the logically simple is <-prior
to the logically complex.4 For example, we see that disjuncts are <-prior to
their disjunctions with
for some j ∈ I : φj
{φj} < ⋁i∈I φi
By this interpretation of ‘<’, our rules reflect a certain, subjective prejudice
of grounding-theorists to favour logically simpler sentences as explanatorily
prior. Note that it is not obvious that the logically complex cannot explain the
logically simple, in some contexts. To motivate this point, suppose that we have
a chemist and her apprentice. They are studying an unknown substance, which
they have found to exemplify chemical properties XYZ. The chemist explains
to her apprentice that the substance has these chemical properties because it
is iron. Meanwhile, we can assume that the property of being iron is defined as
a conjunction of these chemical properties. I see no reason to deny that this is
genuinely explanatory for her apprentice in this context. The apprentice knows
that iron has certain chemical properties, but did not know that the substance
was iron. Hence the exemplification of these chemical properties is explained
by the substance being iron. As such, the truth of some conjuncts is explained
by the truth of their conjunction.
It might be objected that I am talking about different senses of the word
‘explanation’.5 Hence, it is not that there is a subjective preference about
the relative logical simplicity of explanandums and explanans, but instead that
there is one sense of ‘explanation’ from the logically simple to the logically
complex, and another sense of ‘explanation’ from the logically complex to the
logically simple.6 However, this does not undermine the overall point, because
it is not clear that one sense of ‘explanation’ is objectively better than another.
That there are multiple (plausible) senses of ‘explanation’ seems to evidence
the point that any particular sense of ‘explanation’ is only of interest-relative
value.
4Note that a deflationary-friendly interpretation of ‘<’ will result in a deflationary-friendly
interpretation of ‘≺’, ‘⊲’ and ‘◂’, by how they are defined.
5My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising this point.
6For example, a Humean view of laws might take logically complex laws to explain their
logically simpler instances.
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Consequently, suppose that our deductive rules simply reflect a subjective
prejudice about explanatory priority. As this prejudice is subjective, it follows
that our rules are reflecting a phenomenon that is deflationary-friendly.
To demonstrate this, consider again the toy example dispute over whether
the cosmos or its parts exist. The substantivist makes a hyperintensional ma-
noeuvre, reformulating this dispute as a dispute over whether the cosmos or
its parts are more fundamental. They offer a purely logical grounding-variant
of hyperintensional manoeuvre, such that the dispute is over which of the fol-
lowing claims is true:
{∃x(x = a), ∃x(x = b)} < ∃x(x = a) ∧ ∃x(x = b); or
{∃x(x = a) ∧ ∃x(x = b)} < ∃x(x = a).
Hence, the dispute is reformulated as about the correctness of our deduc-
tive rules. However, if our rules merely reflect a subjective prejudice about the
explanatory priority of logically simple sentences, then this reformulated dis-
pute remains deflatable. Both disputants will agree that conjuncts are logically
simpler than their conjunctions. Because of this agreement, the reformulated
dispute is trivially settled: the first claim is true, and the second claim is false.
On the other hand, nothing metaphysically substantive follows from this con-
clusion. The substantivist has failed to protect the substantivity of the dispute
with their hyperintensional manoeuvre.
Before moving on, it is worth summarising the points of this subsection. The
substantivist argues that our deductive rules reflect a deflationary-unfriendly
notion of purely logical grounding. My first response is that they may be right
– but that purely logical, grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre
have limited application. Hence, it does not matter if purely logical grounding
is deflationary-unfriendly, for the purposes of my thesis. My second response
is that we can challenge the idea that our rules reflect deflationary-unfriendly,
purely logical grounding. Instead, we can see our rules as defining the logical
behaviour of a subjectively important kind of explanation from the logically
simple to the logically complex.
Hence, we needn’t worry about the apparent deflationary-unfriendliness of
our deductive rules.
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A Stipulation
For the rest of the thesis, I define ‘<-derivable’ as follows:
There is a <-derivation from Γ to sentence φ iff, from Γ, we can use our
deductive rules to derive that φ.
A sentence that is <-derivable from nothing is simply ‘<-derivable’.
These stipulations are designed to aid readability. The idea of <-derivability
is not supposed to involve a commitment to any full, logical system.
Armed with these definitions, we can state the Ground-Naturalness Con-
nection as follows:
Ground-Naturalness Connection: ∆ ⊲ φ iff there is a <-derivation from
the set of natural grounding claims to ‘∆ ⊲ φ.
and
Natural Grounding Definition: ∆ ◂ φ iff there is a <-derivation of ‘Λ < γ’,
when Λ is a set of perfectly natural translations of the sentences in ∆,
and γ is some perfectly natural translation of φ.
13.6 Conclusion
This chapter explicates the apparatus underpinning the Ground-Naturalness
Connection. This apparatus consists of two halves: the idea of perfectly natural
translation, and our deductive rules by which we derive all grounding claims
from the natural grounding claims.
The Ground-Naturalness Connection is a biconditional, and it is not in-
tended as an analysis of grounding. This means, among other things, that
neither side of the biconditional needs to be more explanatory than the other,
and that it does not matter if the Ground-Naturalness Connection is circular.
A biconditional can be true despite being unexplanatory and circular. How-
ever, if it is true then the Ground-Naturalness Connection allows me to reach
a deflationary-friendly interpretation of grounding from a deflationary-friendly
interpretation of naturalness.
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The rest of Part 3 provides arguments for thinking that the Ground-Naturalness
Connection is true. This allows me to proceed with my thesis and defend de-
flationary heuristics from grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
The next chapter considers conceptual links between grounding, naturalness
and our deductive rules.
Chapter 14
Conceptual Links
14.1 Introduction
The last chapter presented the Ground-Naturalness Connection. In this chap-
ter, I begin the task of evidencing the biconditional, focusing on direct, con-
ceptual links between grounding, naturalness and our deductive rules.
In §14.2, I provide argument for the right-to-left direction of the Ground-
Naturalness Connection. I propose that this takes the form of a proof, rather
than merely supporting this direction of the biconditional.
In §14.3, I consider theoretical considerations that support the left-to-right
(and right-to-left) direction of the Ground-Naturalness Connection. The idea
is that our deductive rules tracks the features of ground, and Naturalish makes
explicit grounding claims that were otherwise ‘hidden’ from those rules. In
§14.4, I conclude.
In this chapter, I make extensive use of square brackets ‘⌜’ and ‘⌝’ to denote
facts. It will be recalled from §12.2 that ‘⌜φ⌝’ denotes the fact expressed by the
sentence ‘φ’. I also make use of ‘⇌’ to denote factual equivalence. The thought
is that φ⇌ ψ iff ⌜φ⌝ = ⌜ψ⌝.
14.2 From Right to Left
The right-to-left direction of the Ground-Naturalness Connection is provable,
from some plausible assumptions. In this section I offer this proof. To clarify,
the claim is that
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If there is a <-derivation from the set of natural grounding claims to
‘∆ ⊲ φ’, then ∆ ⊲ φ.
This claim follows from two observations: that our deductive rules reflect
the nature of grounding, and that a sentence and its perfectly natural transla-
tion express the same fact.
I argue in §13.5 that the grounding theorist should be in a position to accept
our deductive rules as reflecting the nature of ground. They should therefore
accept <-derivations as sound.
Meanwhile, suppose that the Naturalish translation of ∆ is Λ, and the
Naturalish translation of φ is γ. Suppose further that we can <-derive that
Λ ⊲ γ. This means that ∆ ◂ φ. This follows immediately from the definition of
natural grounding, given below:
Natural Grounding Definition: ∆ ◂ φ iff there is a <-derivation of ‘Λ < γ’,
when Λ is a set of perfectly natural translations of the sentences in ∆,
and γ is some perfectly natural translation of φ.
As our deductive rules are unobjectionable to the grounding theorist, it
should be accepted by such theorists that
If ‘Λ ⊲ γ’ is <-derivable, then Λ ⊲ γ.
Meanwhile, we know that the following factual equivalences hold:1
(Λ⇌∆) and (γ ⇌ φ).
As grounding holds between facts, it follows that
Λ ⊲ γ iff ∆ ⊲ φ.
Hence, it follows that grounding theorists should accept that
If ‘Λ ⊲ γ’ is <-derivable, then ∆ ⊲ φ.
1We have previously defined factual equivalence between sentences. We can extend this
definition to sets, such that ‘Λ⇌∆’ expresses that
A sentence φ is in Λ only if there is a sentence ψ in ∆ such that φ ⇌ ψ; AND a
sentence φ is in ∆ only if there is a sentence ψ in ∆ such that φ⇌ ψ.
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This means that if a sentence ψ is a natural grounding claim, then ψ is a
true grounding claim. I am trying to prove the following:
If there is a <-derivation from the set of natural grounding claims to
‘∆ ⊲ φ’, then ∆ ⊲ φ.
I have argued that grounding theorists should accept that <-derivations are
sound and that all natural grounding claims are true. As <-derivations are
sound, they cannot derive falsity from truth. Hence, if there is a <-derivation
from the set of natural grounding claims to ‘∆ ⊲ φ’, then ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ should be
accepted as true by grounding theorists. This delivers the right-to-left direction
of the Ground-Naturalness Connection.
Note that the substantivist grounding theorist will interpret <-derivation
in a deflationary-unfriendly way: as derivations about grounding. It might be
thought that this threatens the deflationary-friendliness of my account. How-
ever, this is not so. The point is that any grounding claim <-derived from the
set of natural grounding claims should be accepted as true even by substantivist
grounding theorists.2 Meanwhile, in §13.5, I demonstrated how deflationists can
use <-derivations without accepting deflationary-unfriendly consequences.
14.3 From Left to Right
Much of Part 3 is engaged in arguing for the left-to-right direction of the
Ground-Naturalness Connection, namely that
Ground-Naturalness Connection: If ∆ ⊲ φ, then there is a <-derivation
from the set of natural grounding claims to ‘∆ ⊲ φ’.
Unlike the right-to-left direction, this claim does not admit of a proof.
The right-to-left direction appeals to the rule-soundness of each of our natural
deduction rules. The left-to-right direction requires something like a Complete-
ness Theorem for our natural deduction rules, which I am not in a position to
offer.
Instead, throughout Part 3, I offer an inductive argument for the left-to-
right direction of the Ground-Naturalness Connection. For example, in ch.15,
2Note that any sentence φ in the set of natural grounding claims is such that the set of
natural grounding claims ⊲ φ (and the set of natural grounding claims ◂φ).
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I consider a number of paradigmatic grounding claims. For each such ground-
ing claim ∆ ⊲ φ, I argue that ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable from the set of natural
grounding claims.3 In ch.16, I consider further, theoretical applications of
grounding and argue that the successful applications are preserved under the
Ground-Naturalness Connection. This inductive argument evidences the con-
clusion that the Ground-Naturalness Connection captures anything that the
substantivist wants to capture with grounding.
In this section, I want to support those results with general, conceptual
reasons for thinking that the left-to-right direction of the Ground-Naturalness
Connection is true. These reasons support the Ground-Naturalness Connection
and hopefully – at least – make the successes of later chapters unsurprising.
We can motivate the left-to-right direction by thinking of grounding as
a restricted supervenience relation. Supervenience has been offered as the
relation of metaphysical dependence, but, as Leuenberger (2013, 228) notes,
this idea has ‘widely gone out of favour’. Leuenberger offers the following
assessment:
First, the target notions of determination and dependence are hyperin-
tensional, while supervenience is not. As a consequence, supervenience
fails to make any discrimination in the realm of the non-contingent. Sec-
ond, the target notions are asymmetric. Supervenience, in contrast, fails
to be asymmetric (228).
We can demonstrate these points with a couple of examples. ⌜There are
infinitely many natural numbers⌝ supervenes on ⌜Sherbie is a cat⌝, but the
former does not seem to metaphysically depend on the latter. Meanwhile, ⌜A⌝,⌜B⌝ collectively supervene on ⌜A ∧ B⌝, but metaphysicians typically want to
deny that conjuncts metaphysically depend on their conjunctions.
Hence, it is not a necessary condition of ⌜A⌝ supervening on ⌜B⌝ that {B}< A. However, the latter is a sufficient condition of the former. This is because
grounding necessitates, that is:
If ∆ < φ, then ◻(⋀∆→ φ).
3Or that the Ground-Naturalness Connection tracks plausible reasons to doubt the
grounding claim.
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This suggests that grounding is a restriction of supervenience. In addi-
tion to these restrictions, we should also note that grounding is factive whilst
supervenience is not. Hence, the thought is that
Building Grounding: ∆ ⊲ φ iff
1. ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on ⌜∆⌝; and
2. All of ⌜∆⌝ are relevant to the obtaining of ⌜φ⌝; and
3. All of ⌜∆⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜φ⌝.4
Our use of ‘⊲’ reflects the restriction of factivity. Clause (2) allows ground-
ing to discriminate ‘in the realm of the non-contingent’, because not all facts
are relevant to the obtaining of necessary facts. Clause (3) makes grounding
asymmetric, because relative fundamentality is an asymmetric relation.
From there, the idea is that there are conceptual links between these clauses,
and the appeals to naturalness and our dedutive rules. I argue that the desired,
restricted supervenience relation is provided by <-derivation from the set of
natural grounding claims. Remember that
Natural Grounding Definition: ∆ ◂ φ iff there is a <-derivation of ‘Λ < γ’,
when Λ is a set of perfectly natural translations of the sentences in ∆,
and γ is some perfectly natural translation of φ.
It follows straightforwardly from this definition that any natural grounding
claim ∆◂φ can be translated into an equivalent, Naturalish natural grounding
claim Λ ◂ γ.5 I return to this point shortly.
Meanwhile, our deductive rules preserve supervenience, relevance and the
direction of relative fundamentality. For example, our three rules do not allow
us to derive that
{φ ∨ ψ} ⊲ ψ,
tracking the idea that ⌜ψ⌝ does not supervene on ⌜{φ ∨ ψ}⌝. Further, we
can see that any appropriate addition to our natural deduction rules should
not license such a derivation. The same thought applies to the derivation of
4This is not intended as an analysis of grounding – for example, the biconditional uses
the notion of relative fundamentality, which grounding theorists might want to analyse in
terms of grounding.
5The grounding claims are equivalent in the sense that they express the same grounding
relation between the same facts.
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{φ, ψ} ⊲ (φ ∨ pi),
tracking the idea that the obtaining of ψ is irrelevant to the obtaining of
(φ ∨ pi). Finally, the same holds for deriving that
{φ ∧ ψ} ⊲ φ, ψ,
tracking the idea that ⌜φ ∧ ψ⌝ is less fundamental than ⌜{φ, ψ}⌝.
More generally, our deductive rules are meant to reflect the behaviour of
grounding. We know that, if ∆ ⊲ φ, then ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on the ⌜∆⌝. Further,
grounding preserves relevance. This is why it is non-monotonic: the thought is
that, if ∆ ⊲ φ, then all of ⌜∆⌝ must be relevant to the obtaining of ⌜φ⌝. Finally,
grounding is supposed to track the direction of relative fundamentality. If
∆ ⊲ φ, then all of ⌜∆⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜φ⌝.
Hence, grounding preserves supervenience, relevance and the direction of
relative fundamentality. Our deductive rules reflect the behaviour of grounding.
Therefore, it should be no surprise that <-derivation preserves supervenience,
relevance and the direction of relative fundamentality.6
Hence:
<-Derivation Simpliciter Restrictions: If ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable, then
1. ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on ⌜∆⌝; and
2. All of ⌜∆⌝ are relevant to the obtaining of ⌜φ⌝; and
3. All of ⌜∆⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜φ⌝.
However, we want to expand this result beyond what is <-derivable sim-
pliciter. Our deductive rules are limited by the language it is used with. For
6Note that using our deductive rules to track these features does not commit us to an
inflationary semantics of ground. In §13.5, I argued that our deductive rules should be in-
terpreted as reflecting a certain conception of explanation, in which the logically complex is
to be explained by what is logically simpler. This is a deflationary-friendly interpretation,
because insisting on this direction of explanation is only of interest-relative value. This con-
ception of explanation also preserves supervenience, relevance and relative fundamentality.
If ∆ fully explains φ, then ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on ⌜∆⌝. An explanation of φ must be relevant to
φ. Finally, because this conception takes the logically complex to be explained by what is
logically simpler, it seems to follow that logically simpler sentences explain logically complex
sentences constructed out of those logically simpler sentences. From this, most grounding
theorists should accept that this conception of explanation tracks relative fundamentality.
This is because it is a common assumption made by grounding theorists that sentential
components of logically complex sentences express more fundamental facts than the facts
expressed by those logically complex sentences.
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example, we cannot use our deductive rules to derive that ‘{a is scarlet} ⊲ a is
red’, because our deductive rules do not ‘know’ the connections between being
scarlet and being red. Hence, it cannot tell us through <-Derivation Simpliciter
Restrictions that ⌜a is red⌝ supervenes on ⌜a is scarlet⌝, that ⌜a is scarlet⌝ is
relevant to ⌜a is red⌝, or that ⌜a is scarlet⌝ is more fundamental than ⌜a is red⌝.
Let us say that such grounding claims are hidden from our deductive rules.
Meanwhile, grounding claims that are not hidden from our deductive rules are
known by them.
This is why I appeal to naturalness. Translating into Naturalish provides
a way for our deductive rules to know grounding claims that were otherwise
hidden. In Naturalish, all these implicit connections are made explicit for our
rules. For example, suppose (for simplicity) that the properties corresponding
to shades of red are perfectly natural, and that the property of being red is not
perfectly natural. We might therefore give the following Naturalish translation
of ‘a is red’:
‘a is scarlet ∨ a is crimson ∨ ...’
The Naturalish translation makes explicit the connections between scarlet
and red. Importantly, English sentences referring to less natural properties
are translated into more logically complex Naturalish sentences than English
sentences referring to more natural properties. Translation into Naturalish
therefore cooperates with our deductive rules in tracking relations of relative
fundamentality between facts.
The following is <-derivable:
‘{a is scarlet} ⊲ a is scarlet ∨ a is crimson ∨ ...’
Naturalish translations thus transform genuine grounding claims into what
is <-derivable, to which the results of <-Derivation Simpliciter Restrictions
apply.
To complete the picture, we note that equivalences hold between facts. Take
an arbitrary natural grounding claim: ∆ ⊲ φ. As noted, we can translate this
claim into a Naturalish sentence ‘Λ ⊲ γ’, which is <-derivable. Also note that
(Λ⇌∆) and (γ ⇌ φ).
It follows that
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1. ⌜γ⌝ supervenes on ⌜Λ⌝ iff ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on ⌜∆⌝; and
2. All of ⌜Λ⌝ are relevant to the obtaining of ⌜γ⌝ iff all of ⌜∆⌝ are relevant
to the obtaining of ⌜φ⌝; and
3. All of ⌜Λ⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜γ⌝ iff all of ⌜∆⌝ are more funda-
mental than ⌜φ⌝.
As Λ ⊲ γ is <-derivable, we know from <-Derivation Simpliciter Restrictions
that
1. ⌜γ⌝ supervenes on ⌜Λ⌝; and
2. All of ⌜Λ⌝ are relevant to the obtaining of ⌜γ⌝; and
3. All of ⌜Λ⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜γ⌝.
From the factual equivalences we have seen, it follows that
1. ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on ⌜∆⌝; and
2. All of ⌜∆⌝ are relevant to the obtaining of ⌜φ⌝; and
3. All of ⌜∆⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜φ⌝.
This result is obtained despite ∆ ⊲ φ (potentially) not being <-derivable.
‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is an arbitrary natural grounding claim. Hence, we can generalise,
such that
Natural Grounding Restrictions: If ∆ ◂ φ, then
1. ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on ⌜∆⌝; and
2. All of ⌜∆⌝ are relevant to the obtaining of ⌜φ⌝; and
3. All of ⌜∆⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜φ⌝.
We therefore know that the natural grounding claims track supervenience,
relevance and the direction of relative fundamentality. We also know that our
deductive rules preserve supervenience, relevance and the direction of relative
fundamentality. We can thus extend the result of Natural Grounding Restric-
tions:
Restrictions Conditional: If ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable from the set of natural
grounding claims, then
1. ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on ⌜∆⌝; and
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2. All of ⌜∆⌝ are relevant to ⌜φ⌝; and
3. All of ⌜∆⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜φ⌝.
Additionally, it is plausible that these three clauses are jointly sufficient for
‘∆ ⊲ φ)’ to be <-derivable from the set of natural grounding claims. That is,
it is plausible that there is no instance where the three clauses are met and it
is not the case that ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable from the set of natural grounding
claims.7
Hence:
Restrictions Biconditional: ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable from the set of natural
grounding claims iff
1. ⌜φ⌝ supervenes on ⌜∆⌝; and
2. All of ⌜∆⌝ are relevant to the obtaining of ⌜φ⌝; and
3. All of ⌜∆⌝ are more fundamental than ⌜φ⌝.
If we can ‘build’ grounding in the manner suggested by Building Grounding,
it follows that we can ‘build’ grounding from the <-derivability of ‘∆ ⊲ φ’
from the set of natural grounding claims, delivering the Ground-Naturalness
Connection:
Ground-Naturalness Connection: ∆ ⊲ φ iff there is a <-derivation from
the set of natural grounding claims to ‘∆ ⊲ φ’.
This provides an argument for the left-to-right direction (and the right-to-
left direction) of the Ground-Naturalness Connection.
14.4 Conclusion
I am now in a position to conclude this chapter.
I have argued that the right-to-left direction of the Ground-Naturalness
Connection is provable from plausible assumptions. I have also argued that
7It must be admitted that I have not offered much evidence for this claim. However,
much of Part 3 acts as a challenge to the substantivist: for them to show that there is some
use for grounding that the Ground-Naturalness Connection fails to capture. In the same
spirit, I offer my sufficiency claim as a challenge to the substantivist: for them to find an
instance where the three clauses are met and it is not the case that ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable
from the set of natural grounding claims.
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the Ground-Naturalness Connection follows from a plausible understanding of
grounding as some kind of restricted, supervenience relation. Throughout, I
have relied on conceptual connections between grounding, naturalness and our
deductive rules.
In §14.3, I provided an argument for the left-to-right direction (and the
right-to-left direction) of the Ground-Naturalness Connection, but I do not
think that it constitutes a proof. This is because it depends on the idea that
grounding can be constructed by adding restrictions to supervenience. I think
that this idea is plausible, but it is not obvious how I would prove this, other
than showing that the restricted supervenience relation – that is, what is pro-
vided by <-derivability from the set of natural grounding claims – is coextensive
with grounding.
Further, Restrictions Biconditional rests on the claim that its three clauses
are jointly sufficient for ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ to be <-derivable from the set of natural ground-
ing claims. Again, I contend that this claim is plausible. However, it is not
obvious how it might be proved that no counterexample exists.
Hence, the argument of §14.3 should be seen as an argument supporting the
left-to-right direction of the Ground-Naturalness Connection. The rest of Part
3 builds on this support. The next chapter considers paradigmatic grounding
claims, and argues that true, paradigmatic claims ∆ ⊲ φ are such that ‘∆ ⊲ φ’
is <-derivable from the set of natural grounding claims. This builds a case
for grounding being coextensive to what is provided by ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable
from the set of natural grounding claims, as the left-to-right direction of the
Ground-Naturalness Connection asserts.
Chapter 15
Paradigmatic Examples of
Grounding
15.1 Introduction
The first half of Part 3 introduced the biconditional connecting grounding with
naturalness, the Ground-Naturalness Connection. Continuing from ch.14, I
now evaluate the Ground-Naturalness Connection and make a case for thinking
that it is true.
This chapter looks at a variety of paradigmatic grounding claims in the lit-
erature, and checks whether the Ground-Naturalness Connection is vindicated
by those grounding claims. It is vindicated if, for any paradigmatic example
of ground ‘∆ ⊲ φ’, that ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable from the set of natural grounding
claims.
In addition to vindicating these paradigmatic grounding claims, the Ground-
Naturalness Connection often provides a diagnostic of grounding controver-
sies. By this, I mean the following. Thinking of controversial grounding
claims in terms of the Ground-Naturalness Connection can make explicit where
the controversy arises. This constitutes a theoretical benefit for the Ground-
Naturalness Connection, and I flag these cases where they appear.
This focuses on the left-to-right direction: ensuring that certain ground-
ing claims are vindicated by the Ground-Naturalness Connection. In ch.14, I
defended the right-to-left direction of the biconditional.
In §15.2, I present the paradigmatic grounding claims in the literature and
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discuss some grammatical issues with their presentation. In §15.3, I consider
those examples which share the feature of multiple realisability: the thought
being that what is grounded is multiply realisable, and what is grounding is one
of those realisations. In §15.4, I consider some examples that are quite directly
vindicated by the Ground-Naturalness Connection. In §15.5, I consider the (un-
grammatical) claim that the law < a given act is illegal, and argue that there
are reasons to be doubtful about these kinds of examples. In §15.6, I argue that
the claim ‘{particle is acted on with net positive force} ⊲ the particle acceler-
ates’ produces a puzzle for grounding theorists. In §15.7, I consider grounding
claims involving existence and suggest that it requires stipulating that Natural-
ish does not contain names. In §15.8, I consider set-theoretic grounding claims
and suggest that the Ground-Naturalness Connection is supplemented with a
clause for set-theoretic talk. Throughout, I defend the thought that some-
thing like the Ground-Naturalness Connection is vindicated, and, in §15.9, I
conclude.
15.2 Testing the Biconditional
A useful test of the Ground-Naturalness Connection is to check whether paradig-
matic, relatively uncontentious examples of grounding are preserved. The
thought is that, if it is widely held that ∆ ⊲ φ, then ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable
from the set of natural grounding claims.
With this in mind, I consider a (non-exhaustive) list of common grounding
claims, taken from the contemporary literature on grounding:
1. Categorical features < dispositional features.1
2. A feature C of an act is wrong < the act is wrong.2
3. Non-normative features < normative features.3
4. Non-aesthetic features < aesthetic features.4
5. Determinates < determinables.5
6. Physical events < mental events.6
1See Audi (2014), Clarke & Liggins (2012) and Rosen (2010).
2See Fine (2014) and Rosen (2010).
3See Audi (2012, 2014), Clarke & Liggins (2012), and Schaffer (2009a).
4See Audi (2014).
5See Audi (2012) and Rosen (2010).
6See Clarke & Liggins (2012), deRosset (2013), Fine (2014), Trogdon (2013) and Wilson
(2014).
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7. Sparse properties < abundant properties.7
8. The plurality of conjuncts < conjunctions.8
9. The law < a given act is illegal.9
10. The particle is acted on with net positive force < the particle accelerates.10
11. Simples < complexes.11
12. Members < sets.12
It is worth noting a certain sloppiness in the presentation of these ground-
ing claims. By the grammar of ground, categorical and dispositional features
belong to the wrong sort of grammatical category to stand on either side of
the grounding operator. It will be remembered that grounding is an oper-
ator holding between a set of sentences that expresses facts, and a sentence
that expresses a fact. Categorical and dispositional features are neither sets
of sentences nor sentences and therefore should not stand on either side of the
grounding operator. Furthermore, once we have resolved this issue, we must
also meet the demands of factivity. To reach grammatical precision therefore
requires some tidying up. For example, we can tidy up ‘categorical features <
dispositional features’ as ‘{an individual x has some categorical feature X} ⊲
x has some dispositional feature Y ’.
However, this example is not quite right, because potentially there are some
categorical features that are not associated with any dispositional features. We
do not want to rule out the possibility of an individual having some categorical
feature and no dispositional features. Grounding necessitates - this means that:
∆ ⊲ φ → ◻(⋀∆→ φ).
Hence, if
{x has some categorical feature X} ⊲ x has some dispositional feature Y,
then
◻(x has some categorical feature X → x has some dispositional feature
Y ).
7See Schaffer (2009a).
8See Fine (2014).
9See Daly (2014).
10See Fine (2014).
11See Bliss & Trogdon (2016).
12See Clark & Liggins (2012), Marshall (2013) and Schaffer (2009a).
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This rules out the possibility of an individual having some categorical fea-
ture and no dispositional features. Something has gone wrong – it is the initial
grounding claim that is at fault.
We can overcome this issue with more specific information. For example,
grounding theorists want to say things like ‘{individual a possesses atomic
composition XYZ} ⊲ a is fragile’. The lack of specificity in the list above
is necessary to express the idea that any x’s exemplification of any specific
dispositional feature is grounded in x’s exemplification of a specific categorical
feature.
The rest of the list can be tidied up and made specific in analogous ways.
I will call this giving an ‘instance’ of an ‘example schema’ taken from the
list above. For example, ‘{specific simples a, b, ... exist} ⊲ specific complex
c exists’ is an instance of the example schema ‘simples < complexes’. Though
some ingenuity may be required to give grammatical instances of these example
schemes, it should be possible in each case.
I want these paradigmatic cases of grounding to be reflected in the Ground-
Naturalness Connection. By this, I mean that each paradigmatic instance of
grounding ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ should be such that ‘∆ ⊲ φ’ is <-derivable from the set of
natural grounding claims.
Where the Ground-Naturalness Connection fails to keep faith with these
paradigmatic examples, this highlights at best a lacuna in my biconditionals.
At worst, such failures suggest that nothing like the Ground-Naturalness Con-
nection is true. On the other hand, where the Ground-Naturalness Connection
is vindicated by these examples, I have offered evidence for the biconditional
(in the left-to-right direction).
I start with some easier cases in §15.3 and §15.4, where it is relatively
straightforward to show that these example schemes are vindicated by the
Ground-Naturalness Connection. From there, I turn to the more complicated
example schemes.
15.3 Example Schemes 1-6: Multiple Realisability
Example schemes 1-6 share the feature of multiple realisability. By this, I mean
that the fact expressed by the grounded sentence can be realised in a multi-
tude of ways. For example, a given dispositional feature can be realised by a
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variety of categorical features. There are a wide range of physical compositions
that give rise to fragility, such that fragility is multiply realisable by a variety
of specific physical compositions. Similarly, that an act is wrong is multiply
realisable: an act can be wrong in virtue of being a lie, or wrong in virtue of
being vicious, and so on.
Analogous remarks can be made for cases 3-6. A normative feature can be
realised by a variety of (combinations of) non-normative features: that an act
is wrong can be realised by it being a lie, or being vicious, as in example schema
2. An aesthetic feature can be realised by a variety of (combinations of) non-
aesthetic features: there are many beautiful things with different non-aesthetic
features. A determinable can be realised by any one of its determinates: an
object can be red by being scarlet, or by being crimson, and so on. Finally, a
mental event can be realised by a variety of different physical events: the same
person can feel hungry in virtue of being in a variety of physical states.
This is suggestive of the availability of appropriate perfectly natural trans-
lations. Suppose sentence φ is multiply realisable. A sentence expressing an
individual realisation of φ is one disjunct of a (possibly infinite) disjunction
of sentences expressing individual realisations. This disjunction expresses the
exhaustive ways φ can be realised. If we translate this disjunction into Natural-
ish, then we have a perfectly natural translation of φ that can be appropriately
manipulated with our deductive rules.
For example, consider the sentence ‘a is fragile’. Each (Naturalish) sentence
expressing an individual realisation of ‘a is fragile’ in terms of a’s categorical
features XYZn forms a disjunct of a disjunction. This disjunction is a Natu-
ralish translation of ‘a is fragile’:
γ: a has atomic composition XYZ1 ∨ a has atomic composition XYZ2 ∨
...
Each sentence expressing an individual realisation of a being fragile (trans-
lated into Naturalish) is a disjunct of γ. For example, suppose that a has
atomic composition XYZ1. Λ = ‘a has atomic composition XYZ1’ is a disjunct
of γ. Note our rule that:
for some j ∈ I : φj
{φj} < ⋁i∈I φi
Hence, we can use our deductive rules to derive that
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Λ ⊲ γ.
By Natural Grounding, ‘{a has atomic composition XYZ1} ◂ a is fragile’.
Consequently, the following can be trivially derived:
‘{a has atomic composition XYZ1} ⊲ a is fragile’ is <-derivable from the
set of natural grounding claims.
By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, we reach the desired conclusion:
{a has atomic composition XYZ1} ⊲ a is fragile.13
The shared feature of multiple realisability means that analogous reasoning can
be applied across example schemes 1-6. What is crucial is that each property
referred to in the grounding sentences are more natural than any property
referred to in the grounded sentence. This is so the Naturalish translation of the
grounds is logically simpler than the Naturalish translation of what is grounded.
Otherwise, the former could not be disjuncts of the latter disjunction.
Suppose that this relative naturalness condition is met. With these example
schemes, it follows that appropriate perfectly natural translations are available
13I should note that sometimes we’ll have to appeal to our second disjunction rule, as
given below:
for each i ∈ I : Γ, φi < ψ
{Γ,⋁i∈I φi} ≺ ψ
We’ll do this when the grounding fact is itself disjunctive. For example, suppose that a has
atomic composition so-and-so, in virtue of which it is fragile. To have atomic composition
so-and-so may itself be multiply realisable. For simplicity, let us assume that a natural
translation of ‘a has atomic composition so-and-so’ contains two disjuncts, and is given as
follows:
a has atomic composition XYZ1 ∨ has atomic composition XYZ2
Consider again our natural translation γ of ‘a is fragile’. By our first disjunction rule,
we can use our rules to derive that {a has atomic composition XYZ1} ⊲ γ and that {a has
atomic composition XYZ2} ⊲ γ. We then use our second disjunction rule to derive that
(If a has atomic composition XYZ1 ∨ a has atomic composition XYZ2, then) {a has
atomic composition XYZ1 ∨ a has atomic composition XYZ2} ≺ γ.
Given that this is a non-reflexive example of weak ground, we can then derive the stronger
claim that
{a has atomic composition XYZ1 ∨ a has atomic composition XYZ2} ⊲ γ,
as required. My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising this point, and
making helpful suggestions for its resolution.
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as (possibly infinite, translated into Naturalish) exhaustive disjunctions of po-
tential realisations. With our deductive rules, we can then deduce that an
individual realisation (translated into Naturalish) of what is being grounded
in turn grounds this disjunction. By Natural Grounding, it follows that the
desired grounding claim is a natural grounding claim. Consequently, by the
Ground-Naturalness Connection, an individual realisation grounds what it is
supposed to ground.
For the Naturalish translation of an individual realisation to be a disjunct
of the Naturalish translation of the multiply realisable, grounded fact, it is nec-
essary that the properties referred to on the left side of the grounding operator
are more natural than the properties referred to on the right side. Moreover,
because the (Naturalish translations of the) properties referred to on the left
side are used to define the (Naturalish translation of the) property referred to
on the right side, the former should be more connectedly natural than the lat-
ter. It is worth taking some time to explain what I mean by more connectedly
natural.
Properties admit of perfectly natural definitions. It is built into the notion
of naturalness that any property has a perfectly natural definition (see ch.6).
In turn, these perfectly natural definitions are associated with multisets of the
perfectly natural properties referred to in those perfectly natural definitions.14
Call these the ‘definitional toolbox multisets’ of perfectly natural definitions:
Definitional Toolbox Multiset Definition: Γ is the definitional toolbox
multiset of perfectly natural definition γ iff ∀x(x is a property referred
to in γ ↔ x is in Γ as many times as it is referred to in γ).
For example, suppose that the properties of being scarlet, being crimson ...
were perfectly natural. Further suppose that a perfectly natural definition of
the property of being red was ‘the property of being scarlet or being crimson
or ...’ A definitional toolbox multiset corresponding to the property of being
red would therefore be {being scarlet, being crimson, ...}.
Some definitional toolbox multisets are sub-multisets of other definitional
toolbox multisets. Suppose that Γ is a definitional toolbox multiset correspond-
14See §11.4 for a brief introduction to the idea of multisets.
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ing to property α, and that ∆ is a definitional toolbox multiset corresponding
to property β.15 We then say that:
Relative, Connected Naturalness Definition: α is more connectedly nat-
ural than β iff Γ ⊂ ∆.
For example, suppose once more that the properties of being scarlet, being
crimson ... were perfectly natural. A perfectly natural definition of the prop-
erty of being scarlet is therefore ‘being scarlet’. Hence, a definitional toolbox
multiset Γ of the property of being scarlet is {being scarlet}. On the same
suppositions, we found that a definitional toolbox multiset ∆ of the property
of being red is {being scarlet, being crimson, ...}. We see that Γ ⊂ ∆. Con-
sequently, the property of being scarlet is more connectedly natural than the
property of being red.
The idea behind relative, connected naturalness is that the perfectly natural
definitions of some properties are contained in the perfectly natural definitions
of others. From this, two observations follow. First, when α is more connectedly
natural than β, α is more natural than β. This is because the complexity of α’s
perfectly natural definition is less than the complexity of β’s perfectly natural
definition: otherwise, the former definition could not be contained in the latter.
Second, when α is more connectedly natural than β, the instantiation of α is
metaphysically relevant to the instantiation of β. This is because part of the
resources for β’s instantiation is met by the instantiation of α.
Returning to example schemes 1-6, the thought is that the shared feature of
multiple realisability supports the relation of relative, connected naturalness.
For the sake of example, consider the claim that {a is scarlet} ⊲ a is red (a
case of example schema 5). We have seen that determinables can be multiply
realised by their determinates. ‘a is scarlet ∨ a is crimson ∨ ...’ is plausibly
cointensional with ‘a is red’. Regardless of whether the appropriate, perfectly
natural translations are available, it is nonetheless plausible that ◻(a is scarlet∨ a is crimson ∨ ... ↔ a is red).
This means that determinables are fully definable out of their determinates.
However, importantly, the converse does not hold. We cannot fully define
determinates with their determinables alone. For example, we cannot fully
15A definitional toolbox multiset corresponds to a property α iff it is the definitional
toolbox multiset of a perfectly natural definition of α.
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characterise what it is for an individual a to be scarlet by saying that a is red
– saying that a is red has failed to communicate all the information about the
colour of a. This suggests that determinates are more connectedly natural than
their determinables.
I took the case of ‘{a is scarlet} ⊲ a is red’ as an example. Yet the reason-
ing hinges only on this feature of multiple realisability, which is shared across
example schemes 1-6. To take another example, we have seen that fragility
can be defined out of a variety of atomic compositions: ‘a has atomic composi-
tion XYZ1 ∨ a has atomic composition XYZ2 ∨ ...’ Meanwhile, having atomic
composition XYZ1 is not definable out of fragility. This means that the per-
fectly natural definition of fragility has greater definitional complexity than
the perfectly natural definition of having atomic composition XYZ1. Hence,
the latter is more natural than the former. Further, because of the definitional
links between the two properties, the latter is more connectedly natural than
the former. Because of the shared feature of multiple realisability across ex-
ample schemes 1-6, analogous reasoning can be used to defend the idea that
the properties referred to on the left side of the grounding operator are more
connectedly natural than the properties referred to on the right side.
Some instances of these example schemes are not natural grounding claims,
but will be <-derivable from the set of natural grounding claims. Suppose that
we have found that ‘{a is scarlet} ◂ a is red’. It follows that:
‘{a is scarlet} ⊲ (a is red ∨ a is green)’
Is <-derivable from the set of natural grounding claims. This is because our
deductive rules reflect the fact that obtaining disjuncts ground their disjunc-
tions, and grounding is transitive.16 By the Ground-Naturalness Connection,
it follows that:
{a is scarlet} ⊲ (a is red ∨ a is green).
16The derivation is as follows. We know that the set of natural grounding claims contains
the sentence that
(1) {a is scarlet} ⊲ a is red.
As our deductive rules reflect that obtaining disjuncts ground their disjunctions, it is <-
derivable from this sentence that:
(2) {a is red} ⊲ (a is red ∨ a is green).
Because grounding is transitive, it is <-derivable that
(3) {a is scarlet} ⊲ (a is red ∨ a is green).
Hence, it is <-derivable from Γ that {a is scarlet} ⊲ (a is red ∨ a is green).
202 CHAPTER 15. PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLES OF GROUNDING
We can therefore be confident that the Ground-Naturalness Connection is
vindicated by example schemes 1-6.
It might be objected that it is unintuitive to deal with multiple realizability
using disjunctions instead of quantifiers. The thought might be that the meta-
physical nature of (for example) being red is the satisfaction of some conditions
(perhaps regarding wavelengths and frequencies of light), rather than being one
of an infinite number of particular shades of red.
I think this objection highlights an important point about Naturalish trans-
lation.17 As aforementioned, there is no presumption for unique Naturalish
translation – a sentence may have numerous Naturalish translations. Further,
a Naturalish translation of a predicate should not be seen as providing the meta-
physical essence of the associated property. Though I have spoken of perfectly
natural definitions, these definitions are not supposed to be metaphysically sig-
nificant beyond our current purpose. It would be a further metaphysical posit
that the essences of properties are given by some Naturalish translation of their
predicates, and I do not make that posit here.
Hence, there might be some Naturalish translation of ‘a is red’ that uses
existential quantification.18 This Naturalish translation may better reflect the
essence of the property of being red. However, this does not mean that our
disjunctive Naturalish translations are incorrect. I use infinitary, disjuntive
Naturalish translations because they are tractable for our deductive rules.19 It
may be that infinitary, disjunctive Naturalish translations fail to provide the
metaphysical essence of determinable properties, but nor are they meant to.
17My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for identifying the need for this clarifica-
tion.
18For example, consider the following symbolisation scheme:
• ‘Bxyz’: x is between y and z
• ‘Wxy’: x has wavelength y
• ‘Fxy’: x has frequency y
If these are Naturalish predicates (if they refer to properties that are perfectly natural),
then the following might be a Naturalish translation of ‘a is red’:∃xy((Bxn1n2 ∧ Wax) ∧ Bym1m2 ∧ Fay))
when all red falls between wavelength n1 and n2 millimetres, and between frequency m1
and m2 hertz (limiting our attention to colours of light).
19It might be thought that we should simply provide deductive rules governing the be-
haviour of grounding and existential quantification. However, providing these rules is fraught
with difficulty. For example, Korbmacher (2018) notes that there are significant infinitary
complications from introducing quantification into infinitary ground logics. I leave such
efforts for other projects.
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15.4 Example Schemes 7 & 8: Some Easy Cases
Example schemes 7 and 8 are relatively straightforward. To see that the
Ground-Naturalness Connection is vindicated by example schema 7, we must
first make explicit the connection between naturalness and sparseness. I pro-
pose that the perfectly natural properties just are the sparse properties. The
sparse properties are those that fully characterise the world without redun-
dancy.20 Other properties are redundant because they can be ‘defined out of’
the sparse properties. Similarly, relatively natural properties are defined out of
the perfectly natural properties. The perfectly natural properties are primitive,
in the sense that they are not definable out of other, more natural properties.
They therefore form a minimal base of metaphysically privileged properties,
just like the sparse properties. Furthermore, in introducing naturalness, Lewis
(1983) seems to equate perfect naturalness and sparseness. Lewis notes that
‘like me, Bealer favours an inegalitarian twofold conception of properties: there
are abundant ‘concepts’ and sparse ‘qualities” (1983, 346, footnote 6). If Lewis
does treat sparseness as distinct from naturalness, it is only in that univer-
sals are sparse whilst properties are natural. Given it is now commonplace to
speak of sparse properties, this distinction falls away to nothing in the present
context. Finally, the sparse properties are often identified as the properties of
fundamental physics, just as the perfectly natural properties are.
The identification of the sparse properties with the perfectly natural prop-
erties shows that the Ground-Naturalness Connection keeps faith with exam-
ple schema 7. The sparse properties are the perfectly natural properties, and
20It may prove prudent to relax this redundancy constraint. My thanks to Jon Litland
and Michael Potter for raising this point. The issue is that some relations are converses of
one another, and thus interdefinable. This is problematic when such relations are apparently
sparse. For example, Sider (2012) notes that the relations earlier than and later than are
interdefinable, but appear sparse. We cannot say that one is sparse, and the other not,
without arbitrariness. However, if there is to be no redundancy, then we cannot say that
both are sparse. This forms a puzzle.
Sider suggests relaxing the redundancy constraint. We might say that the sparse properties
fully characterise the world with as little redundancy as avoiding arbitrariness allows. An
alternative approach is suggested by Dorr (2004), who argues that there are no non-symmetric
relations (despite there being non-symmetric predicates). Fine (2000) argues for the weaker
claim that certain relations (those with converses) cannot be said to hold in a specific order.
I propose that none of this undermines the Ground-Naturalness Connection, however. The
puzzle for sparseness does not undermine an identification of the perfectly natural properties
with the sparse properties. This is because the naturalness theorist faces an entirely analogous
(indeed, in my view, identical) puzzle when faced with asymmetric relations that appear
perfectly natural. This point of comparison provides further support for identifying the
perfectly natural properties with the sparse properties.
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abundant properties are the unnatural properties. Moreover, insofar as the
instantiation of a sparse property grounds the instantiation of an abundant
property, there should be some metaphysical connection between the sparse
property and the abundant property. Suppose, for the sake of example, that
the properties of being green, being round and being red were sparse, and that
the property of being green and round is abundant. Though it is true that
{a is green, a is round} ⊲ a is green and round,
it is not the case that
{a is red} ⊲ a is green and round.
This is despite (for the sake of this example) the property of being red
being sparse and the property of being green and round being abundant. For
an instance of example schema 7 to be true, there must also be a metaphysical
connection between the sparse and the abundant property. What is required
is that the sparse properties are used to define the abundant property.
My biconditional is therefore vindicated. Staying with the same example
(and the same suppositions of which properties are sparse), a Naturalish trans-
lation of ‘a is green and round’ is ‘a is green ∧ a is round’.21 It is <-derivable
that
{a is green, a is round} ⊲ a is green ∧ a is round.
This follows from the rule below:
for each i ∈ I : φi
{φi ∣ i ∈ I} < ⋀i∈I φi
By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, it therefore follows that:
{a is green, a is round} ⊲ a is green and round.
More generally, whenever the instantiation of sparse properties grounds the
instantiation of an abundant property, it is because the abundant property
is definable in terms of those sparse properties. This will be reflected in the
Naturalish translations of the grounding sentence and the grounded sentence,
21Note that these two sentences are not equivalent. The first ascribes to a a ‘conjunctive’
property, whilst the other is a conjunction between two sentences about a.
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such that it is <-derivable that {grounding sentence} ⊲ grounded sentence. By
the Ground-Naturalness Connection, it follows that the instantiation of sparse
properties grounds the instantiation of an abundant property.
Some instances of example schema 7 are not natural grounding claims.
However, such instances will be <-derivable from the set of natural grounding
claims about sparse and abundant properties. For example:
It is <-derivable from ‘{a is green, a is round} ⊲ a is green and round’
that:
{a is green, a is round} ⊲ (a is green and round ∨ a is red and cuboid).22
Hence, the Ground-Naturalness Connection is also vindicated by these in-
stances of example schema 7.
Example schema 8 states that conjuncts ground their conjunctions. Vin-
dicating the Ground-Naturalness Connection for this example schema is rel-
atively simple. This is because instantiations of example schema 8 are not
natural grounding claims. In the case of conjuncts and conjunctions, it does
not matter what claims comprise the set of natural grounding claims. This is
because it is <-derivable that obtaining conjuncts ground their conjunctions,
as seen by the rule below:
for each i ∈ I : φi
{φi ∣ i ∈ I} < ⋀i∈I φi
Consider a specific instantiation of example schema 8. Suppose we have
sentences A and B. An instantiation of example schema 8 is that
{A, B} ⊲ A ∧ B.
By the conjunction rule above, this claim is <-derivable. Therefore, even
if the set of natural grounding claims is empty, this sentence is <-derivable
from that set. By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, the sentence is a true
grounding claim.
22The derivation is as follows. Because our deductive rules reflect that obtaining disjuncts
fully ground their disjunctions, it is <-derivable that
(1) {a is green and round} ⊲ (a is green and round ∨ a is red and cuboid).
We assume that
(2) {a is green, a is round} ⊲ a is green and round.
Because grounding is transitive, it is then <-derivable that
(3) {a is green, a is round} ⊲ (a is green and round ∨ a is red and cuboid).
Consequently, we can conclude that
(4) it is <-derivable from ‘{a is green, a is round} ⊲ a is green and round’ that: {a is green,
a is round} ⊲ (a is green and round ∨ a is red and cuboid).
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15.5 Example Schema 9: Laws and Illegality
Example schema 9 holds that the law is so-and-so < a given act is illegal. An
instantiation of this schema is that {the law is so-and-so} ⊲ murder is illegal.23
However, I am doubtful that this grounding claim is true, because it seems
to violate the non-monotonicity of grounding. To demonstrate this, consider
the following toy example. Suppose that the law consisted of two prohibitions:
that we are not allowed to murder and that we are not allowed to steal. We
then ask ourselves whether the law being the way it is grounds that murder is
illegal. Presumably it does not. That the law states that we are not allowed
to murder and that we are not allowed to steal does not ground that murder is
illegal, because the law’s prohibition of stealing is irrelevant to the legal status
of murder. The case is analogous to the grounding claim that {a is scarlet ∧ a
is round} ⊲ a is red. Grounding theorists take this grounding claim to be false
because the roundness of a is irrelevant to its redness.
The falsity of this example is reflected in the Ground-Naturalness Con-
nection. Our deductive rules shouldn’t allow us to violate grounding’s non-
montonocity.
However, perhaps I have offered an unfair instantiation of example schema
9. Instead, an instance of example schema 9 might be that {the law prohibits
murder} ⊲ murder is illegal. This avoids violations of non-monotonicity. As
it is, though, I still have doubts about whether the grounding claim is true. I
suspect that ‘the law prohibits murder’ and ‘murder is illegal’ express the same
fact. Given that grounding is irreflexive, it follows that it is not the case that
{the law prohibits murder} ⊲ murder is illegal.
If the grounding claim is false for these reasons, then any Naturalish trans-
lation of ‘the law prohibits murder’ is also a Naturalish translation of ‘murder is
illegal’. As we assume for our derivations that grounding is irreflexive, it follows
by the Ground-Naturalness Connection that it is not the case that {the law
is so-and-so} ⊲ murder is illegal. Hence, the Ground-Naturalness Connection
reflects the same issue.
I propose that these kinds of problem are quite general for example schema
9. Consider the claim that ‘{Roe v. Wade is law} ⊲ abortion rights are so-and-
23It is probably not necessary to use ‘⊲’ rather than ‘<’ here, given the law is so-and-so.
However, I continue to use ‘⊲’ throughout this section, to allow the considered claims to have
maximum generality. In any case, my use of ‘⊲’ rather than ‘<’ does not impact on any of
the arguments that follow in this section.
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so’. With this claim we can form a dilemma. Either the so-and-so abortion
rights just are those set out in Roe v. Wade, or they are not. If the so-and-so
abortion rights just are those set out in Roe v. Wade, then ‘abortion rights
are so-and-so’ and ‘Roe v. Wade is law’ seem to express the same fact. The
grounding claim therefore appears to violate the irreflexivity of ground. This
is reflected in the Ground-Naturalness Connection, because any Naturalish
translation of ‘abortion rights are so-and-so’ is also a Naturalish translation
of ‘Roe v. Wade is law’, and we assume for our derivations that grounding is
irreflexive.
On the second horn of the dilemma, Roe v. Wade does not exhaust abortion
rights being so-and-so, such that some aspects of abortion rights being so-and-
so follow from laws distinct from Roe v. Wade. In this case, it is implausible
that {Roe v. Wade is law} ⊲ abortion rights are so-and-so. This is because
grounds necessitate what they ground, and it is not the case that:
◻(Roe v. Wade is law → abortion rights are so-and-so).
What is more plausible is that {Roe v. Wade is law} ⊴ abortion rights are
so-and-so: that we have a partial grounding claim. Yet this partial grounding
claim is not a special case related to laws and what is illegal. Instead, it
is a straightforward case of a conjunct partially grounding its conjunction.
Any Naturalish translation γ of ‘abortion rights are so-and-so’ is a conjunction
given by a Naturalish translation Λ of ‘Roe v. Wade is law’ and a Naturalish
translation of the rest of abortion rights. Λ therefore contains a conjunct of γ,
such that ‘Λ ⊴ γ’ is <-derivable, and ‘Λ ⊲ γ’ is not.
As this dilemma rests on claims about factual equivalence, it should be
noted that it may be limited to the worldly conception of ground.24 If we
adopted a conceptual understanding of ground, we might insist that ‘Roe v.
Wade is law’ and ‘abortion rights are so-and-so’ express different truths, even
if they express the same fact (on the first horn’s assumption that abortion
rights are exhausted by Roe v. Wade). This would avoid issues of irreflexivity.
However, I confess to finding the conceptual understanding of ground difficult.
I’m not sure how to understand the claim (for example) that ‘φ ∨ φ’ and ‘φ’
express different truths. Given this conceptual impasse, I limit my arguments
to the worldly conception of ground.
24My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising this point.
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Putting aside this qualification, we might consider a third instantiation of
example schema 9 to try and avoid our dilemma. Consider the claim that {the
Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 passed} ⊲ it is illegal to import psychoactive
substances. The thought behind the grounding claim is that the act of passing
a law grounds the illegality of the actions that the law prohibits.
It is not clear that the Ground-Naturalness Connection meets this exam-
ple, because it is not obvious that the passing of the Psychoactive Substances
Act 2016 is more fundamental than the illegality of importing psychoactive
substances. This means that we cannot guarantee the requisite, perfectly nat-
ural definitions for the Ground-Naturalness Connection to deliver a grounding
claim. However, insofar as we doubt this direction of relative fundamentality,
the grounding theorist is also merited to deny this grounding claim. This is
because grounding is meant to track the direction of relative fundamentality
between facts.25
Suppose that the passing of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 is more
fundamental than the illegality of importing psychoactive substances. This
would then be reflected in the Ground-Naturalness Connection. We begin
by treating the illegality of importing psychoactive substances as a multiply
realisable fact. For example, it could be realised by the passing of the Psy-
choactive Substances Act 2016, or it could be realised by the passing of some
other law at some other time. This means that a Naturalish translation of ‘it
is illegal to import psychoactive substances’ is a Naturalish translation of ‘the
Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 is passed ∨ law1 is passed ∨ law2 is passed
...’ Hence, the Naturalish translation of ‘the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016
is passed’ is a disjunct of a Naturalish translation of ‘it is illegal to import
psychoactive substances’. Our deductive rules reflect that obtaining disjuncts
ground their disjunctions. Hence, the Ground-Naturalness Connection delivers
that {the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 is passed} ⊲ it is illegal to import
psychoactive substances, as desired.
As noted, I am doubtful of this grounding claim, because I doubt that the
Naturalish translation of the disjunction offered is a perfectly natural definition
of ‘it is illegal to import psychoactive substances’. This is because I doubt
25Moreover, we have the familiar problem of violating non-monotonicity. As the Psy-
choactive Substances Act 2016 also makes it illegal to export psychoactive substances, and
so on, it is not clear that all of the grounding fact is metaphysically relevant to the grounded
fact.
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that ‘the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 is passed’ is more fundamental
than ‘it is illegal to import psychoactive substances’. I propose that this claim
has mistaken causation for grounding. It is plausible that the passing of the
Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 caused it to be illegal to import psychoactive
substances. This shows that not every causal claim is a grounding claim,
because causes are not always more fundamental than their effects.
As noted, if the grounding theorist shares these concerns, they are also
merited to deny the grounding claim as given. We therefore see that reason-
able doubts about the truth of a grounding claim are reflected in the Ground-
Naturalness Connection. Hence, the Ground-Naturalness Connection vindi-
cates successful grounding claims.
In this instance, the Ground-Naturalness Connection also offers a diagnostic
of controversial grounding claims. With each example of schema 9 considered,
we were able to pinpoint the precise worries we had with that grounding claim.
This was aided by thinking of grounding through the Ground-Naturalness Con-
nection. For example, we were able to identify worries regarding violations of
non-monotonicity, as well as worries regarding the direction of relative funda-
mentality. By identifying these concerns, the Ground-Naturalness Connection
enjoys a theoretical benefit in helping to make precise those arguments that
surround such grounding claims.
15.6 Example Schema 10: A Puzzle for Ground
An example of example schema 10 is that a particle is acted on with net positive
force ⊲ the particle accelerates. I find this example interesting because it seems
to generate a puzzle for grounding theorists.
Grounding connects facts. This means that the truth of a grounding claim
should not depend on how those facts are expressed. When the sentences in ∆
and Λ express the same facts, ∆ < φ iff Λ < φ. Similarly, when φ and γ express
the same fact, ∆ < φ iff ∆ < γ.
The case is analogous for partial grounding. When the sentences in ∆ and
Λ express the same facts, ∆ ≤ φ iff Λ ≤ φ. When φ and γ express the same fact,
∆ ≤ φ iff ∆ ≤ γ.
This can be problematic, as the following example shows. Suppose that
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individual a is accelerating at 2m/s2.26 Because acceleration = net force ÷
mass, we can express this fact in (at least) two ways:
1. φ: a is accelerating at 2m/s2.
2. γ: ((a has a net force of 2N acting on it ∧ a has a mass of 1kg) ∨ (a has
a net force of 3N acting on it ∧ a has a mass of 1.5kg) ∨ ...)
γ is an infinitely long sentence and is non-ideal for many practical reasons
when compared with φ, but it nonetheless expresses the same fact.
Similarly, we can express the fact that a has a net force of 2N acting on it
in (at least) two ways:
1. ∆: {a has a net force of 2N acting on it.}
2. Λ: {((a is accelerating at 2m/s2 ∧ a has a mass of 1kg) ∨ (a is accelerating
at 4m/s2 ∧ a has a mass of 0.5kg) ∨ ...)}
Again, Λ is infinitely long and generally unwieldy, but its sentence still
expresses the same fact as the sentence in ∆, regardless of these shortcomings.
From this we can construct the following puzzle.
∆ ⊴ γ. This is because there is some Σ such that ∆ ∪ Σ ⊲ γ, namely when
Σ = {a has a mass of 1kg}:
∆ ∪ {a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ (a has a net force of 2N acting on it ∧ a has
a mass of 1kg)
Consequently, ∆ ∪ Σ ⊲ a disjunct of γ. As obtaining disjuncts ground their
disjunctions, and grounding is transitive, it follows that ∆ ∪ Σ ⊲ γ. From the
definition of partial ground, it follows that ∆ ⊴ γ.
As ∆ ⊴ γ, it follows that ∆ ⊴ φ. This is because γ and φ express the same
fact.
Meanwhile, {φ} ⊴ Λ.27 This is because there is some Σ such that {φ} ∪ Σ⊲ Λ, namely when Σ = {a has a mass of 1kg}:
26As we make this supposition, it is not necessary for me to use ‘⊲’ rather than ‘<’ in what
follows. However, I continue to use ‘⊲’ for consistency with earlier sections. In any case, this
does not affect any of the arguments in this section.
27This is not quite grammatical, because Λ is a set rather than a sentence. To make the
claim grammatical, we can write it as ‘{φ} ⊴ the sentence in Λ’. As it is, I leave the claim
as it is: though it is ungrammatical, its current presentation aids readability. Readers who
prefer strict adherence to grammar can take ‘{φ} ⊴ Λ’ to be an abbreviation of ‘{φ} ⊴ the
sentence in Λ’, and analogously for other such, ungrammatical claims.
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{φ, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ (a is accelerating at 2m/s2 ∧ a has a mass of
1kg)
Consequently, {φ} ∪ Σ ⊲ a disjunct of Λ. As obtaining disjuncts ground
their disjunctions, and grounding is transitive, it follows that {φ} ∪ Σ ⊲ Λ.
From the definition of partial ground, it follows that {φ} ⊴ Λ.
As {φ} ⊴ Λ, it follows that {φ} ⊴ ∆. This is because the sentences in Λ and
∆ express the same fact.
Hence, both {∆} ⊴ φ and {φ} ⊴ ∆. This violates the asymmetry of (partial)
grounding, leaving us in a puzzle.
It is not clear how to escape. We might reject the claim that the truth of a
grounding claim does not depend on how those facts are expressed. However,
this means that grounding becomes relative to the language of discourse. This
undermines the supposed objectivity of ground.
We might reject that φ and γ express the same fact, or that the sentences
in ∆ and Λ express the same fact. However, given the Newtonian equation of
F = ma, it is not clear to me how this could be justified.
Alternatively, we might reject the asymmetry of partial grounding. This
means that partial grounding only imperfectly tracks the direction of relative
fundamentality, such that partial grounds can be as fundamental as what they
partially ground. Given an analogous puzzle can be mustered for full ground,
we also must abandon the asymmetry of full ground.
Consider again the option of treating grounding as language-relative. Ground-
ing theorists can preserve the objectivity of ground by fixing a privileged lan-
guage of ground. An obvious choice would be Naturalish. Suppose that there
is no predicate in Naturalish referring to the property of accelerating at xm/s2.
The thought is that the properties of being acted on with a net force of yN, and
of having a mass of zkg, are perfectly natural whilst the property of accelerat-
ing at xm/s2 is not. This means that φ and the sentence in Λ are not sentences
in Naturalish. We get that ∆ ⊴ γ, but we cannot reverse the direction of
grounding, because grounding is relative to Naturalish. Meanwhile, grounding
remains objective because Naturalish is, supposedly, objectively privileged.
This manoeuvre plays directly into the vindication of the Ground-Naturalness
Connection. Suppose we are considering the claim that
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{a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a is accel-
erating at 2m/s2.
The grounding theorist has supposed that a perfectly natural translation of
‘a is accelerating at 2m/s2’ is γ. Meanwhile, ‘a has a net force of 2N acting on
it, a has a mass of 1kg’ are perfectly natural translations of themselves. It is<-derivable that
{a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ γ.
By Natural Grounding and the Ground-Naturalness Connection, we can
derive the desired conclusion that
{a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a is accel-
erating at 2m/s2.28
The appeal to Naturalish solves the issue and vindicates the Ground-Naturalness
Connection. However, the manoeuvre relies on the assumption that the prop-
erty of accelerating at xm/s2 is not perfectly natural (or the properties of being
acted on with a net force of yN, or of having a mass of zkg, are not perfectly
natural). Suppose that all three properties are perfectly natural. It follows that
φ, γ, the sentence in ∆ and the sentence in Λ are all sentences in Naturalish,
allowing the puzzle to proceed as before.
In this instance, the grounding theorist might abandon the asymmetry of
ground. The Ground-Naturalness Connection would reflect this abandonment
(once we abanoned the asymmetry of ground and associated derivations). If all
three properties are perfectly natural, then γ is a perfectly natural translation
of φ, and it is <-derivable that
∆ ∪ {a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ γ.
Hence, by Natural Grounding and the Ground-Naturalness Connection:
28This derivation is as follows. It is <-derivable that
(1) {a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ γ.
By Natural Grounding, it follows that
(2) {a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ◂ a is accelerating at 2m/s2
By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, it follows that
(3) {a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a is accelerating at 2m/s2,
as desired.
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{a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a is accel-
erating at 2m/s2.29
Meanwhile, if all three properties are perfectly natural, then the sentence
in Λ is a perfectly natural translation of the sentence in ∆. From this, it is<-derivable that
{φ, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ Λ.
Hence, by Natural Grounding and the Ground-Naturalness Connection:
{a is accelerating at 2m/s2, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a has a net force of
2N acting on it.30
Hence, the Ground-Naturalness Connection delivers a symmetric instance
of ground, on the assumption that all three properties are perfectly natural.
The substantivist might make the following objection:
The connection between force, mass and acceleration is contingent: the
laws of nature might have been different. Hence, a Naturalish translation
of ‘a is accelerating at 2m/s2’ should not mention ‘force’ or ‘mass’ – at
some worlds, acceleration has nothing to do with such properties.
This is an interesting objection, and it is worth considering its impact.31
As we have noted, grounding necessitates. Hence, if the grounding claim
{a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a is accel-
erating at 2m/s2
is true, then
◻((a has a net force of 2N acting on it ∧ a has a mass of 1kg) → a is
accelerating at 2m/s2)
29See footnote 16 for the full details of an analogous derivation.
30Again, see footnote 16 for the full details of an analogous derivation.
31My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising it.
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My opponent denies this modal claim, and so denies the truth of the ground-
ing claim. Hence, their response to this puzzle is to deny the grounding claims
that led to them. Moreover, it should be noted that Ground-Naturalness
Connection tracks their concerns. My opponent denies that there is a nec-
essary connection between force, mass and acceleration. This is tracked in the
Ground-Naturalness Connection by the unavailability of appropriate Natural-
ish translations. If my opponent is correct, there are no Naturalish translations
of sentences involving acceleration that mention ‘force’ and ‘mass’. Once again,
the Ground-Naturalness Connection offers a useful diagnosis of the grounding
claim, because it makes explicit why some philosophers may want to deny these
grounding claims.
On the other hand, I contend that my opponent’s objection is controversial.
We might respond that what we call ‘acceleration’ at a possible world where
F ≠ ma is not genuinely acceleration, but some other phenomenon: call it
‘schmacceleration’. This makes explicit the thought that acceleration is defined
in terms of Newton’s equation, and pushes back on the idea that the connection
between acceleration, force and mass is contingent.
Such an argument makes a case for a metaphysically necessary connection
between acceleration, force and mass. However, suppose that my opponent had
reason to deny this argument. Perhaps she would concede, nonetheless, that
there is some notion of necessity at play. Fine (2005) contends that there are
natural necessitites, such that natural necessity is not merely a restriction or
defined in terms of metaphysical necessity. Fine argues that ‘natural necessity
is the form of necessity that pertains to natural phenomena’ (2005, 238). He
gives the example of one billiard-ball hitting another, arguing that there is a
sense (given certain antecedent conditions) in which the second ball must move.
This is not a metaphysical necessity, but a physical one.
Fine (2014) then makes a case for a limited pluralism of ground, correspond-
ing to different notions of necessity. Hence, he suggests that there is a notion of
metaphysical ground and a distinct notion of natural ground. If my opponent
is happy to follow Fine along these lines, then their objection serves only to
restrict the puzzle to natural grounding. This should be considered progress
by my opponent, but they must still contend with this apparent, symmetric
instance of natural grounding.
If we resist Fine and argue that natural grounding is merely a restriction
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of metaphysical grounding, then another response to my opponent is available.
We accept that
{a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a is accel-
erating at 2m/s2
is not a true grounding claim, but instead argue that
{F = ma, a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a
is accelerating at 2m/s2
is a true grounding claim. The puzzle can then proceed analogously. From
the perspective of the Ground-Naturalness Connection, we contend that
(F = ma ∧ ((a has a net force of 2N acting on it ∧ a has a mass of 1kg)∨ (a has a net force of 3N acting on it ∧ a has a mass of 1.5kg) ∨ ...))
is a Naturalish translation of ‘a is accelerating at 2m/s2’ when acceler-
ation, force and mass all correspond to perfectly natural properties. The
Ground-Naturalness Connection therefore continues to track our reasoning
about grounding.
With this in mind, it is not obvious to me what to say about this puzzle.
I do not see why Newton’s equation or anything in physics suggests that ac-
celeration is less fundamental than force or mass, but the alternative requires
abandoning the asymmetry of ground. In either case, the Ground-Naturalness
Connection reflects the choice of the grounding theorist. If the grounding the-
orist thinks that acceleration is not fundamental, then (because naturalness
tracks the relative fundamentality of properties) it follows that the property
of accelerating at xm/s2 is not perfectly natural. As noted above, on these
assumptions, the Ground-Naturalness Connection delivers the claim that
{a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a is accel-
erating at 2m/s2.
Alternatively, if the grounding theorist thinks that acceleration is equally
fundamental to mass and net force (such that the three properties are all per-
fectly natural), the puzzle reasserts itself and it seems they must abandon the
asymmetry of ground. Reflecting this, the Ground-Naturalness Connection
delivers the desired twin claims:
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{a has a net force of 2N acting on it, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a is accel-
erating at 2m/s2
{a is accelerating at 2m/s2, a has a mass of 1kg} ⊲ a has a net force of
2N acting on it.
Either way, then, the Ground-Naturalness Connection tracks the reasoning
of grounding theorists, as desired.
Once again, the Ground-Naturalness Connection also enjoys a theoretical
benefit in offering a diagnostic of this puzzle. By thinking of grounding in
terms of my biconditional, I was able to highlight the precise problem. In
this case, the issue regards matters of relative fundamentality, and whether
acceleration is less fundamental than force or mass. This demonstrates the
Ground-Naturalness Connection’s utility in highlighting what is at issue in
puzzles of ground.
15.7 Example Schema 11: Simples, Complexes and
Existence
The example schema states that simples < complexes. Of course, for an instance
of this example scheme to be true, the simples must be those that exhaustively
make up the complex. Moreover, what is grounded is the existence of the
complex. A grammatical instance of example schema 11 reflects these points.
Consequently, consider the following instance of the example schema. Sup-
pose that a and b are simples and that c is the complex formed by the mereolog-
ical sum of a and b. For sake of simplicity, I adopt the maximalist assumption
that any sum of simples forms a complex.
From there, the grounding claim is that
{∃x(x = a), ∃x(x = b)} ⊲ ∃x(x = c),
when existence is expressed through the existential quantifier.32
γ = ‘∃x(x = a) ∧ ∃x(x = b)’ is trivially a Naturalish translation of ‘∃x(x =
c)’. This is because γ and ‘∃x(x = c)’ are cointensional, and neither sentence
refers to any properties.33
32Such that the claim can be glossed as ‘if a, b exist, then the fact that a, b exists grounds
that c exists’.
33Similarly, ‘∃x(x = c)’ is a Naturalish translation of γ.
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Our deductive rules reflect that conjuncts ground their conjunctions. We
can therefore use them to derive that
{∃x(x = a), ∃x(x = b)} ⊲ γ
Meanwhile, the sentences ‘∃x(x = a)’ and ‘∃x(x = b)’ are trivially Natu-
ralish translations of themselves. This is trivially the case because neither
sentence refers to any properties. ‘{∃x(x = a), ∃x(x = b)} ◂ γ’. By the Ground-
Naturalness Connection, it follows that
{∃x(x = a), ∃x(x = b)} ⊲ ∃x(x = c).
This reasoning reaches the desired result in this case, but it is problematic
in other cases. Suppose that a, b and c all necessarily exist. It follows that a
Naturalish translation of ‘∃x(x = a)’ is ‘∃x(x = b) ∧ ∃x(x = c)’. From there,
analogous reasoning has the Ground-Naturalness Connection deliver the claim
that
{∃x(x = b), ∃x(x = c)} ⊲ ∃x(x = a).
This result violates the asymmetry of ground. Moreover, the second ground-
ing claim is intuitively implausible: the existence of complexes does not ground
the existence of their simples. Further, because both ‘∃x(x = b)’ and ‘∃x(x =
b) ∧ ∃x(x = c)’ are Naturalish translation of ‘∃x(x = a)’, it follows from the
Ground-Naturalness connection that:
{∃x(x = a)} ⊲ ∃x(x = a)
This result violates the irreflexivity of ground.
We might be tempted in this case to appeal to haecceitic properties: prop-
erties uniquely exemplified by specific individuals. Haecceitic properties are
used by Quine to ‘subsume a one-word name or alleged name ... under Rus-
sell’s theory of description’ (1948, 27). For example, we might ‘convert’ the
names ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ into the properties of being a, being b and being c. I refer
to these properties by predicates ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C ’, respectively. We might then
insist that the Naturalish translation of ‘complex c exists’ is
∃xAx ∧ ∃xBx
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and the Naturalish translations of ‘simple a exists’ and ‘simple b exists’
are ‘∃xAx’ and ‘∃xBx’, respectively. From there, we note that our deductive
rules reflect that conjuncts (collectively) ground their conjunctions. We can
therefore derive that
{∃xAx, ∃xBx} ⊲ ∃xAx ∧ ∃xBx.
It follows that the grounds have a Naturalish translation Λ, and the grounded
has a Naturalish translation γ, such that it is <-derivable that Λ ⊲ γ. ‘{∃x(x =
a), ∃x(x = b)} ◂ ∃x(x = c)’. By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, it follows
that
{∃x(x = a), ∃x(x = b)} ⊲ ∃x(x = c),
as desired. Furthermore, because the property referred to by ‘C ’ is not
perfectly natural, we cannot reverse the direction of grounding when referring
to these haecceitic properties. ‘∃xCx’ cannot be the Naturalish translation of
‘simple a exists’, because the predicate ‘C ’ is not a Naturalish predicate.
Though this approach provides the correct direction of grounding, it does
not entirely solve our issue. This is because it does not do anything to rule
out the problematic Naturalish translations given earlier. The new approach
provides some unproblematic Naturalish translations, but this is compatible
with the existence of distinct, problematic Naturalish translations of the same
English sentences.34 Hence, though ‘∃xAx’ is a Naturalish translation of ‘simple
a exists’, so is ‘∃x(x = b) ∧ ∃x(x = c)’ (assuming that a, b and c all necessarily
exist). Hence, appealing to haecceitic properties does nothing to block the
problematic, symmetric result we have considered earlier in this section.
The solution is to stipulate that Naturalish does not contain any names.35
Having stipulated that there are no names in Naturalish, it follows that ‘∃x(x= b) ∧ ∃x(x = c)’ is not a Naturalish translation of ‘simple a exists’. This is
because the names ‘b’ and ‘c’ are not included in Naturalish. Having removed
all names from Naturalish, we must instead appeal to haecceitic properties
when providing the Naturalish translation of ‘simple a exists’. The situation is
then as detailed above.
34Remember that English sentences can have numerous Naturalish translations.
35Note that such a stipulation does not threaten the deflationary-friendliness of the
Ground-Naturalness Connection. It remains deflationary-friendly whether a property is per-
fectly natural, and hence whether its corresponding predicate is a Naturalish predicate.
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Some philosophers may balk at the idea of simples a, b being more funda-
mental than complex c. They would therefore reject the claim that the prop-
erties referred to by ‘A’ and ‘B’ are more natural than the property referred
to by ‘C ’, such that they reject the claim that ‘∃xAx ∧ ∃xBx’ is a Naturalish
translation of ‘∃x(x = c)’. However, I propose that such philosophers are also
well-motivated to reject the claim that
{∃x(x = a), ∃x(x = b)} ⊲ ∃x(x = c).
I cannot think of a motivation to think that the existence of particular
simples grounds the existence of their complexes other than through the idea
that particular simples are in some sense more fundamental than their com-
plexes. Remember that grounding is meant to track the direction of rela-
tive fundamentality. We therefore see parallels between grounding judgements
and judgements of relative, connected naturalness, supporting the Ground-
Naturalness Connection.36 Furthermore, thinking of grounding through the
Ground-Naturalness Connection highlights the precise assumptions underpin-
ning the grounding claim: that particular simples are more fundamental than
their complexes. Once more, the Ground-Naturalness Connection offers a help-
ful diagnostic behind grounding claims.
Removing names from Naturalish complicates other Naturalish translations,
but does not threaten the previous results of this chapter. For example, sup-
pose (for sake of simplicity) that properties corresponding to shades of red are
perfectly natural, and the property of being red is not perfectly natural. Pre-
viously, I have suggested that a Naturalish translation of ‘a is red’ is (on these
suppositions)
a is scarlet ∨ a is crimson ∨ ...
This Naturalish translation is incorrect when there are no names in Natu-
ralish, because we can no longer help ourselves to the name ‘a’. However, we
could offer the following Naturalish translation instead:
γ: ∃x(Ax ∧ x is scarlet) ∨ ∃x(Ax ∧ x is crimson) ∨ ...,
36Note that even if a, b and c all necessarily exist, this does not mean that there is a
predicate for being c in Naturalish. We would still need predicates for being a and being b to
distinguish individuals a and b – ‘being c’ could not be used to express distinctions between
them. Meanwhile, if we have names for a and b, then a name for c is redundant.
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when the property referred to by ‘A’ is the property of being a.
As noted, this makes our Naturalish translations more complicated, but
does not throw into doubt the result that ‘{a is scarlet} ⊲ a is red’. This is
because our Naturalish translation of ‘a is scarlet’ becomes
Λ: ∃x(Ax ∧ x is scarlet)
Λ ⊲ γ is <-derivable, because our deductive rules reflect that obtaining
disjuncts ground their disjunctions. By the Ground-Naturalness Connection,
it follows that
{a is scarlet} ⊲ a is red,
as desired.37
15.8 Example Schema 12: Set-Theoretic Grounding
There are limitations in our deductive rules. Our deductive rules cannot handle
quantification, modal notions and so on. This causes issues when we consider
example schema 12.
Example schema 12 states that members < sets. A grammatically tidied
instantiation is something like the following: {Socrates exists} ⊲ {Socrates}
exists. Note that the left-hand-side of the grounding operator is a singleton set
containing a sentence, whilst the right-hand-side of the grounding operator is
a sentence referring to the singleton set containing Socrates.
To handle sets, we might supplement our deductive rules with the following
deduction rule, Membership Grounding:
⋀{∃x(x = φi) ∣ i ∈ I}⋀{∃x(x = φi) ∣ i ∈ I} < ∃y(y = {φi ∣ i ∈ I})
37It should be noted that there is some art in finding tractable Naturalish translations –
my thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising this point. For example, I might
have offered the following Naturalish translation of ‘a is red’:∃x((Ax ∧ x is scarlet) ∨ (Ax ∧ x is crimson) ∨ ...)
This Naturalish translation is not tractable with our deductive rules, as we would need
rules for the grounding behaviour of disjunctions within the scope of quantification.
As has been noted, there is no presumption for unique Naturalish translation. Our defini-
tion of natural grounding only requires that some Naturalish translations Λ, γ of ∆ and φ are
such ‘Λ ⊲ γ’ is <-derivable. Hence, the availability of intractable Naturalish translations does
not undermine the Ground-Naturalness Connection – there is only a problem of tractable
Naturalish translations are not available.
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Suppose that {φi ∣ i ∈ I} = {Socrates}, such that ⋀{∃x(x = φi) ∣ i ∈ I}
is equivalent to ‘∃x(x = Socrates)’. When our rules are supplemented with
Membership Grounding, it is <-derivable that
{∃x(x = Socrates)} ⊲ ∃y(y = {Socrates}).
By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, and by treating existential quan-
tification as expressing existence, it follows that {Socrates exists} ⊲ {Socrates}
exists, as desired.38
It might be objected that supplementing our deductive rules is something
like a cheat. The worry is that we could simply add a deductive rule for
each, true grounding claim. Less dramatically, we may need to keep adding
deductive rules to deal with how different types of entities are grounded: such
as multi-sets, sequences, hylomorphic compounds and so on.39 Regardless, the
worry is that, with each supplemental rule, we cheapen the importance of the
Ground-Naturalness Connection, and the role played by Naturalish translation.
I think this is a genuine concern. However, it is worth stating a few points
in defence of the Ground-Naturalness Connection and my deflationary-friendly
purpose.
Firstly, we can resist the thought that adding supplemental rules to govern
the grounding behaviour of different types of entities is unduly ad hoc. This
is because the grounding theorist would presumably endorse the supplemental
deductive rules that would be offered. For example, grounding theorists are
presumably content to say that Membership Grounding holds with general-
ity, and can be properly thought of as a deductive rule reflecting the nature
of grounding. Though we may have to add many more rules governing the
grounding behaviour of further kinds of entities, the thought is that each ad-
ditional rule would be endorsed by the typical grounding theorist. Further, it
should be remembered that the Ground-Naturalness Connection is not offered
as an analysis of grounding. Increased complexity from an increasing number
of deductive rules may undermine the Ground-Naturalness Connection as an
analysis of grounding, but presumably does not impact upon the truth of the
biconditional itself.
38The derivation is as follows. It is <-derivable by Membership Grounding that
{∃x(x = Socrates)} ⊲ ∃y(y = {Socrates}).
Hence, this sentence is <-derivable from the set of natural grounding claims. Hence, by the
Ground-Naturalness Connection, it is a true grounding claim.
39My thanks to Jon Litland and Michael Potter for raising this concern.
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Secondly, it is worth remembering my deflationary-friendly project. Each
time we add a supplemental, deductive rule, we risk our deflationary-friendly
interpretation (see §13.5) of those deductive rules. We would have to check that
each rule can be interpreted as reflecting the nature of a certain kind of expla-
nation: one from the logically simple to the logically complex. For example, I
would contend that Membership Grounding can be interpreted this way (with
a sufficiently broad understanding of what is logical). The thought is that we
explain the existence of sets – logically complex entities – by the existence of
their members.40 This imposes a check on the kind of supplemental rules that
could be added, and maintains the overall deflationary-friendly purpose of this
thesis.
Nonetheless, adding supplemental rules that are not mediated through Nat-
uralish translation does undermine the role played by Naturalish translation in
the Ground-Naturalness Connection. This might motivate us to adopt a third
defence. We might be optimistic for the formulation of some deductive rule
governing the grounding behaviour of abstraction more generally. If we had
such a rule, we would only need a single supplemental rule rather than many,
thus limiting the impact on the Ground-Naturalness Connection.
The thought may run as follows.41 In set-theory and other abstraction-
theories, we have principles such as ‘if you have such-and-such things, then
you have an object so-and-so’. The situation is made more complex by the
need to protect the consistency of the theory. For example, there are limita-
tions on the construction of sets to avoid the set-theoretic paradoxes. Hence,
each abstraction-theory may have some mathematical principle of the following
shape:
For any things a1, a2 ... such that Φ(a1, a2 ...), ABSTRACTION(a1, a2
...) exists,
when ‘Φ(...)’ outlines some condition designed to make our abstraction-
theory consistent, and ‘ABSTRACTION(...)’ is an operator designed to yield
40If the reader does not want to countenance sets as logically complex, we might expand
our deflationary-friendly interpretation, such that our deductive rules reflect the nature of
explanation from the generically simple to the generically complex. This would remain
deflationary-friendly, because the value of such explanation (above other kinds of explanation)
is of interest-relative value. We can consider cases where a complex explanation of a simply
expressed phenomenon is valuable.
41My particular thanks to Tim Button for this suggestion.
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some object. For example, in the theory of unrestricted mereology, we might
have that
• Φ(a1, a2 ...): a1, a2 ... are each self-identical (the condition is trivial)
• ABSTRACTION(a1, a2 ...) = the fusion of a1, a2 ...
such that our mathematical principle may be summarised as follows:
For any things, the fusion of those things exists.
Call these mathematical principles abstraction principles. The thought is
that we offer a schema of deductive rules Abstraction Grounding Schema to
govern the grounding behaviour of abstraction principles:
Φ(a1, a2 ...)
{Φ(a1, a2 ...)} < ABSTRACTION(a1, a2 ...) exists
The hope is that this prevents the need for the addition of many, arbitrary
supplemental rules to get the Ground-Naturalness Connection to work. This
limits the undermining of the role for Naturalish translation and addresses our
ongoing concern about endless, supplemental rules.
Note that this reasoning does not endorse any particular abstraction prin-
ciple. The point is just that if a grounding theorist embraces some abstraction
principle, then they should supplement <-derivability with an appropriate in-
stance of the Abstraction Grounding Schema.
15.9 Conclusion
This chapter discusses each paradigmatic case of grounding presented in §15.2.
I do not pretend that this list is exhaustive of popular grounding claims, but I
hope that they are representative of the wider literature.
For each example schema, I have argued one of the following: (1) that the
example schema vindicates the Ground-Naturalness Connection; (2) that the
example schema is in doubt; or (3) that something in the spirit of the Ground-
Naturalness Connection is vindicated by the example schema. When it comes
to option (3), I have suggested modification – such as in the case of abstraction
grounding claims. These appeals preserve a deflationary-friendly interpretation
of grounding.
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As noted in §15.1, considering these examples defends the left-to-right di-
rection of the biconditional. In considering these example schemes, I have
therefore provided support for something like the Ground-Naturalness Con-
nection being true. I now turn to theoretical applications of grounding.
Chapter 16
Theoretical Applications of
Grounding
16.1 Introduction
Grounding has a variety of theoretical roles: characterising fundamentality, in-
trinsicality, physicalism and the distinction between certain three-dimensionalist
and four-dimensionalist positions. This chapter demonstrates that these appli-
cations of grounding do not produce any problems for the Ground-Naturalness
Connection. The thought is that the truth of the Ground-Naturalness Connec-
tion should be at least compatible with these theoretical roles, insofar as those
theoretical roles are genuinely successful.
The first point to note is that the Ground-Naturalness Connection does not
appeal to any of the notions that grounding is purported to characterise. I
appeal to perfectly natural translations and our deductive rules. The notion
of perfectly natural translation is analysed in terms of perfect naturalness.
Given that grounding is not purported to characterise any of these notions, the
Ground-Naturalness Connection is not circular.
As it is, it is not clear that circularity would be problematic. I have pro-
posed the Ground-Naturalness Connection as a true biconditional and not as an
analysis. If the Ground-Naturalness Connection represented an analysis, then
circularity would be vicious – I would be attempting to analyse grounding ul-
timately in terms of grounding. Conversely, there are many true biconditionals
that are ‘circular’. For example, consider the triviality that
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∆ < φ iff ∆ < φ.
For my purposes, as long as there is good reason to think that the right
side of the Ground-Naturalness Connection is deflationary-friendly – that it is a
subjective, interest-relative matter when it is <-derivable from the set of natural
grounding claims that ∆ ⊲ φ – then the truth of the Ground-Naturalness Con-
nection is enough to prompt a deflationary-friendly interpretation of ground.
Though the Ground-Naturalness Connection does not appear to be circular, it
would not matter if it was.
On the other hand, the purported theoretical applications of grounding
could be problematic if the Ground-Naturalness Connection ruled them out
as unsuccessful. It may be that the Ground-Naturalness Connection reflects
genuine problems with those theoretical applications. However, we want the
Ground-Naturalness Connection to be compatible with successful theoretical
applications for grounding. Otherwise, the Ground-Naturalness Connection is
in doubt, as it is not compatible with how grounding is used. I therefore turn
to considering each application in more detail.
I take each theoretical role in turn. In §16.2, I consider grounding’s role in
characterising fundamentality. In §16.3, §16.4 and §16.5, I consider characteri-
sations of intrinsicality, physicalism and certain three-dimensionalist positions,
respectively. In §16.6, I conclude.
16.2 Characterising Fundamentality
Grounding theorists often claim that ⌜φ⌝ is fundamental iff φ is ungrounded.
This is a theoretical role for grounding in characterising fundamentality.
We have seen that the Ground-Naturalness Connection keeps faith with
a wide variety of grounding judgements. Consequently, there is no reason to
doubt that, if φ is ungrounded, then it is not <-derivable from the set of natural
grounding claims that
∆ ⊲ φ
for any ∆. Hence, the set of ungrounded sentences will be identical with the
set of sentences that fail to meet the right-hand-side condition of the Ground-
Naturalness Connection. Insofar as the Ground-Naturalness Connection keeps
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faith with grounding examples, it will deliver the same set of fundamental facts
via the biconditional ‘⌜φ⌝ is fundamental iff φ is ungrounded’.
16.3 Characterising Intrinsicality
Another theoretical role for grounding is found in characterisations of intrinsi-
cality. Witmer, Butchard & Trogdon (2005) argue that a property is intrinsic
iff it can only be exemplified intrinsically, when
An individual a exemplifies P intrinsically iff (i) P is independent of
accompaniment and (ii) for any property X, if x has P in virtue of having
X, X is also independent of accompaniment.1
This proposal is based on the following definitions:
Independent of Accompaniment Definition: A property α is independent
of accompaniment iff
1. α can be exemplified by an unaccompanied individual,
2. α can fail to be exemplified by an unaccompanied individual,
3. α can be exemplified by an accompanied individual, and
4. α can fail to be exemplified by an accompanied individual.
Accompanied/Unaccompanied Individuals Definition: An individual a is
unaccompanied at a possible world w iff the only individual in w is a;
and accompanied at w otherwise.
Consider this proposal, and whether the Ground-Naturalness Connection
keeps faith with this theoretical role. The issue rests on whether the right kind
of grounding claims are true – or, more importantly, that the wrong kind of
grounding claims are false. For example, consider {Qa} ⊲ Pa, when a is some
individual, P is (intuitively) an intrinsically had property (and independent of
accompaniment), and Q is not independent of accompaniment. If there is a
case like this, then it is a counterexample against this application of ground.
1Similarly, Bader (2013) characterises analyses of intrinsicality as guided by two general
principles: that intrinsic properties are had solely in virtue of how a thing is and not in
virtue of how it is related to other things, and the instantiation of intrinsic properties is
independent to how the rest of the world is.
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One such potential counterexample is when a denotes Socrates, P refers to
the property of being human and Q refers to the property of being brought into
existence by process XYZ, when process XYZ is a microphysical characterisa-
tion of Socrates’s conception from particular gametes.2 The property of being
brought into existence by process XYZ is not independent of accompaniment,
because it can only be exemplified in worlds containing individuals involved
in the process XYZ.3 Meanwhile, the property of being human is intuitively
intrinsic, and seems independent of accompaniment. The crucial issue, then,
is whether {Socrates was brought into existence by process XYZ} ⊲ Socrates
is human.
I believe that our intuitions regarding whether this is a true grounding
claim depends on whether we think ⌜Socrates was brought into existence by
process XYZ ⌝ is more fundamental than ⌜Socrates is human⌝, and on whether
we think Socrates being brought into existence by process XYZ is indepen-
dently sufficient for Socrates being human. This is largely reflected in our
intuitions regarding which sentences are Naturalish translations of ‘Socrates is
human’. Suppose that we are content to say that
γ = Socrates was brought into existence by process XYZ1 ∨ Socrates was
brought into existence by process XYZ2 ∨ ...
is a Naturalish translation of ‘Socrates is human’.4 Further, suppose we are
content to say that ‘Socrates was brought into existence by process XYZ1’ is
a Naturalish translation of itself. It follows that it is <-derivable that
{Socrates was brought into existence by process XYZ1} ⊲ γ.
2Property XYZ refers to particular gametes to accommodate Kripke’s (1980) origin es-
sentialism: the doctrine that individuals essentially have (most of) their actual origins.
3For example, Phaenarete and Sophroniscus. However, even in worlds where process
XYZ saw Socrates emerge from a swamp (assuming, contrary to Kripke’s (1980) origin
essentialism, that there are such worlds), we would need that swamp to exist at that world
for Socrates to be brought into existence by process XYZ.
4Accommodating origin essentialism, each process XYZ1, XYZ2 ... will involve the same,
particular gametes and mostly the same process. However, origin essentialism allows for some
minor variation in origins. For example, it is not essential to Socrates that he was conceived
at precisely the time he was actually conceived. Hence, processes XYZ1, XYZ2 ... can be
seen as duplicate processes that occur at slightly different times.
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By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, it follows that this sentence is a
true grounding claim.5
I propose that it is plausible that the property of being brought into ex-
istence by process XYZ1 is more natural than the property of being human:
this reflects the intuition that ⌜Socrates was brought into existence by process
XYZ ⌝ is more fundamental than ⌜Socrates is human⌝. However, the Naturalish
translation of a sentence should be cointensive with that sentence: a Natural-
ish translation γ of ‘Socrates is human’ must be such that ◻(⋀γ ↔ Socrates is
human). This is problematic, for there is reason to doubt that a disjunct of γ
is a sufficient condition for Socrates being human. We may think that we need
a further fact along the lines of ⌜∀x(if x is brought into existence by process
XYZ, then x is human)⌝ to obtain.
If this further fact is required, it follows that
Socrates was brought into existence by process XYZ1 ∨ Socrates was
brought into existence by process XYZ2 ∨ ...
fails to be a Naturalish translation of ‘Socrates is human’. If so, then the
Ground-Naturalness Connection fails to deliver that {Socrates was brought
into existence by process XYZ} ⊲ Socrates is human. If this further fact is not
required, meanwhile, then the Ground-Naturalness Connection delivers that
{Socrates was brought into existence by process XYZ} ⊲ Socrates is human.
My belief is that the further fact is not required, and the example constitutes
a counterexample against the theoretical application of grounding to character-
ising intrinsicality. However, it does not matter for present purposes whether
my belief is true. The point is that our intuitions regarding the availability of
appropriate Naturalish translations tracks our intuitions regarding grounding.
If we think that this example constitutes a counterexample, then this is re-
flected in the Ground-Naturalness Connection. Moreover, it would mean that
the theoretical role for grounding was unsuccessful and there would be nothing
for the Ground-Naturalness Connection to keep faith with. Alternatively, if
we think that this example fails to constitute a counterexample, then this is
5The derivation is as follows. We know that it is <-derivable that
(1) {Socrates was brought into existence by process XYZ1} ⊲ γ.
By Natural Grounding, it follows that
(2) {Socrates was brought into existence by process XYZ1} ◂ Socrates is human. Hence, it
is trivial that this sentence is <-derivable from the set of natural grounding claims. By the
Ground-Naturalness Connection, it therefore expresses a true grounding claim.
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reflected in the Ground-Naturalness Connection, because the same reasoning
would suggest that γ is not a genuine Naturalish translation of ‘Socrates is hu-
man’. More generally, there is no reason to think that the Ground-Naturalness
Connection will not reflect the theoretical role of grounding in characterising
intrinsicality, should that theoretical role be successful.6
16.4 Characterising Physicalism
Bliss & Trogdon (2016) and Fine (2014) suggest that physicalism is best char-
acterised in terms of grounding. The suggestion is that physicalism is the claim
that all mental states are grounded in physical states. This is designed to avoid
difficulties with intensional, rather than hyperintensional, characterisations of
physicalism, which run the risk of being too coarse-grained.
The Ground-Naturalness Conception is entirely compatible with using ground-
ing to characterise physicalism. Insofar as the physicalist wants to affirm a
grounding relation between physical properties and mental properties (speak-
ing ungrammatically), they will be prepared to affirm a connection between
physical properties and mental properties. Presumably they will also be pre-
pared to say that physical properties are more natural than mental properties
– that the physical properties carve more closely at the joints of nature. This
opens the door for the requisite Naturalish translations. In §15.3, I outline how
my biconditional keeps faith with true grounding claims of the example scheme
‘physical events < mental events’.
The physicalist might object to this characterisation of their position, ar-
guing that they are not committed to any ideas of relative fundamentality or
a deeper structure to objective reality. Such a physicalist might note that she
is simply committed to a type-identity between physical events and mental
events. Perhaps she also wants to say that talk in terms of physical events
is explanatorily more useful than talk in terms of mental events, but that
this does not correspond to any objective structure. Such a physicalist would
6Characterisations of intrinsicality in terms of grounding have found alternative chal-
lenges. Marshall (2013) offers counterexamples to such accounts. He notes that it is plausible
that {Obama exists} < {Obama} exists. The fact that {Obama} exists therefore holds in
virtue of the existence of entities distinct from {Obama}, such that {Obama}’s existence is
extrinsic. However, Marshall alleges that the property of existence is intrinsic.
Grounding theorists who want to use grounding to characterise intrinsicality might respond
that existence is not a property that can be intrinsic or extrinsic. However, the full details
of this debate needn’t concern us here.
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therefore reject the idea that physical properties are more natural than mental
properties, due to scepticism of hyperintensional notions. Hence, the required
Naturalish translations would not be available. However, this same scepticism
would also drive her to reject any characterisation of her position in terms of
grounding. Hence, this does not involve the Ground-Naturalness Connection
breaking faith with this theoretical role.
It seems to me likely that certain physicalists should characterise their po-
sition in terms of grounding, and other physicalists should not characterise
their position in terms of grounding, depending on their views about the struc-
ture of objective reality. However, the Ground-Naturalness Connection reflects
when such a characterisation is appropriate, and when it is not. It is therefore
well-suited for this theoretical role.
16.5 Characterising Three-Dimensionalist and
Four-Dimensionalist Positions
Fine (2014) suggests that grounding is crucial for understanding the distinc-
tion between certain three-dimensionalist and four-dimensionalist positions.
He notes that the three-dimensionalist might be willing to admit that material
things have temporal parts ‘in thought’, but hold that the existence of a tem-
poral part is grounded in the existence of the persisting object at the relevant
time. Without grounding, the distinction between the three-dimensionalist
who accepts temporal parts and the four-dimensionalist is impossible to char-
acterise.
The Ground-Naturalness Connection can accommodate this theoretical role,
given certain assumptions about future supplementations to our deductive
rules, and by eliminating names from Naturalish as detailed in §15.7. Sup-
pose that a is the temporal part of a persisting object b at time t. Suppose
that:
• ‘Ax’ expresses that x exemplifies the haecceitic property of being a.
• ‘Bx’ expresses that x exemplifies the haecceitic property of being b.
• ‘Tx’ expresses that x exemplifies the property of occupying time t.
A Naturalish translation of ‘a exists’ is given by:
‘∃x(Bx ∧ Tx)’
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This can be roughly read (in English) as ‘persisting object b exists and
occupies time t’.
Meanwhile, a Naturalish translation of ‘b exists’ is given by ‘∃xBx’.
To accomodate this theoretical role, we need our rules to be supplemented
with rules involving existential quantification. In particular, we would need it
to be the case that
∃xFx∃xFx ≤ ∃x(Fx ∧ Gx)
For any predicates F and G.
It would follow that
{persisting object b exists} ⊴ temporal part a exists
is a natural grounding claim. By the Ground-Naturalness Connection, we
would therefore arrive at the desired (partial) grounding claim.
In my mind, it is plausible that {∃xFx} is a partial ground of ∃x(Fx ∧ Gx).
In theory, then, our deductive rules should be supplementable with deductive
rules that deliver this result. However, as remarked in §15.7, Korbmacher
notes that introducing quantification to the system comes with complicated,
infinitary issues. On the other hand, he is optimistic regarding further work
into the subject. I am content to share in this optimism.
As such, the idea is that the property of being a particular persisting ob-
ject is more natural (and thus more fundamental) than the property of being
a particular temporal part. If a theorist disagrees with this claim of rela-
tive naturalness, then they will reject the Naturalish translations provided and
Fine’s grounding claim cannot be derived from the Ground-Naturalness Con-
nection. However, such a theorist is well-motivated to reject Fine’s grounding
claim. This is because grounding is meant to track the direction of relative
fundamentality, and the theorist denies that particular temporal parts are less
fundamental than their corresponding, persisting objects.
The Ground-Naturalness Connection is therefore well-suited for this the-
oretical role, tracking any intuition regarding the relative fundamentality of
temporal parts and persisting objects.
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16.6 Conclusion
Consequently, the Ground-Naturalness Connection either keeps faith with the
theoretical applications of ground, or there are good reasons to doubt the
correctness of those applications.
This completes my defence of the Ground-Naturalness Connection. I have
delivered a proof of the biconditional in the right-to-left direction in ch.14. In
the same chapter, I have provided a conceptual argument for the left-to-right
direction. Additionally, I have provided further arguments that support the
truth of the biconditional in the left-to-right direction. In ch.15, I argued that
the Ground-Naturalness Connection is vindicated by a wide variety of examples
of grounding claims. In this chapter, I have shown that the Ground-Naturalness
Connection is compatible with successful applications of grounding.
I therefore propose that something in the spirit of the Ground-Naturalness
Connection is true. This delivers a deflationary-friendly interpretation of ground-
ing, insofar as we should adopt a deflationary-friendly interpretation of natu-
ralness.

Chapter 17
Small-g Relations
17.1 Introduction
In this short chapter, I consider an objection against grounding that bears on
my strategy against hyperintensional manoeuvres. This objection makes the
case for grounding being an unnatural disjunction of ‘small-g’ relations, rather
than a unified, metaphysical phenomenon. It does not directly challenge the
Ground-Naturalness Connection, but does raise indirect complications for my
deflationary methodology. In §17.2, I explain what this objection amounts to,
and, in §17.3, I consider how the argument is broadly supportive of my strategy
against hyperintensional manoeuvres. In §17.4, I conclude.
17.2 The Small-g Relation Objection
Suppose that we wanted to say that
{My arm exists} ≤ I exist,
and that
{Socrates exists} ⊲ {Socrates} exists.
The ‘small-g’ theorist argues that the first claim is about parthood – that my
arm is a part of my body – and that the second claim is about set-membership
– that Socrates is the sole member of {Socrates}. The objection is that these
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two relations are entirely distinct, and that it is artificial to group them under
grounding.
Bennett (2011) defends the (standard) view of grounding as unitary. The
thought is that grounding is a fundamental building relation of which other,
standard metaphysical notions are species. These species include composition,
constitution, realisation of properties, micro-based determination and emer-
gence.1 One of Bennett’s arguments for this conceptual unity is that these
species of metaphysical notions all seem to licence the ‘in virtue of’ locution.
Moreover, we use terms such as ‘compose’, ‘realise’ and ‘emerge’ ‘in so many
mixed up motley ways’ (2011, 89) which suggests conceptual entanglements
between them.
This view of grounding as unitary is challenged by Koslicki (2014) and
Wilson (2014, 2016). They argue that the ‘small-g’ relations are not species
of one notion of grounding as Bennett supposes. Wilson (2014) notes that the
small-g relations do not share logical properties. For an example, she proposes
that set-membership is a small-g relation, but that it is not transitive. Yet
Bennett (2011) argues that this is not conclusive. Though it demonstrates
that set-membership is not identical with (say) composition, it does not refute
the claim that set-membership and composition are both species of a broader
genus. On the other hand, I propose that the diversity in the logical properties
of small-g relations at least undermines the idea that they belong to a broader
genus. It does not conclusively demonstrate that there is no such genus, but it
does provide a point of contrast between the small-g relations that undermines
any proposal to unify them.
Koslicki and Wilson bring more arguments to bear against unified ground-
ing. Their arguments can be construed as a response to an indispensability
argument in favour of grounding. My reformulation of their arguments is as
follows:
1. We should accept grounding as a metaphysical kind only if it is indis-
1Composition is a many-one relation between distinct objects and conceptually linked
with parthood. Constitution is a one-one relation between co-located objects of different
kinds. Realisation is a one-one relation between properties, property instances or perhaps
states of affairs. Micro-based determination is a many-one relation between properties in-
stantiated by different individuals, of which the micro-based properties are ‘nothing over and
above’ the properties in which they are based. Emergence is micro-based determination with-
out the thought that the micro-based properties are nothing over and above the properties
in which they are based.
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pensable.
2. Grounding is dispensable.
3. Hence, we should not accept grounding as a metaphysical kind.
Premise 1 can be defended on the basis of ideological conservatism, or per-
haps by suspicion of metaphysical kinds. The thought is that positing meta-
physical kinds incurs some kind of cost, that should be overcome by their
theoretical roles.
Koslicki and Wilson focus on premise 2. They both note that grounding
does little theoretical work when we already have the small-g relations to hand.
To defend this contention, Wilson (2014) considers physicalism. She notes
that there are various ways of being a physicalist, and that grounding is too
coarse-grained to distinguish those positions. For example, physicalist A may
think that the mental reduces to the physical, and so claim that the mental
is grounded in the physical. Another physicalist B may reject the thought
that the mental reduces to the physical, but insist that the mental is, in some
sense, composed out of the physical. Hence B will also assert that the mental is
grounded in the physical. Consequently, A and B both agree on the grounding
claim whilst substantively disagreeing about physicalism. This suggests that
grounding is too coarse-grained to be of much use in describing the disputes
regarding physicalism.
A response to Wilson might be that grounding-talk is still useful in charac-
terising physicalism, even if there is disagreement within the physicalist camp.
By analogy, the concept of moral realism is a useful idea, even though the de-
ontologist and consequentialist have substantive disagreement within the camp
of moral realism. However, Wilson should respond that this fails to defend
grounding as a metaphysical kind. Though grounding-talk may be useful, this
does not mean that there is a metaphysical kind corresponding to that talk. We
find an analogy in the case of jade. Plausibly, jade is not a natural kind, because
it is improperly disjunctive: both jadeite and nephrite are called ‘jade’, and the
two substances have entirely distinct chemical compositions. Nonetheless, we
can see how jade-talk might be useful in bartering and trade. The pragmatic
benefits of jade-talk is not sufficient for jade to be a natural kind. Analogously,
the pragmatic benefits of grounding-talk is not sufficient for grounding to be a
metaphysical kind.
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There are other reasons to think that grounding is dispensable. Wilson
(2014) adds that we do not need grounding to talk about metaphysical de-
pendence, because small-g relations such as type identity, token-but-not-type
identity, functional realisation, the part-whole relation, the set membership re-
lation and so on are already available to describe individual instances of meta-
physical dependence. Indeed, heeding the argument above, grounding seems
too coarse-grained to describe the varieties of metaphysical dependence that
we seem to find in the world.
An available response to these arguments is to note that we need grounding
to govern the direction of metaphysical dependence. The part-whole relation
does not come ‘ready made’ with a direction of metaphysical dependence –
nothing about the fact that my right hand is a part of my body (directly)
implies that {my right hand exists} ≤ my body exists. The thought is that
a distinct relation of ground provides these facts about the direction of meta-
physical dependence. However, Wilson (2016) responds that this work can be
done by a distinct relation of primitive fundamentality. Wilson rejects analyses
of fundamentality in terms of grounding because it rules out the possibility of
fundamental facts being self-grounded or mutually-grounded.
17.3 Small-g Relation Objections and the
Ground-Naturalness Connection
My interest in the argument against unified ground concerns what it means for
analyses of fundamentality in terms of ground.
Koslicki and Wilson argue that grounding is not unified. Meanwhile, if
grounding is not unified then it should not be posited as a distinct, meta-
physical kind. This provides another reason to favour the deflationary-friendly
interpretation of grounding provided by the Ground-Naturalness Connection.
Deflationary-friendly grounding is not supposed to be a metaphysical kind:
it is a subjective, interest-relative phenomenon. By contrast, deflationary-
unfriendly grounding is posited as a metaphysical kind. Hence, if Koslicki and
Wilson’s arguments show that grounding is not a metaphysical kind, so much
the better for deflationary-friendly interpretations of ground.
Koslicki and Wilson’s arguments also undermine the role that grounding can
play in hyperintensional manoeuvres. It seems that the small-g relations are in-
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dividually insufficient to characterise fundamentality. By Wilson’s own lights,
small-g relations alone do not provide the direction of metaphysical dependence
or relative fundamentality. This is why Wilson is tempted to posit primitive
fundamentality. If Wilson is correct, then we cannot use hyperintensional ma-
noeuvres through fundamentality as characterised by (any interpretation of)
ground. This is because neither deflationary-friendly or unfriendly ground can
be used to analyse fundamentality.
Accepting the disunity of ground therefore affects my thesis in both positive
and negative ways. Positively, it supports deflationary-friendly interpretations
of ground. Furthermore, it blocks the attempt to use hyperintensionalist ma-
noeuvres through fundamentality as characterised by ground. This is because
– if Wilson and Koslicki are correct – there is no effective characterisation of
fundamentality in terms of ground. Negatively, Wilson leaves us with primitive
fundamentality, which can be utilised for hyperintensionalist manoeuvres. To
block such a manoeuvre, I would need to give a deflationary-friendly interpre-
tation of primitive fundamentality. This would be difficult to do without first
knowing more about what primitive fundamentality amounts to – examples of
its use, theoretical roles and so on. I do not attempt this project in this thesis.
Instead of appealing to primitive fundamentality, perhaps Wilson (2014,
2016) could appeal to primitive naturalness. If naturalness can be used to char-
acterise fundamentality, then the direction of metaphysical dependence can be
provided by naturalness instead of ground. This would suit my purposes di-
rectly, as Part 2 provides a deflationary-friendly interpretation of naturalness
that would ‘push through’ to this characterisation of fundamentality. Appeal-
ing to deflationary-friendly naturalness would also allow Wilson to eliminate
another highly metaphysical, primitive notion.
The small-g relation objection is therefore mostly supportive of my defla-
tionary project.
17.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered an alternative challenge to grounding-variants
of hyperintensional manoeuvre. This small-g relation objection argues that
grounding cannot be used to characterise fundamentality. It follows that there
are no grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre. Further, it suggests
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that grounding is not a metaphysical kind, supporting deflationary-friendly
interpretations. However, the objection is not entirely deflationary-friendly,
because Wilson seeks to replace primitive grounding with primitive fundamen-
tality. On the other hand, this deflationary-unfriendliness can be eliminated
by appealing to primitive naturalness instead of primitive fundamentality.
A more complete thesis would consider primitive fundamentality and whether
it admits of a deflationary-friendly interpretation. This would defend defla-
tionary heuristics from primitive fundamentality-variants of hyperintensional
manoeuvre.
However, I propose that I am warranted to wait until the notion of primitive
fundamentality is developed. To provide support for the Ground-Naturalness
Connection, I considered paradigmatic examples of grounding claims, theoret-
ical links between grounding and other primitive notions, and the theoretical
roles to which grounding is applied. Without this kind of information available
about primitive fundamentality, it is hard to see how a deflationary-friendly
interpretation could be defended. However, this is not to say that the correct
interpretation of primitive fundamentality is not deflationary-friendly. Instead,
the point is that the notion of primitive fundamentality needs to be developed
if it is to do serious, metaphysical work. Once this work has begun, I will be in
a position to assess whether the correct interpretation of primitive fundamen-
tality is deflationary-friendly. The ball is in the substantivist’s court.
Chapter 18
Conclusion
I am now in a position to conclude my thesis.
The structure of my argument has been as follows. I have detailed defla-
tionary heuristics designed to argue that certain disputes are deflatable and
should be deflated. These deflationary heuristics are susceptible to what I
have called hyperintensional manoeuvres. These manoeuvres reformulate the
dispute as disputes about hyperintensional facts, such that one property or
position is more fundamental. Having set up this threat, the rest of this thesis
has mounted a defence on behalf of the deflationist against hyperintensional
manoeuvres.
The thought is that we can defang hyperintensional manoeuvres if it is a
subjective, interest-relative matter whether a property or fact is more funda-
mental. If this is the case, then it is only of pragmatic significance whether one
side in a dispute uses more fundamental concepts. By reformulating metaphys-
ical disputes about disputes over fundamentality, hyperintensional manoeuvres
succeed only in reformulating the dispute into a pragmatic dispute. This fails
to preserve the substantive metaphysics that is otherwise deflated.
To demonstrate that fundamentality is subjective and interest-relative, I
noted that there are various analyses available of fundamentality. Some seek
to analyse fundamentality in terms of naturalness, others in terms of ground-
ing. To render each variant of fundamentality subjective and interest-relative
– or deflationary-friendly – I had to show that the correct interpretations of
naturalness and grounding are deflationary-friendly.
I started with naturalness in Part 2. I presented my Deflationary-Friendly
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Naturalness, which interpreted naturalness such that
Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness: Property α is perfectly natural iff α
is a property referred to by a primitive predicate in the language of ideal
science.
I explained what I meant by ‘ideal science’ and showed that Deflationary-
Friendly Naturalness rendered naturalness subjective and interest-relative. To
demonstrate that it is the correct interpretation of naturalness, I appealed to
the following cost-benefit analysis. The thought was that, if my interpretation
of naturalness can enjoy the same theoretical benefits as its rivals, but more
cheaply, then it should be favoured as the correct interpretation. Having shown
that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness avoided costs associated with its rivals,
I turned to demonstrating that it can enjoy the same theoretical benefits. I
showed that many of the theoretical applications of naturalness are compatible
with Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness. Though Deflationary-Friendly Natu-
ralness is incompatible with some of the traditional roles given to naturalness,
I argued that these theoretical applications are unsuccessful on any interpre-
tation. Hence, I demonstrated that Deflationary-Friendly Naturalness enjoys
the same theoretical benefits as its rivals, but with fewer costs. A plausible
cost-benefit analysis therefore favours my deflationary-friendly interpretation
as correct. This defangs naturalness-variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
In Part 3, I turned to metaphysical grounding. I argued for conceptual
links between grounding and naturalness, such that the deflationary-friendly
interpretation of naturalness would push through the conceptual link and show
grounding to be deflationary-friendly. I argued that
Ground-Naturalness Connection: ∆ ⊲ φ iff there is a <-derivation from
the set of natural grounding claims to ‘∆ ⊲ φ.
such that
Natural Grounding Definition: ∆ ◂ φ iff there is a <-derivation of ‘Λ < γ’,
when Λ is a set of perfectly natural translations of the sentences in ∆,
and γ is some perfectly natural translation of φ.
Having explained what the Ground-Naturalness Connection amounts to, I
turned to defending the biconditional. I made arguments for conceptual links
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between grounding, perfectly natural translation and our deductive rules. I
considered a range of paradigmatic examples of grounding, and showed that
they helped vindicate the Ground-Naturalness Connection. Finally, I argued
that the Ground-Naturalness Connection is compatible with those theoretical
applications of grounding that are successful. These points of evidence support
the claim that the Ground-Naturalness Connection is true – that the left-
hand-side of the biconditional obtains iff the right-hand-side obtains. This
showed grounding to be deflationary-friendly. This defangs grounding-variants
of hyperintensional manoeuvre.
Here, then, I conclude. I have defended deflationary heuristics from variants
of hyperintensional manoeuvre. My arguments have conceded much to the
substantivist – such as the meaningfulness of their notions, and the theoretical
benefits that they can bring. I propose that my arguments are stronger for these
concessions. The substantivist cannot complain that my arguments simply
dismiss the substantivist’s project: these arguments can be countenanced not
only by critics of substantivism, but by substantivists as well.
If the substantivist is to argue against the application of deflationary heuris-
tics, they need to offer alternative analyses of fundamentality, and thus alter-
native variants of hyperintensional manoeuvre. For example, the substantivist
might appeal to Sider’s (2011) notion of structure, or Wilson’s (2014) notion
of primitive fundamentality. This gestures in the direction of future work for
protecting the deflationist against hyperintensional manoeuvres. For instance,
I propose that we may be able to offer a deflationary-friendly interpretation of
Sider’s structure, and that this interpretation may be favoured by a plausible
cost-benefit analysis. I leave this work for a future project. Here, I am content
to show that naturalness and grounding-variants of hyperintensional manoeu-
vre cannot be utilised against the deflationist, as the substantivist intends.
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